

Soviet System and the Historian:
E. V. Tarle (1875-1955) as a Case Study



SIDNEY ROBERT SHERTER

WAYNE STATE UNIV.
HISTORY DEPT.

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THE SOVIET SYSTEM AND THE HISTORIAN: E.V. TARLE
(1875-1955) AS A CASE STUDY

by

Sidney Robert Sherter

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Burks of Wayne State University for graciously consenting to read my dissertation and agreeing under the circumstances to serve as Chairman of the defense committee. I wish to thank Professor Goldwin Smith of Wayne State University for allowing me to undertake the initial research on E.V. Tarle in his Ph.D. seminar. I would like to praise the staff of the Wayne State University Library, especially the personnel in the inter-library loan section, for their aid in locating source materials from all over the country.

My father-in-law Samuel Tattelbaum of Newton, Massachusetts, Elizabeth Poniewerska of Chicago, Illinois, Professor Frank Gambacortta and William Kluback of Southampton College deserve mention for their assistance in translating some difficult passages in Russian, Polish, Italian, and German. I also wish to commend my typist, Miss Barbara Dubikowicz, for a superlative job.

Above all, I owe a special debt of gratitude to my wife Selma. Without her patient understanding and unselfish help, this dissertation would never have been completed.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

THE SOVIET SYSTEM AND THE HISTORIAN

Ever since the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, Soviet leaders have viewed the field of history as the most political of the social sciences. Soviet historiography, as a result, has been conditioned by political events; and Marxist-Leninist ideology, also affected by politics, has been used as its philosophical justification.

As early as 1899, Lenin recognized that Karl Marx had merely laid the foundation for scientific socialism and that socialists in the future must reinterpret this doctrine in light of changing circumstances.¹ Lenin's doctrine has been one of the major characteristics of Soviet ideology. Whether in the guise of Marxism, Leninism, or Stalinism, Soviet ideology has been highly flexible and inextricably linked

¹George Friedman, "Revolt Against Formalism in the Soviet Union." Science and Society, II (Summer, 1938), p. 300; Lenin's views can be found in later editorials: Pod Znamenem Marksizma, No. 4-5 (1943), p. 13; and in Bolshhevik, No. 1 (January, 1945), p. 2.

with changes that have occurred on the foreign and domestic scene.²

The flexibility of Soviet ideology has created an almost insurmountable obstacle for the historian. The rationale behind historical scholarship has been and still is utility, with the historian being used as a tool in support of ideological or political platforms proposed by the Party. As an employee of the state, the historian has found it practically impossible to work independently of party policy or to circumvent it; and just precisely what party policy might be at any given moment has presented even more complex problems. Often unaware, and even when aware, the historian has been unable to comprehend the reasons for sudden tactical

²Several articles in leading Western Journals express this point of view. The following is by no means a complete list: J-S, "Changements en U.S.S.R.," Le Monde Slave, IV (October, 1936), pp. 161-180; Hans Jonas, "Die Entwicklung der Geschichtsforschung in der Soviet-Union Seit Ausgang des Weltkrieges," Zeitschrift für Osteuropäische Geschichte, V (1931), pp. 66-83, 386-396; George Kagan, "La Crise de la Science Historique Russe," Revue Historique, LXV (April 1940), pp. 1-35; Anatole G. Mazour, "Party Line History," American Scholar, XXII (Summer, 1953), pp. 293-303; Anatole G. Mazour, and Herman E. Bateman, "Recent Conflicts in Soviet Historiography," Journal of Modern History, XXIV (March, 1952), pp. 56-68; Philip E. Mosely, "Freedom of Artistic Expression and Scientific Inquiry in Russia," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, CC (November, 1938), pp. 254-274; R. Salomon, "Zur Lage der Geschichtswissenschaft in Russland," Zeitschrift für Osteuropäische Geschichte, VI (1932), pp. 385-402; Günther Stökl, "Historiker auf Generallinie: Geschichtswissenschaft und Partei in vier Jahrzehnten Sowjetunion," Wort und Wahrheit, XII (1957), pp. 511-26; Stuart R. Tompkins, "Trends in Communist Historical Thought," The Slavonic

shifts in domestic and foreign policy which has placed him at the mercy of the Party.³ Consequently, the non-party and even the party historian who has been writing acceptable history may suddenly find himself accused of producing "unscientific bourgeois" history. In most instances, the offender has been given a chance to confess his errors and agree to rewrite his work in accordance with current party historical directives. Severe penalties have been imposed on the historian who has refused to admit his "shortcomings." The subsequent punishment has been exile, permanent banishment from the profession accompanied by severe social and economic hardships, or, in extreme cases, execution, especially during the Stalinist period.⁴

and East European Review, XIII (January, 1935), pp. 294-319; Georg von Rauch, "Grundlinien der Sowjetischen Geschichtsforschung im Zeichen des Stalinismus," Europa Archiv, V (October, 1950), pp. 3383-88; Bertram D. Wolfe, "Operation Rewrite; The Agony of Soviet Historians," Foreign Affairs, XXI (October, 1952), pp. 39-57. This theme can also be inferred from editorials in Pravda, Izvestia, and Soviet historical journals.

³Herbert E. Bowman, "Literary and Historical Scholarship," The Transformation of Russian Society: Aspects of Social Change, ed. Cyril E. Black (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960), p. 381; Fritz Epstein, "Die Marxistische Geschichtswissenschaft in der Sowjetunion Seit 1927," Jahrbucher fur Kultur und Geschichte der Slaven, VI (1930), pp. 79-80.

⁴See footnote two. Also Vladimir Chernavin, "The Treatment of Scholars in the Soviet Union," Slavonic and East European Review, XI (April, 1933), pp. 710-14. The most comprehensive study of this problem in English is Konstantin F. Shtepa, Russian Historians and the Soviet State (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1962). In Russian see G. Zaidel and M. Tsvibak, Klassoviy Vrag na Istoricheskom Fronte: Tarle i Platonov i ikh

Some historians have managed to survive the reoccurring purges by dealing with obscure historical topics of a non-political nature, such as pre-Kievan and early Byzantine history. Probably others have made it a practice to review carefully party publications which might tend to suggest forthcoming changes in the writing of history. The historian in this case has been able to revise his work in time, avoiding the inevitable chastisement or public confession of guilt.⁵

Since 1917, four distinct periods have emerged in the development of historical writing in the Soviet Union. Each period has been marked by acute domestic and foreign problems which had a direct bearing on the relationship of the historian

Shkoly (Moscow-Leningrad, 1931); "Burzhuaznye Istoriki Zapada v SSSR (Tarlé, Petrushevski, Kareev, Buzeskul i Dr.)", Istorik Marksist, XXI (1931), pp. 44-86; S. Mokhov, "Intervent Tarlé pod Zashchitoy Vostokova," Borba Klassov, II (1931), pp. 120-21; M.N. Pokrovsky, "O Zadachakh Marksistkoy Istoricheskoy Nauki v Rekonstruktivnye Period," Istorik Marksist, XXI (1931), pp. 3-7.

⁵It is evident that party officials have been acutely aware of this problem and in several editorials have taken the historian to task for avoiding contemporary history. For example: "Zadacha i Zhurnala Voprosy Istorii," Voprosy Istorii, I (1945), pp. 3-5; Current Digest of the Soviet Press (hereafter CDSP) Vol. I, No. 10 (April 5, 1949), pp. 54-55. "Why Are There No General History Textbooks," A. Davydov and M. Bizer, Literaturnaya Gazeta, (February 23, 1949), p. 2; CDSP Vol. I, No. 26 (July 26, 1949), pp. 16-23. "On the Tasks of Soviet Historians in the Struggles with Manifestations of Bourgeois Ideology," Voprosy Istorii, No. 2 (1949), pp. 3-13; CDSP Vol. I, No. 35 (September 27, 1949), pp. 3-9. (Editorial) "Tasks of Soviet Historians in the Field of Modern and Recent History," Voprosy Istorii, No. 3 (March, 1949), pp. 3-13; CDSP Vol. I, No. 50 (January 10, 1950), pp. 6-8. "Raise the Standard of Bolshevist Criticism and Self Criticism in Soviet

to the government. Briefly, the decade between 1917-1928 was characterized by the relatively peaceful coexistence of the old "Bourgeois" historian with the new "Marxist" historian; 1928-1934 was marked by an all out attack and purge of the "Bourgeois" school of history; 1934-1945 witnessed the subjugation of ideology and the historian to the political aims of the regime; and from 1945 to the present, the writing of history has been conditioned by the Cold War with the historian serving as a propagandist for the regime despite the "slight thaw" of the Khrushchev period.⁶

Before the Bolshevik Revolution, Russia had already developed a tradition of historical scholarship which was an integral part of Western European historiography.⁷ The influence and work of Vasily Klyuchevsky, who had emphasized the importance of social and economic factors in the course of Russian history, was at its zenith. Most of the foremost historians

Historical Science," Voprosy Istorii, No. 7 (1949), pp. 3-8; CDSP Vol. IV, No. 34 (October 4, 1952), pp. 6-8; "Concerning the Magazine Voprosy Istorii," by L. Maximov. Bolshevik, No. 13 (July, 1952), pp. 60-70.

⁶Shteppa, Russian Historians and the Soviet State, Introduction, pages not numbered.

⁷Cyril E. Black, "History and Politics in the Soviet Union," Rewriting Russian History, ed. Cyril E. Black (New York; Random House, 1962), p. 7; Bowman, "Literary and Historical Scholarship," The Transformation of Russian Society, p. 376; Butenko, V. translated from Annaly 1922, pp. 128-167 by René Martel, "La Science de l'histoire moderne en Russie," Revue Historique, No. 3 (1929), pp. 109-151; The most comprehensive treatment is N.L. Rubinshtein, Russkaya Istorio-grafiya (Moscow, 1941).

of the next generation were his students, although they differed from him in interpretation. For example, the liberal historian Paul Milyukov asserted that the forces in history were too complex to be presented as an organic unit; thus his major works were monographic in nature.⁸ Other students of Klyuchevsky who disagreed with him were Alexander Presnyakov who emphasized the political role of the state, and Paul Vinogradov, the distinguished scholar in the area of Western feudalism and legal history.⁹ It was during this period that a school of Marxist historians emerged. Led by Michael Pokrovsky and Nikolai Razhkov, both of whom studied under Klyuchevsky and Milyukov, the Marxists attempted to challenge the accepted principles of Russian historical scholarship, but met with little success.¹⁰

Most historians devoted their time to the publishing and editing of source materials, the writing of short monographic studies, or broader historical syntheses. As long as historians were not involved in political intrigues, they were permitted to pursue independent studies free from

⁸ Sherman B. Barnes and Alfred A. Skerpan, "Modern Russian Historiography," Historiography under the Impact of Rationalism and Revolution (Kent: Kent State University Press, 1952), pp. 39-40.

⁹ Black, "History and Politics in the Soviet Union," Rewriting Russian History, p. 4; Mazour, Modern Russian Historiography, p. 186.

¹⁰ Black, Ibid., pp. 4-5; Mazour, Ibid., pp. 185-186.

government control.¹¹ Two notable exceptions were Paul Milyukov and Michael Pokrovsky; both were excluded from the teaching profession because of their political activities. One final observation can be made about this period. The Czarist government did not use the historian as a propaganda weapon in support of its political policies.¹²

The success of the Bolsheviks in 1917 did not produce any immediate changes in the writing of history and in the relationship of the historian to the new regime. The Soviet government was confronted with problems much more important and serious than subjugating the historian to its immediate political needs. Most of the old historians also wrote within an economic determinist frame of reference and were social minded.¹³ However, the historian did not remain unscathed. The period of War Communism, accompanied by the allied intervention and civil war, created serious hardships for him. Libraries and archival repositories were burned and looted; it was practically impossible for the historian to undertake research in his field of study. On a few occasions the historian was

¹¹Black, Ibid., p. 5.

¹²Ibid.

¹³Sherman B. Barnes and Alfred A. Skerpan, "Modern Russian Historiography," Historiography under the Impact of Rationalism and Revolution, p. 41.

persecuted for political reasons. In spite of the social, economic, and political upheaval which accompanied the period of War Communism, the historian was relatively free to pursue his former work and to continue teaching in the traditional manner as long as he did not attack the regime.¹⁴ A few well known historians such as Paul Milyukov, Otto Struve, George Vernadsky, and M.I. Rostovtzeff, who were not in sympathy with the new government, were permitted to leave the Soviet Union. They spent the remainder of their careers in exile challenging and criticizing Soviet interpretations of history.¹⁵

The Bolshevik Revolution also brought to the forefront several Marxist historians. The most prominent of these was Michael Pokrovsky who dominated the field of Soviet historiography for more than a decade and a half.¹⁶ Prior to the Revolution, Pokrovsky joined the Bolsheviks, became a close associate of Lenin, and helped to organize the revolt of the Moscow workers in 1905. Hunted by the secret police because

¹⁴A. Presniakov, "Historical Research in Russia During the Revolutionary Crisis," American Historical Review, XXVIII (January, 1923), pp. 248-49; Kagan, "La Crise de la Science Historique Russe," p. 2.

¹⁵Mazour, Modern Russian Historiography, pp. 234-242; Tompkins, "Trends in Communist Historical Thought," p. 294.

¹⁶Thomas R. Hall, "Mikhail Nikolayevich Pokrovsky (1868-1932)," Some Historians of Modern Europe, ed. Bernadotte E. Schmitt (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1942), p. 349; Mazour and Bateman, "Recent Conflicts in Soviet Historiography," p. 57; Von Rauch "Grundlinien der Sowjetischen Geschichtsforschung im Zeichen des Stalinismus," p. 3383.

of his political activities, Pokrovsky fled Russia. He spent most of his time in France where he was involved in both political polemics and historical research.¹⁷ After the Revolution, Pokrovsky was given the task of training a new generation of historians in order "to overthrow the philosophy on which an older generation of historians had been nurtured, replacing it with one more suitable to a young, dynamic, and revolutionary people."¹⁸

As head of the Moscow Soviet, a ranking member of the Communist Party, assistant commissioner of Education, and chief of the historical section, Pokrovsky was in a commanding position to implement the government's policy of producing a new generation of Marxist historians. Under his direction, the Institute of History was merged with the Academy of Science of the USSR, a society of Marxist historians was organized in the chief towns of the Soviet Union, and the Institute of Red Professors was initiated. Pokrovsky became the editor of the new historical journal Krasnyi Arkhiv which was dedicated to the publication of documentary materials.¹⁹ Most significant,

¹⁷Hall, Ibid., p. 351; Kagan, "La Crise de la Science Historique Russe," p. 5.

¹⁸Hall, Ibid., p. 352.

¹⁹Black, "History and Politics in the Soviet Union," Rewriting Russian History, pp. 6-7; Hall, Ibid., p. 351; Mazour, Modern Russian Historiography, pp. 188-189.

he established the Society of Marxist Historians and was the chief editor of its publication, Istorik Marksist. The goals of the journal were: the maintenance of a united front of all Marxists engaged in historical research, the study of Marxian methodology, the combating of all anti-Marxist bourgeois distortions in historical writing, the establishment of a critical Marxian literature, assistance to its members in matters of research, and the popularization of the Marxian historical view. The sheer physical accomplishments and organizing capacities of Pokrovsky provided the new Soviet government with a solid foothold in the field of history.²⁰

The historical views of Pokrovsky, at least during this period, were used by the government in support of its political goals. Official sanction was given to Pokrovsky's Brief History of Russia in a congratulatory note written by Lenin who advocated its adoption as a text.

I congratulate you very heartily on your success. I like your new book . . . immensely. The construction and the narrative are original. It reads with tremendous interest. It should in my opinion be translated into the European languages. I will permit myself one slight remark. To make it a textbook (and this it must become), it must be supplemented with a chronological index. This is roughly what I am suggesting: first column, chronology; second column, bourgeois view (briefly); third column,

²⁰M.N. Pokrovsky, "Zadachi Obshchestvo Istorikov Marksistov," Istorik Marksist, I (1926), pp. 3-10. A German and English translation of the tasks of Marxists historians appears respectively in Fritz Epstein, "Istorik Marxist," Jahrbucher fur Kultur und Geschichte der Slaven, IV (1928), p. 277; Mazour, Modern Russian Historiography, p. 189.

your view, Marxian, indicating the pages in your book.

The students must know your book and the index so that there should be no skimming, so that they should retain the facts, and so that they should compare the old science and the new. What do you say to such an addition?²¹

In light of later developments, especially after 1934, Lenin's statement was to cause serious repercussions for the historian who wrote within the Marxian framework espoused by Pokrovsky.

Initially, Pokrovsky's interpretation of history supplied the Bolsheviks with a necessary and useful philosophy which supported their objectives for more than a decade. According to Pokrovsky, material needs were the basis of human existence; as for history it was a revolutionary weapon which must be used to serve the needs of the state.²² In other words, history was subordinated to politics, or as Pokrovsky put it, "History is politics projected into the past."²³ The Russian Revolution was interpreted by Pokrovsky as the forerunner of an international workers revolution which would serve as an example for the inevitable uprising of all the working classes and subjugated colonial peoples of other countries. Historical phenomena such as nationalism

²¹Mazour and Bateman, "Recent Conflicts in Soviet Historiography," pp. 57-58.

²²Hall, "Mikhael Nikolayevich Pokrovsky (1868-1932)," p. 353; Mazour and Bateman, Ibid., p. 58; Mazour, Modern Russian Historiography, p. 186.

²³Mazour and Bateman, Ibid.; Sergius Yakobson, "Postwar Historical Research in the Soviet Union," Annals of the American Academy of Political Science, CCLXII (May, 1949), p. 123.

and patriotism or cultural and religious factors were completely rejected by Pokrovsky. The Russian past was not to be glorified; Tzarist Russia was depicted as a "prison of oppressed peoples." Nationalism and patriotism, in particular, were interpreted by Pokrovsky as merely manifestations of traditional bourgeois historiography.²⁴

In general, historians of the Pokrovsky school explained historical events by means of socio-economic systems. They minimized the role played by individuals or any form of ideology which inspired leadership. The history of individual nations became unimportant since all events were explained simply as part of the overall class struggle. Thus the historian reduced the facts of history to general trends. Above all, it was the duty of every historian of the Pokrovsky school to wage a constant war against the influence of bourgeois history and to be continually on guard to avoid being deceived by bourgeois writers of the past.²⁵

The destruction caused by the civil war and the policy of War Communism forcibly introduced by the Bolsheviks led

²⁴Paul H. Aron, "M.N. Pokrovsky and the Impact of the First Five Year Plan on Soviet Historiography," Essays in Russian and Soviet History, ed. John Shelton Curtiss (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963), pp. 295-297; Hall, "Mikhail Nikolayevich Pokrovsky (1868-1932)," p. 360.

²⁵Hall, Ibid., pp. 349; Rafina Papouškava L'histoire en U.R.S.S., " Le Monde Slave, IV (October, 1936), p. 400.

to a wave of strikes and peasant uprisings which finally culminated in a rebellion at the Kronstadt Naval Base in 1921. These events prompted Lenin and his colleagues to modify their domestic programs for purely tactical reasons. In effect, the period of War Communism was a failure; it was replaced by the so-called New Economic Policy which temporarily brought about a superficial normalization of conditions.²⁶

Within the ranks of the party, however, the New Economic Policy touched off a wave of disillusionment. The difficulty lay in the reconciliation of this policy with the original revolutionary fervor and idealism of 1917. The doctrine of "one step backward and two steps forward" which, according to Lenin, meant that communism had merely retreated to make a new start, did not allay the fears of several prominent Bolsheviks. A few party members committed suicide, giving further evidence to the dissatisfaction of this policy. The suicides were accompanied by the appearance of elements in society which were hostile to the Bolshevik regime; some even predicted a return to Czarist times.²⁷

In spite of the turmoil caused by the introduction of the New Economic Policy, Lenin held his ground; he continued to assert that this was the correct path to the new socialist

²⁶Kagan, "La Crise de la Science Historique Russe," p. 3; Mazour and Bateman, "Recent Conflicts in Soviet Historiography," p. 58.

²⁷Tompkins, "Trends in Communist Historical Thought," p. 294.

state.²⁸ Lenin even made further concessions, especially with regard to the intelligentsia. In his State and Revolution Lenin had asserted that the intellectuals would voluntarily join the ranks of the workers when revolution broke out in Russia.²⁹ Since this had not happened, Lenin tried to gain the support of the educated, non-party members by reversing his previous ideological stand. As for the historian, he was granted more freedom to pursue independent research and, in some instances, he was appointed to a position formerly reserved only for party members.³⁰

Lenin never realized his new approach to socialism. His premature death in 1924 left the party leaderless and caused a power struggle between Trotsky and Stalin, the leaders of the opposition, who had already been quarreling about the direction of the revolution. Stalin contended that before world revolution could be realized, the resources of the Soviet Union ought to be concentrated in building socialism within its own borders. Trotsky argued that the Soviet Union must continue to intensify its efforts to bring about a world revolution.

²⁸V.I. Lenin, "The New Economic Policy: Report Delivered at the Seventh Moscow Gubernia Party Conference, October 29, 1921," Vol. IX: V.I. Lenin: Selected Works, ed. J. Fineberg (12 Vols.; New York: International Publishers, 1937), pp. 276-294.

²⁹V.I. Lenin, "State and Revolution," Vol. VII: V.I. Lenin: Selected Works, ed. J. Fineberg (12 Vols.; New York: International Publishers, 1943) pp. 92-93.

³⁰Tompkins, "Trends in Communist Historical Thought," p. 295; Izvestia, May 12, 1927, p. 4.

In a series of shrewd tactical maneuvers, Stalin defeated the Trotsky wing of the party and other opposing factions, finally emerging as leader of the party in 1928.³¹

The power struggle within the ranks of the party afforded the pre-1917 historian an opportunity to continue to write history in the traditional frame of reference. In fact, during the period of the New Economic Policy, two schools of historical thought coexisted, both cooperating and tolerating each other to a certain degree. Some non-Marxist historians were allowed to join the Society of Marxist Historians, a policy which was in keeping with Lenin's pronouncement concerning intellectuals. Marxist, as well as Non-Marxist, historians participated in historical congresses held in Berlin and Oslo. A few non-Marxist historians were granted permission to leave the Soviet Union, enabling them to continue their research in the archives of foreign states.³²

Further evidence of the relatively peaceful coexistence

³¹ Many articles touch on the party struggle. However, the most comprehensive treatment of this topic is Leonard Schapiro, The Communist Party of the Soviet Union (New York: Random House, 1960), pp. 267-308; also see T. Szamuely, "The Elimination of Opposition Between the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Congresses of the CPSU," Soviet Studies, XVII (January, 1966), pp. 318-338; Pravda, February 12, 1928, p. 2; Pravda, September 13, 1928, p. 4.

³² Black, "History and Politics in the Soviet Union," Rewriting Russian History, pp. 5-7; Mazour and Bateman, "Recent Conflicts in Soviet Historiography," p. 58; Tompkins, "Trends in Communist Historical Thought," pp. 297-298.

between the official (Pokrovsky) school and the old historical school can be seen in the number of new historical periodicals initiated while the New Economic Policy was in effect. In spite of the lack of funds, journals such as The Annals, The Russian Past, Centuries, Russia and the West, Labors and Days, and The Russian Historical Journal published articles dealing with a variety of subjects of a non-Marxian nature. The history of the Bolshevik Revolution and its antecedents was reversed exclusively for the Marxist historian.³³

Outwardly, it appeared that continued cooperation between the old and new historians was possible. However, a series of interrelated internal and external political events dispelled this illusion. The exile of Trotsky not only completed the victory of Stalin over the opposition, but it also weakened the party. At about the same time, the almost certain global wide depression fanned the hopes of world revolution among party theoreticians. But the most significant departure in party policy, which obliterated all objective history, was

³³The most complete summaries of historical works written by Marxist and non-Marxist historians during this period can be found in the following articles: Fritz Epstein, "Die Marxistische Geschichtswissenschaft in der Sovetunion Seit 1927," pp. 78-203; Antoine Florovsky, "La Litterature Historique Sovietique-russe. Compte-rendu 1921-1931," Bulletin d'Information des Sciences Historique en Europe Orientale, VI (1934-1935), pp. 120-186, pp. 5-111; P. Vostokov, "Les Sciences Historiques en Russie," Le Monde Slave, VII (September, 1930), pp. 438-68; (October, 1930), pp. 79-98; (November, 1930), pp. 294-311; (December, 1930), pp. 437-460; VIII (February, 1931), pp. 265-294.

the introduction of the First Five Year Plan by Stalin. It officially ended the era of compromise marked by the period of the New Economic Policy, and ushered in a policy of oppression. From this point on, compromise of any kind was not to be tolerated unless the conditions warranted it. A concerted effort was undertaken by the party to eliminate the opposition, including the bourgeois historians, so as to ensure the success of the First Five Year Plan. All resources were placed at the disposal of the state in support of the program of socialist reconstruction. Historians who had enjoyed some degree of freedom in the past were publicly castigated as enemies of the state. Some were accused of being saboteurs and others were labeled agents of foreign powers. Pokrovsky reached the zenith of his career as he became undisputed leader of all historians. His specific task was to organize a monolithic historical front which would act as one voice in support of Stalin's policies.³⁴

For Pokrovsky, it was fortunate that he died in 1932. Shortly thereafter, his interpretation of history became

³⁴Ann K. Erickson, "E.V. Tarle: The Career of a Historian under the Soviet Regime," The American Slavic and East European Review, XIX (April, 1960), p. 204; Kagan, "La Crise de la Science Historique Russe," p. 4; Mazour and Bateman, "Recent Conflicts in Soviet Historiography," p. 58; Mosely, "Freedom of Artistic Expression and Scientific Inquiry in Russia," p. 255; M.N. Pokrovsky, "Institut Istorii i Zadachi Istorikov Marksistov," Istorik Marksist, XIV (1929), pp. 3-12; Tompkins, "Trends in Communist Historical Thought," pp. 298-299.

politically inconvenient for the regime and he, along with several of his close associates, was posthumously purged from the ranks of historians. He was accused of being anti-national and anti-patriotic, of neglecting specific events, dates, facts, chronology, and his entire conception of history was viewed as an empty generalized sociological scheme.³⁵ In lieu of Pokrovsky's anti-nationalistic approach to history, Stalin and his supporters initiated a rather narrow nationalistic interpretation. They were fully aware that a fresh climate of opinion had to be created to justify their domestic policies and a new direction had to be taken to strengthen the position of the Soviet Union in relation to the changes taking place on the international scene in the early thirties.

It became quite apparent to Stalin and his close advisors that recent events on the foreign scene posed a direct threat to the existence of the Soviet Union. The triumph of Adolf Hitler, his purge of the German Communist Party, and his professed hatred of Bolshevism contributed heavily to change the attitude of Stalin and his clique. The rise of Fascist movements in Western Europe, the menace of an expansionist Japan, the failure of the working class to revolt during the

³⁵ Mazour and Bateman, Ibid., p. 59; Kark Radek, "Nedostatki istoricheskogo front i oshibki shkoly Pokrovskogo," Bolshevik, No. 5 (1936), pp. 53-66; B.H. Sumner, "Soviet History," Slavonic and East European Review, XVI (April, 1938), p. 603.

world wide depression, and the economic recovery of the so-called capitalist states also played a major role in the fundamental shift in Soviet thinking.³⁶

On the domestic scene, the initial implementation of the Five Year Plan, accompanied by forced collectivization, and the massive purge of the Kulak class, created severe economic and social problems. Government officials met with stubborn resistance throughout the Soviet Union when they tried to execute Stalin's policies. In several regions of the Soviet Union separatist movements broke out among minority nationalities, and, from the vantage point of the regime, it appeared that civil war was imminent.³⁷ Confronted with these enormous domestic and foreign problems, a major effort was undertaken by the Soviet Government to gain the support of the masses and to promote the cooperation of the Western democracies.

Internally, as a means of distracting the masses' minds from the hardships caused by the Five Year Plan, to consolidate his power, and to eliminate the remaining opposition to his domestic policies, Stalin proclaimed that "class enemies" were entirely responsible. Trotskyite agents (among them

³⁶G.B. Carson, "Changing Perspectives in Soviet Historiography," South Atlantic Quarterly, XLVII (April, 1948), pp. 188-189; Mazour, "Party Line History," pp. 295-296; Klaus Mehnert, Stalin versus Marx (London: George Allen and Unwin Limited, 1952), pp. 24-25.

³⁷Mazour and Bateman, "Recent Conflicts in Soviet Historiography," p. 59; Mehnert, Ibid., p. 25.

several prominent historians) supported by Fascist states were blamed for sabotaging the government's efforts. Furthermore, they were accused of plotting to overthrow the Soviet regime and planning to replace it with a fascist government. A wave of purges, culminating in the massive show trials of the middle and late thirties, followed Stalin's announcement.³⁸

While the "class enemies" were being rooted out, the Soviet Government launched a program to stimulate national sentiment among the masses and, at the same time, reversed its anti-Western attitude to gain the cooperation of democratic states by advocating a system of collective security against the fascist threat. The fundamental aim of Soviet policy was to insure the safety of its own borders.³⁹

The signal for change began in 1934 when an editorial appeared in Pravda praising the previously much maligned League of Nations.⁴⁰ It was no longer considered a tool of the bourgeois-capitalist world, but rather an organ which stood for world peace. On September 18, 1934, the Soviet

³⁸V. Altman, "Chto chitat o Mirovoy Voiny," Borba Klassov, No. 5 (1931), pp. 120-21; Kagan, "La Crise de la Science Historique Russe," p. 5; Mokhov, "Intervent Tarle Podzashchitoy Vostokova," pp. 120-21; G. Zaidel and M. Tsvibak, Klassoviy Vrag na Istoricheskom Fronte, entire book.

³⁹F. Barghoorn, "Stalinism and the Russian Cultural Heritage," The Review of Politics, XIV (April, 1952), pp. 178-182.

⁴⁰Mazour and Bateman, "Recent Conflicts in Soviet Historiography," p. 59.

Union entered the League of Nations.⁴¹ Soon after, a flood of party directives appeared in newspapers and journals with a decidedly pro-Western tone indicative of the new departure in Soviet policy. The pro-Western attitude continued until collective security failed with the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia.⁴²

During this period, historians were given a key role in stimulating Soviet patriotism and in creating a pro-Western climate of opinion. As a result, two clearly marked tendencies appeared in Soviet historiography: an entirely new picture of pre-1917 Russia and a revision of previous interpretations of Western European history. In fulfilling the former, the historian had to extol the heroic deeds of the masses by relating the significant role they played in defeating Russia's enemies. For example, the War of 1812 was now considered as a victory for the Russian people because of their efforts in the defeat of Napoleon. The "Time of Troubles" was viewed as a nationalistic movement on the part of the masses in driving foreign invaders from Russian soil. Minin and Pozharsky, two key figures of this period, were elevated to the ranks of folk heroes. Previously despised Tsars were rehabilitated by the

⁴¹Schapiro, The Communist Party of the Soviet Union, p. 482.

⁴²J. Stalin, V. Molotov, and A. Zhdanov, "Na Fronte Istoricheskoy Nauki," Bolshevik, No. 3 (1936), pp. 60-66.

historian in line with the party's directives. Peter the Great was portrayed as a military genius whose reforms were considered progressive, and some historians even claimed that he was a forerunner of Bolshevism. Alexander Nevskii proved the invincibility of Russians over Germans, and Ivan IV (not Ivan the Terrible) was a forward looking ruler and statesman. Military personalities, such as Suvorov, Kutuzov, and Bagration, were depicted as the initiators of a heroic military tradition. Even Tsarist wars of aggression were interpreted as defensive in nature.⁴³

Prior to this period, Soviet historians had expressed a completely hostile attitude toward the historical development of Western Civilization. To counteract this view, historians began to point out liberal trends in Western European history which helped to shape the culture and history of Russia. Democratic and socialist movements in Western Europe, according to historians now, had a positive impact upon the social development and revolutionary tradition in Russia. In general, this

⁴³ See the following articles in Cyril E. Black, ed. Rewriting Russian History, Leo Yaresh, "Ivan the Terrible and the Oprichnina," pp. 216-232; C.E. Black, "The Reforms of Peter the Great," pp. 233-259; Leo Yaresh, "The Campaign of 1812," pp. 261-289; Ernest Bock, "The Rewriting of Soviet History," History Today, IV (1954), p. 489; Mazour and Bateman, "Recent Conflicts in Soviet Historiography," p. 59; A. Powell, "The Nationalist Trend in Soviet Historiography," Soviet Studies, II (April, 1951), pp. 372-377; B.H. Sumner, "Soviet History," Slavonic and East European Review, XVII (July, 1938), pp. 157-160; Georg von Rauch, "Grundlinien der Sowjetischen Geschichtsforschung im Zeichen des Stalinismus," pp. 3386-3388, 3428-32.

interpretation was similar in many respects to the thought of the Western oriented intelligentsia of the nineteenth century. As events proved, however, after World War II the historian was to suffer the consequence for his pro-Western attitude and his explanation of Russia's indebtedness to the West.⁴⁴

By 1939 the international scene in Europe had changed considerably. Austria had become part of Germany, the Spanish Civil War had produced a Fascist regime, and the fate of Czechoslovakia had been determined at the Munich Conference. Infuriated by the events at Munich, Stalin interpreted the settlement as a capitalist-imperialist plot concocted by Great Britain and France for the purpose of giving Hitler the opportunity to attack the Soviet Union. Fearing the danger of a German attack, Stalin courted the Nazi Government and was able to conclude a Non-Aggression Pact on August 23, 1939.⁴⁵ When the Germans attacked Poland, Stalin, in accordance with the secret provisions of the Non-Aggression Pact, delivered the final blow by ordering the Red Army to march on Poland. Shortly after, Soviet forces invaded Finland. For this act the Soviet Union was expelled from the now moribund League

⁴⁴Carson, "Changing Perspectives in Soviet Historiography," p. 191; Mazour and Bateman, Ibid.

⁴⁵"O Ratifikatsii Sovetsko-germanskogo dogovora o nenapadenii-soobshchenie tov. Molotova na zasedanii verkhov-nogo Soveta Soyuz SSR 31 Avgusta 1939 Goda," Istoricheskii Zhurnal, No. 9 (September, 1939), pp. 1-8.

of Nations.⁴⁶

The events of 1939, especially the conclusion of the Non-aggression Pact with Germany, set the stage for another drastic revision of history. Until the Germans attacked the Soviet Union in 1941, historians tried desperately to justify the regime's policies. Fascist states were no longer considered enemies, since it was argued that France and Great Britain had plotted to destroy the Soviet Union. Historians pointed out that Germany and Russia had a long tradition of friendly relations. Particular emphasis was placed on the nineteenth century in order to justify this point of view.⁴⁷

The German invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941 ended this trend in historiography and signalled an immediate about face in the writing of history. During the early stages of the war, when German armies scored smashing victories, historical output was aimed particularly at bolstering the sagging morale of the population and the army. For the most part, therefore, historians dealt with patriotic themes and produced

⁴⁶Schapiro, The Communist Party of the Soviet Union, p. 489.

⁴⁷A. Tonapetyan, "Angliiskaya interventsia v Zakavkaze," and V. Virginskii, "Panamskii Kanal," Istoricheskii Zhurnal, No. 2 (1940), pp. 47-53, 87-96; V. Golant, "Angliiskii imperializm v Yuzhnoy Afrike," and Ya. Goldberg, "Frantsuzskaya imperialisticheskoy voyny," Istoricheskii Zhurnal, No. 6 (1940), pp. 53-64, 65-74.

volumes of anti-German polemics.⁴⁸ Another important feature of this period was the almost complete absence of ideological conformity. In fact, the historian was given great latitude in interpreting historical events. Foremost in the minds of Stalin and his advisors was the survival of the Soviet regime which necessitated the total support of all Russians and, in particular, the historian.

As for the United States and Great Britain, the allies of the Soviet Union, they were no longer denounced as hostile, capitalist states. Instead, they were placed almost on an equal level with the Soviet Union and constantly referred to as democratic, peace-loving, parliamentary states whose masses enjoyed a considerable amount of political freedom. The rationale behind this shift in Soviet attitude toward the West was twofold. The United States and Great Britain were involved in a struggle against the common enemy, Germany, and the Soviet Union desperately needed all the aid it could get

⁴⁸Needly, "Kannibalskaya rasistskaya teoria v fashistskoy istoriografii," and A. Predtechenskii, "Otechestvennaya Voyna 1812," Istoricheskii Zhurnal, No. 8 (1941), pp. 61-74, 81-101; S. Gopner, "Edinye front narodov protiv gitlerovskoy Germanii," and V. Picheta, "Vekovaya borba polskogo naroda s nemetskimi zakhvatchikami," Istoricheskii Zhurnal, No. 9 (1941), pp. 1-13, 64-73; B.D. Grekov, and E.V. Tarle, "Soviet Historical Research," Science and Society, VII (Winter, 1943), pp. 229-232.

from its allies.⁴⁹

Towards the end of World War II, it became increasingly apparent that cooperation between the Soviet Union and the West was merely an expedient measure.⁵⁰ With the final capitulation of Nazi Germany, the spirit of the so-called "Grand Alliance" officially came to an end. On the international scene, the Soviet Union emerged as a world power in control of Central Europe and most of the Balkans. As war time agreements between the Soviet Union and its Western allies broke down, the United States began to take an active role in preventing further Soviet expansion. On the domestic scene, the defeat of Germany marked the end of war time relaxation as the regime tightened its controls on all aspects of life. In light of the stand taken by the United States in blocking Soviet attempts at domination of Western Europe, a new cultural offensive was initiated to eliminate all vestiges of Western European influences. A major role was assigned to the historian in creating this new milieu. As a result, Soviet historiography since 1945 has been conditioned by the Cold War atmosphere and distinguished by the following tendencies: its political

⁴⁹ See the following editorials in Bolshevik: No. 17 (September, 1941), pp. 5-14; No. 10-11 (June, 1942), pp. 63-67; No. 9 (May, 1942), p. 37; No. 24 (December, 1942), p. 6.

⁵⁰ John L. Snell, Illusion and Necessity: The Diplomacy of Global War 1939-1945 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1963), entire book.

propagandist nature, its ultra-nationalistic overtones symbolically represented in the historical role of the Great Russians during the "Great Fatherland War," its complete negation of Western culture, and, until 1956, the intensification of the Stalin "cult of the personality."⁵¹

The first sign of impending change was the suspension of the publication of Istoricheskii Zhurnal which was replaced by a new journal entitled Voprosy Istorii. Its first editorial gave the reason for the demise of Istoricheskii Zhurnal: it failed to carry out the tasks assigned to it by the party. The editorial also emphasized the objectives of Voprosy Istorii: to deal with historical questions of a more theoretical nature, to serve as an organ of the government, to counteract the excessive nationalism of the war years, and to rewrite history in an anti-Western frame of reference.⁵²

By the beginning of 1946, any form of hope of cooperation between the Soviet Union and the West had all but disappeared. Under the direction of Andrei Zhdanov, who was charged with the task of cultural discipline by Stalin, an all out attack was launched on the influence of Western culture in Soviet

⁵¹Frederick C. Barghoorn, "The Soviet Union Between War and Cold War," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 263 (May, 1949), p. 1.

⁵²Editorial, "Zadachi Zhurnala Voprosy Istorii," pp. 3-5; (See footnote 5).

intellectual life. In a speech delivered at a meeting of Soviet writers on August 21, 1946, Zhdanov officially inaugurated the Cold War when he declared,

The position of socialism was strengthened as a result of World War II. The question of socialism has been entered into the agenda of many countries of Europe. This displeases the imperialists of all shades; they fear socialism, fear our socialist country which is an example for the whole of progressive mankind. The imperialists, their ideological henchmen, their writers, and journalists, their politicians and diplomats are trying to slander our country in every way they can, to represent it in a wrong light, to slander socialism. Under these conditions the task of Soviet literature is not only to return blow for blow against all this vile slander and these attacks upon our Soviet culture, upon socialism, but also boldly to attack bourgeois culture which is in a state of degeneration and decay.⁵³

In another speech in September, Zhdanov reiterated this theme:

It is no accident that in the literary journals of Leningrad people have been carried away with enthusiasm for the contemporary, low caliber bourgeois literature of the West. Some of our literary people have begun to regard themselves not as teachers but as pupils of bourgeois and petty bourgeois literati, have fallen into a tone of kowtowing and self prostration before petty bourgeois foreign literature. Is such kowtowing fitting for us, Soviet patriots, for us who have built the Soviet order which is a hundred times loftier and better than any bourgeois order? Is kowtowing before the narrow minded petty bourgeois literature of the West fitting for our progressive Soviet literature; the most revolutionary literature in the world?

Zhdanov's speeches also set the tone for the future of Soviet historiography. A new Five Year Plan was introduced

⁵³James H. Meisel and Edward S. Kozera (ed.) Materials For the Study of the Soviet System (Ann Arbor: George Wahr Publishing Company, 1953), p. 384.

⁵⁴Andrei Zhdanov, "Doklad o Zhurnalakh Zvezda i Leningrad," Literaturnaya Gazeta, No. 39 (1946), pp. 2-3.

to eliminate all references to bourgeois culture in history textbooks. In other words, history had to be rewritten to conform to current trends in domestic and foreign policy. Moreover, additional emphasis was placed on the role played by the Great Russians during the Second World War and the progressive influence they exerted on minority nationalities within the Soviet Union. At the same time, the historian had to walk a narrow path because he could not minimize the part played by minority groups in defending the Soviet Union.⁵⁵

Dissatisfied with the progress of the new Five Year Plan in history, Deputy Premier Malenkov, in a speech delivered late in 1948, repeated Zhdanov's views by announcing that the historian must encourage Soviet patriotism by exterminating all traces of bourgeois culture.⁵⁶ He argued that it was preying on Soviet citizens and worked as a tool of American and British imperialism.⁵⁷

Malenkov's speech was followed by an editorial in Voprosy Filosofii entitled "Against the Bourgeois Ideology of Cosmopolitanism," marking the beginning of the use of anti-

⁵⁵ CDSP, Vol. I, No. 10 (April 5, 1949), pp. 54-55, "Why Are There No General Textbooks?" (See footnote five).

⁵⁶ CDSP, Vol. I, No. 35 (September 27, 1949), pp. 3-9; (Editorial) "Tasks of Soviet Historians in the Field of Modern and Recent History," Voprosy Istorii, No. 3 (March, 1949), pp. 3-13.

⁵⁷ Mazour and Bateman, "Recent Conflicts in Soviet Historiography," p. 62.

Western cliches so characteristic of the post World War II period. The widely used term "cosmopolitanism" was applied to Western European states which joined together under the leadership of the United States to block Soviet designs in Western Europe. According to the editorial,

cosmopolitanism is a reactionary ideology preaching renunciation of national traditions, disdain for the distinguishing features in the national development of each people and renunciation of the feelings of national dignity and national pride. Cosmopolitanism conceals either an imperialistic great power chauvanism toward other nations or a nihilistic attitude toward one's own nation, a betrayal of national interests. Reactionary American imperialism has made cosmopolitanism its ideological banner as a capitalistic scheme to enslave Europe and to annihilate independent nations. American imperialism strives to place the whole world under its sway.⁵⁸

In opposition to cosmopolitanism was Soviet patriotism, professing a love of one's country and a respect for internationalism.⁵⁹

Western historiography as a whole came under attack and was denounced as "bourgeois objectivism," Western historians were criticized for failing to write history within the only "true scientific framework" that is, Marxist-Leninist doctrine. In the case of the United States, specifically, the term socio-reformism was applied to periods in American

⁵⁸ CDSP, Vol. I, No. 1 (February 1, 1949), pp. 5-12; (Editorial) "Against the Bourgeois Ideology of Cosmopolitanism," Voprosy Filosofii, No. 2 (1948), pp. 3-12.

⁵⁹ Pravda, April 7, 1949, editorial, p. 1.

history referred to as the "New Deal," "Fair Deal," and the "New Freedom." All these movements were instituted by the ruling class in order to deceive the proletariat.⁶⁰

Shortly after the editorial appeared in Voprosy Filosofii, several historians were attacked by the Party because of Western influences in their works. The brunt of the attack was directed at Nicholas Rubinstein who published a book entitled Russkaya Istoriografia in 1941 with the blessings of the regime. Written in the spirit of war time cooperation, Rubinstein's book viewed the development of Russian and Soviet historiography as an integral part of the Western European tradition. His failure to revise his work in accordance with Zhdanov's speeches about the autochthonous nature of Russian culture and the uniqueness of its historical tradition was the principle reason for his castigation. Reprimanded by his colleagues and forced to confess his errors, Rubinstein agreed with the criticism and suggested that an entirely new work on Soviet historical development be prepared by a group of historians under the guidance of the Party.⁶¹

⁶⁰CDSP, Vol. I, No. 6 (March 8, 1949), pp. 11-17; (editorial), "Against Objectivism in Historical Science," Voprosy Istorii, No. 12, (December, 1948), pp. 3-12.

⁶¹Ibid., p. 12; CDSP Vol. I, No. 26 (July 26, 1949), pp. 16-23; (Editorial) "On the Tasks of Soviet Historians in the Struggle with Manifestations of Bourgeois Ideology," Voprosy Istorii, No. 2. (1949), pp. 3-13.

While Rubinstein and other historians were being severely criticized, an editorial appeared in Voprosy Istorii indicating the party's complete dissatisfaction with the work of historians in the area of modern history. Violently anti-American, the editorial outlined the tasks of the historian. He was to deal exclusively with the history of American imperialism, wage all out ideological warfare with "Anglo-American falsifiers of history," and portray the United States as the symbolic leader of the forces of reaction and cultural decadence. In sharp contrast to the United States, the historian was instructed to represent the Soviet Union as the champion in the world struggle for justice and progress. He was also ordered to stress the progressive nature of Russian culture showing how it historically benefited Slavic (non-Russian) and non-Slavic minorities now within the Soviet orbit.⁶² Used pragmatically by the regime to justify both Tsarist and Soviet expansion, this view served as the basis for the development and eventual acceptance of the "lesser evil" formula. Accordingly, the Great Russians served as elder brothers and guides in the economic and cultural development of disparate ethnic groups. It was far more advantageous for them to come under Russian tutelage rather than

⁶² CDSP, Vol. I, No. 35 (September 27, 1949), pp. 3-9; "Tasks of Soviet Historians in the Field of Modern and Recent History," Voprosy Istorii, No. 3 (March, 1949), pp. 3-7.

Turkish, Persian, or Chinese. The acceptance of this thesis was confirmed when the government ordered it to be taught in secondary schools.⁶³

Another mandatory task of the historian during this period was to build up the image of Stalin. This was by no means a new assignment. Beginning in the mid-thirties, Stalin's role in the development of all areas of Soviet life had received a considerable amount of attention. The victory over Nazi-Germany added more fuel to the already legendary deeds and qualities of Stalin. Portrayed as the savior of the Soviet Union because of his brilliant military tactics during the "Great Fatherland War," Stalin was viewed as the foremost commander and strategist in Russian history. His "peaceful" foreign policy, compared with the war-like actions of Western statesmen, earned him the title "champion in the fight for peace." Furthermore, Stalin was solely responsible for the liberation of Europe from the Fascist yoke. Finally, he played a major role in freeing the Chinese

⁶³ See the following articles in CDSP: Vol. 3, No. 31 (August, 1951), pp. 4-5; M. Nechkina, "On the Question of the Lesser Evil Formula," Voprosy Istorii, IV (April, 1951) pp. 44-48; Vol. 3, No. 50 (January 26, 1952), pp. 11-15; M. Mustafayev, "The Lesser Evil Formula," Voprosy Istorii, No. 9 (September, 1951), pp. 97-101; Vol. 3, No. 50 (January 26, 1952), pp. 15-16; K. Nayakshin, "On the Question of Russia's Annexation of the Middle Volga Region," Voprosy Istorii, No. 9 (September, 1951), pp. 108-111; Vol. 4, No. 2 (February, 1952), pp. 8-9; A. Yakunin, "On the Use of the Lesser Evil Formula in Assessing Annexation of Non-Russian Nationalities to Russia," Voprosy Istorii, No. 11 (November, 1951), pp. 83-86.

from the despotism of Chiang Kai-Shek.⁶⁴

The death of Stalin in 1953 did not produce any immediate changes in the writing of history. In general, historical output between 1953 and 1956 followed the tendencies generated by the post World War II scene. The principal reason for the apparent lack of historical directives was the fact that the leading members of the party were engaged in a struggle for power. Even with the triumph of Khrushchev in 1956 as the party leader, the duties of the historian were yet uncertain.

Since this dissertation deals with the career of E.V. Tarle who died in 1955, suffice it to say that despite the "thaw" and the policy of de-Stalinization during the Khrushchev period, the historian to the present day is a servant of the state. He is told what to write by the party and any deviation leads to severe censure.

⁶⁴The following articles are by no means a comprehensive list of the building of the "cult of the personality," CDSP, Vol. I, No. 2 (February 8, 1949), pp. 37-38. "The Party of Lenin-Stalin is the Directing Force in the Struggle for Building Communism," S. Abalin, Pravda (January 12, 1951), p. 2; CDSP, Vol. III, No. 45 (December 22, 1951), pp. 8-11; N. Talensky, "Great Lesson of History," Bolshevik, No. 11 (June, 1951), pp. 24-36; CDSP, Vol. III, No. 45 (December 22, 1951), pp. 11-12; "Toward the Tenth Anniversary of J.V. Stalin's Report on the Twenty-Fourth Anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution," Pravda (November 6, 1951), p. 2; CDSP, Vol. II, No. 20 (July 1, 1950), pp. 10-13; Suvorov Sesquicentennial." In these articles Stalin is compared with Suvorov and placed above him in the Russian military tradition. CDSP, Vol. II, No. 31 (September 16, 1950), pp. 3-7; (Editorial) "On the Tasks of Studying the History of the Stalinist Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union," Voprosy Istorii, No. 4 (April 1950), pp. 3-11.

CHAPTER II

E.V. TARLE'S CAREER BEFORE THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION

In 1962, seven years after the death of E.V. Tarle, The Soviet Academy of Science completed the publication of twelve volumes of his works.¹ The chief editor, A.S. Erusalimskii, who wrote the biographical sketch of Tarle, was aided by other members of the historical section of the Academy in producing this multi-volume collection. Excellent chronological bibliographical data, as well as representative works of Tarle including articles, book reviews, and monographic studies are furnished by the editors. In general, adequate materials have been supplied for the study of Tarle's career under the Tsarist and Soviet regimes.

There are, however, some shortcomings. The collection is not a complete compilation of Tarle's writings and far too great an emphasis is placed on his professional activities during the Stalin era.² Thus the use of Western sources is extremely important as they supply the additional data

¹A.S. Erusalimskii (glavny redaktor). Akademik Evgenii Viktorovich Tarle Sochineniya v Dvenadtsati Tomakh (Moskva: Izdatelstvo Akademii Nauk SSSR, 1957-1962). Hereafter cited as Sochineniya and Volume Number.

²A complete bibliography of Tarle's works is given in Sochineniya, Vol. XII, pp. 486-521.

necessary for a more complete picture of Tarle's long productive career, the evolution of his historical views, and especially his checkered relations with the Soviet government. Non-Russian sources fill in vital chunks of information conveniently left out by the Soviet editors. For example, Erusalimskii's biographical sketch makes no mention of the following difficulties encountered by Tarle beginning in 1928: the violent attack and subsequent denunciation of Tarle by the Pokrovsky historical school; the trumped up charge of his involvement in a plot to overthrow the Soviet government, his imprisonment for one year in Leningrad; his banishment to Central Asia; and, the recurring attacks on his professional competence throughout his career for failing to rewrite his works in accordance with the changing party line.³

One final observation should be made concerning the biographical sketch before evaluating the life and works of E.V. Tarle. Striking similarities are obvious when Tarle's career is compared to the respective fictional

³Sochineniya, Vol. I, pp. XXIII-XXIV. Although the editors of the collected works make no mention of Tarle's difficulties beginning in 1928, several articles appeared in Istorik Marksist written by Pokrovsky and members of this historical school which attacked Tarle for his interpretation of the causes of World War I. Later, (in the journal Bolshevik), Tarle was criticized for his views concerning the role of Marshal Kutuzov in the Fatherland War of 1812.

heroes of Mikhail Sholokhov's novel Quiet Flows the Don and Leonid Leonov's The Thief. Tarle appears to experience the same transformation as his fictional counterparts Gregor Melikhov and Mitka Vekshin who in the beginning reject the ideals of the Bolshevik Revolution, but in the end go through a metamorphosis and accept the new Soviet way of life. As a former "bourgeois" historian who at first is an opponent of Communist ideology, Tarle over a period of time sees the unequivocal truth in Marxist-Leninist historical science and the achievements of the Revolution. It is precisely because of these factors that Tarle became one of the most outspoken proponents of Soviet historical scholarship and the new way of life. Finally, and even more important, is the fact that Tarle's pen unquestionably served the propaganda needs of the Soviet government on the domestic and foreign scene.⁴

Apparently from a middle class background, E.V. Tarle was born in either Kiev or Nikolaev in the Ukraine on November 8, 1875. The exact place of birth remains a mystery as Soviet biographical sketches mention both cities as Tarle's birth-place.⁵ At an early age Tarle moved, together with his family,

⁴"Der Treitschke des Stalinismus," Ost-Probleme, No. 43 (October, 1950), pp. 1350-1351.

⁵Sochineniya, Vol. I, p. VII; A.S. Manfred, "Evgenii Viktorovich Tarle," Iz Istorii Obshchestvennykh Dvizhenii i Mezhdunarodnykh Otnoshenii (Moskva: Izdatel'stvo Akademii Nauk SSSR, 1957), p. 5; Ann K. Erickson, "E.V. Tarle: The

to the town of Kherson where he was enrolled in the local gymnasium. According to Erusalimskii, "Tarle astonished his teachers because of his exceptional memory and his profound knowledge in the fields of history and Russian literature."⁶ He also displayed a considerable amount of interest in the work of the English historian Thomas Carlyle.⁷ It appears that this early interest in Carlyle may have influenced Tarle throughout his career as many of his monographs are devoted to the study of the role of the individual in history.

After completing his education at the gymnasium in 1892, Tarle enrolled at the University of Odessa.⁸ In the same year, for some unknown reason, he transferred to the University of Kiev where he began to study the history and philosophy of the Middle Ages under the direction of I.V. Luchitskii. A leading historian of the "Russian historical school" who specialized in the social and economic history

Career of a Historian Under the Soviet Regime," p. 202, footnotes one and two; Edgar Hosch, Evgenii Viktorovič Tarle (1875-1955) und Seine Stellung in Der Sowjetischen Geschichtswissenschaft (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1964) p. 15, footnote twenty.

⁶Sochineniya, Vol. I, p. VII.

⁷Ibid.

⁸Ibid; Franco Venturi, "Evgenii V. Tarle," Rivista Storica Italiana, LXVIII (1956), p. 192; Wiktor Weintraub, "Blaski i Nedze Dziejow Zycia Prof. Tarlego," in Polskie Towarzystwo Historyczne w Wielkiej Brytani: Teki Historyczne, I (1948), p. 81.

of Western Europe, Luchitskii had established his reputation by publishing important studies on the agrarian situation in France under the Ancien Regime and the condition of the peasants just prior to the outbreak of the French Revolution.⁹ These works were based on newly uncovered documentary materials which Luchitskii had gathered from the provincial archives of France on several trips to that country.¹⁰

The "Russian historical school" stems from the Western educated intelligentsia of the nineteenth century, men imbued with the spirit of the enlightenment and dedicated to its ideas of political and social justice. Frustrated by Czars, secret police, and censors, unable to implement their programs of reforms, the intelligentsia began to turn toward progressive movements in Western European history. Even before this time, Russian historians in general had been obsessed with the harsh economic and social conditions which existed under autocracy. Thus it was a simple matter for the historian to regard the liberalizing tendencies of the French Revolution and its long

⁹Sochineniya, Vol. XI, "I.V. Luchitskii: k pyatidesyatiletii ego nauchno-literaturnoy deyatelnosti," pp. 378-394; V. Butenko, translated from Annaly. 1922 Rene Martel, "La Science de l'histoire moderne en Russie," Revue Historique, III (1929), p. 110; P. Vostokov, "Les Sciences historiques en Russie," Le Monde Slave, VII (1930), pp. 438-439; N.J. Kareev, "La Revolution Francaise dans la Science Historique Russe," La Revolution Francaise, No. 42 (1902), pp. 321-345.

¹⁰Sochineniya, Vol. I, pp. VII-VIII.

range effects as the most forward looking trend in history. Had it not created a new social and economic order based on the rational humanitarian principles of the eighteenth century philosophes?¹¹

The death of Nicholas I and the accession to the throne of Alexander II--to be followed soon after by the Emancipation Edict--fanned the hopes of reform among intellectual circles. The relaxation of censorship, the removal of teaching restrictions, the updating of the curriculum at the university level especially in the field of history, the opening of archival repositories, and the permission granted by the government to permit historians to travel and do research in Western European libraries in the 1870's contributed heavily to the rapid rise and popularity of the "Russian historical school." Even the repressive measures instituted during the reign of Alexander III could not counter these tendencies in Russian intellectual life. As a result, by the 1890's historians of this school had made valuable scholarly contributions to the economic and social history of the French Revolution with work based primarily on previously unpublished

¹¹Herbert E. Bowman, "Literary and Historical Scholarship," The Transformation of Russian Society: Aspects of Social Change, ed. Cyril E. Black (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960), pp. 371-376; Venturi, "Evgeni V. Tarle," pp. 186-190.

archival materials.¹²

The influence of Luchitskii, the studies produced by historians of the "Russian School," the climate of opinion among intellectual circles, and the social and economic conditions of Russia had a profound influence on Tarle. These forces helped to shape and color his views of history as well as his ideas concerning social and economic reform. His best known pre-Soviet works were studies of the social and economic conditions in France during the era of the French Revolution and Napoleonic period. Like the works of his mentor Luchitskii and the historians of the "Russian School," Tarle's publications were based on documentary materials which he collected on his numerous trips to France and other Western European states.¹³

In 1896, upon completion of his candidacy paper, "Pietro Pomponazzi and Skeptical Movements in Italy at the Beginning of the Sixteenth Century," Tarle was graduated from the University of Kiev.¹⁴ Two years later, he left

¹²Martel, "La Science de l'histoire moderne en Russie," pp. 109-113; P. Vostokov, "Les Science historique en Russie," pages 439 and 455; Venturi, "Evgeni V. Tarle," pp. 188-190; Edgar Hösch, "Der Historiographische Umbruch in Russland: Tarle als Beispiel," Saeculum, XI (1960), pp. 202-206.

¹³Sochineniya, Vol. I, p. XVII; A.S. Manfred, "Evgenii Viktorovich Tarle," pp. 5-6; Alfred Meusel, "Zum Andenken an E.V. Tarle," Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft, III (1955), p. 149.

¹⁴Sochineniya, Vol. I, p. 8.

Russia to undertake intensive research in Western European archives, where he was able to collect enough materials for his early publications and to acquaint himself thoroughly with Thomas More and English history of the sixteenth century. The work on More was in preparation for his Master's degree. His trip to France resulted in the publication of two articles in 1898, one dealing with the thought of Gracchus Babeuf and the other with French political activities in the eighteenth century.¹⁵

Between 1898 and 1901 Tarle wrote several articles, monographs, and reviews on a wide variety of subjects, such as Charles Parnell, German humanism, the history of Athens in the Middle Ages, Italy during the Middle Ages, and social movements in Europe during the nineteenth century.¹⁶ For the most part, Tarle produced nothing original in these early works. In fact, during these formative years, Tarle merely rehashed what had already been written by historians in

¹⁵ Sochineniya, Vol. XII, p. 486; "Delo Babefa: Ocherk iz istorii Frantsii" Mir Bozhii, No. 4 (1898), pp. 73-99; No. 5 (1898), pp. 1-24; "Politicheskii deyatel' staroy Frantsii," Mir Bozhii, No. 8 (1898), pp. 1-33; No. 9 (1898), pp. 1-32.

¹⁶ Sochineniya, Vol. XII, pp. 486-487; "Charles Parnell," Mir Bozhii, No. 1 (1899), pp. 1-26; No. 2, pp. 58-89; No. 3, pp. 82-110; Review of L. Geiger's, "Istoriya Italii v Srednie Veka," (1901); "Kharakteristika obshchestvennykh dvizhenii v Evrope XIX Veka," Vestnik Evropy, No. 2 (1901), pp. 702-730; No. 3, pp. 167-198.

these areas.¹⁷ Perhaps, of all these works, his treatment of Charles Parnell appeared to be the most representative of his early historical conceptions. Absorbed in the history of recent times, especially with social problems and revolutionary movements, Tarle shed additional light on the struggle for Irish independence and, more broadly, the relations between Britain and Ireland. In this essay, he also dealt with the theme of the role of the individual as a creative agent in history.¹⁸ This work was foreshadowed in content by Tarle's short study of "The Peasants in Hungary During the Reforms of Joseph II."¹⁹

In 1901, after successfully defending his thesis, "The Social Attitudes of Thomas More in Connection with the Economic Conditions of England of His Time," Tarle was awarded his Master's degree. Later, in the same year, the publication of his thesis caused heated discussion among academic circles at the University of Kiev. The work was criticized primarily for the superficial manner in which he utilized

¹⁷Venturi, "Evgeni V. Tarle," p. 194; Sochineniya, Vol. I, p. IX.

¹⁸Sochineniya, Vol. I, "Charles Parnell: Stranitsa iz istorii Anglii i Irlandii," pp. 39-118; A.S. Manfred, "Evgenii Viktorovich Tarle," p. 7.

¹⁹Sochineniya, Vol. I, "Krestyane v Vengrii do Reformy Iosifa II," pp. 3-118.

his sources.²⁰ It showed, however, that Tarle was keenly aware of acute domestic problems, the evolution of the Utopian socialist tradition, and the reasons for the development of socialist thought. Tarle was not a socialist himself, and, in fact, criticized Marxism. He contended that, "Marx did not have the scholarly right to present prognoses, for his prediction of revolution did not come true."²¹

Tarle's activities were not strictly confined to academic matters. On evidence given by his sister, he attended illegal lectures conducted by members of the Social Democratic Party. According to an article in Izvestiia, he was arrested for being present at one such lecture in 1901, but was released by the authorities for lack of evidence.²² Tarle was never pardoned for his guilt by association. He was judged unreliable by the secret police.²³ Based on this one incident, the Soviet editors attempted to play up Tarle's Marxist sympathies, but, according to Weintraub,

²⁰ Sochineniya, Vol. XII, p. XIV; Sochineniya, Vol. I, "Obshchestvennye vozzreniya Tomasa Mora v svyazi s ekonomicheskim sostoyaniem Anglii ego vremeni," pp. 121-164.

²¹ Sochineniya, Vol. XI, p. 4; Weintraub, "Blaski i Nedze Dziejow Zycia Prof. Tarlego," p. 84.

²² Izvestiia, "Perevybory prezidenta Akademii Nauk SSSR," May 12, 1927, p. 1.

²³ Sochineniya, Vol. XII, p. XIII.

"it is a risky thing to draw from this one detached episode any far reaching conclusions [that Tarle was a Marxist]."²⁴ In his early years, Tarle's sentiments were close to those of the Social Democrats, but by 1905 a change in his political ideology began to occur. As a "leftist" member of the Constitutional Democratic Party, he participated with students from the University of St. Petersburg in the street demonstrations against Tsarist autocracy. On October 18, in one such demonstration, Tarle was severely wounded when Tsarist troops opened fire. Recovering from his wound, he was permitted to return to his teaching position.²⁵ When World War I began, Tarle actively supported Russia's entry, its territorial ambitions, its so-called obligations to its Slavic brothers, and, especially, its alliance with France.²⁶

Under constant surveillance by the authorities because of his liberal political activities and ideas, Tarle was nevertheless promoted to Assistant Professor of History at the University of St. Petersburg. Almost immediately, he

²⁴Weintraub, "Blaski i Nedze Dzejow Zycia Prof. Tarlego," p. 85.

²⁵Sochineniya, Vol. XII, p. XV; Hosch, Evgenij Viktorovic Tarle (1875-1955) und Seine Stellung in Der Sowjetischen Geschichtswissenschaft, p. 17; Venturi, "Evgeni V. Tarle," p. 197; M.N. Pokrovsky, "Burzhuaznie istoriki zapada v SSSR (Tarle, Petrushevskii, Kareev, Buzeskul i dr.)," Istoriik Marksist, Vol. XXI (1931), pp. 56-57.

²⁶Sochineniya, Vol. XI, p. 5; Weintraub, "Blaski i Nedze Dziejow Zycia Prof. Tarlego," p. 85.

became a very popular lecturer and teacher who possessed the oratorical qualities and professional knowledge to attract students from other fields to elect his courses. Tarle's teaching career was focussed on courses dealing with the general history of Europe in the eighteenth century. He also offered special seminars on the French Revolution and the Napoleonic period.²⁷ Why Tarle was not removed from his teaching position has not been explained. Perhaps the authorities felt that his dismissal might cause serious repercussions among the student body and faculty because of his popularity. And, after all, Tarle's misdemeanor was rather minor when compared with the extensive illegal underground political activity which was taking place in Russia at that time.

After 1905, Tarle's experiences with the government were reflected in several of his publications. Although well-documented and presented in a scholarly manner, his writings became propagandistic in tone and intent. To avoid the wrath of the secret police and the censors, Tarle wrote a number of articles pertaining to French history in the eighteenth century which had obvious implications for autocracy in Russia and for those liberals who had compromised with it when they accepted the reforms promised by Nicholas II

²⁷Sochineniya, Vol. XII, p. XV.

during the Revolution of 1905. Tarle's disdain for these liberals was illustrated quite clearly in an article written in 1908 entitled, "The Unfortunate Compromise." The analogy drawn by Tarle between the French bourgeoisie who supported the Bourbon restoration after the demise of Napoleon I with the "Octobrists" who broke away from the Constitutional Democratic Party after the issuance of the October Manifesto by Nicholas II, was remarkably striking.²⁸ In another article published in 1913, Tarle vigorously defended the ideas of French bourgeois liberalism against the dual conservatism of the Bourbons and Jesuits. He also argued that the French bourgeoisie was the only class which actively struggled against the preservation of the vestiges of feudalism.²⁹ Other essays written by Tarle during this period in a similar vein, such as "The Decline of Absolutism in Western Europe," "The Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizens," "Separation of Church and State in France," and "The Role of Students in the Revolutionary Movements in Europe in 1848," were all indicative of his uncompromising stand with regard to Tsarism. Finally, it appears that

²⁸ Sochineniya, Vol. XI, "Neudavshiisya Kompromiss," pp. 286-341; p. 2.

²⁹ Sochineniya, Vol. XI, "Paul-Louis Kure (1772-1825)," pp. 342-361; p. 3.

Tarle wrote these same essays with another purpose in mind. Holding up Western European institutions and principles as either prescriptions, models, or scientific axioms, Tarle, by example, tried to show how the backward economic, social, and political conditions which existed in Russia at the beginning of the twentieth century might be corrected. Even though limited constitutional monarchy was initiated during this period, Tarle was far too optimistic about the future for he overlooked the peculiar Russian situation and its realities.³⁰

Although Tarle wrote numerous politically motivated essays between 1907 and 1913, the same period witnessed the publication of his most original and creative works based on several years of thorough investigation in the French archives. The first results of his fruitful research was the publication of a short monograph in 1907, Workers of National Manufacturing in France during the Revolutionary Period (1789-1799).³¹ A more detailed study of the same subject appeared in 1909, The Working Class in France During the Period of the Revolution (1789-1791). In 1911 a second

³⁰ Sochineniya, Vol. XII, "Otdelenie tserkvi ot gosudarstva vo Frantsii," "Padenie absolyutizma v Zapadnoi Evrope," "Rol' studenchestva v revolyutsionnom dvizhenii v Evrope v 1848," pp. 490-491.

³¹ Sochineniya, Vol. I, "Rabochie natsionalnykh manufaktur vo Frantsii v epokhu revolyutsii (1789-1799)," pp. 605-695.

volume was published concluding Tarle's study of this topic.³² After submitting his two volume work as his doctoral dissertation and defending his conclusions successfully, Tarle was awarded his degree in the same year.³³ Prior to the appearance of Tarle's works on this subject, French historians, such as LeVasseur and Jaures, had written about the working class in France but in a less thorough and systematic manner.³⁴ In contrast, Tarle was the first historian to write a comprehensive history of this topic based on such a vast amount of archival material.³⁵ He also displayed a remarkable talent for synthesizing evidence, and the ability to reconstruct this period of history in a methodical manner while neither sacrificing readability for details nor content for meaning. Later in his career Tarle acknowledged the debt that he owed his mentor, Luchitskii, and recognized the influence of the "Russian historical school" in writing this study.³⁶ Despite these ties with the past, he made an original contribution to the historical

³²Sochineniya, Vol. II, Rabochii Klass vo Frantsii v epokhu revolyutsii, entire volume.

³³Sochineniya, Vol. I, p. XVI.

³⁴Sochineniya, Vol. I, p. XVII; Weintraub, "Blaski i Nedze Dziejow Zycia Prof. Tarlego," p. 82.

³⁵Kareev, "La Revolution Francaise dans la Science Historique Russe," p. 386.

³⁶Sochineniya, Vol. XI, "I.V. Luchitskii kak universitetskii prepodavatel," pp. 407-410.

literature of the French Revolution and pioneered a fertile area of study for historians to expand upon in the future. His work was praised in several reviews which added to his already growing scholarly reputation among Western European historical circles.³⁷

In the first part of his study, Tarle painstakingly reviewed the reports of the Inspectors of Manufacturing and of Administrative Correspondence. From this evidence, he was able to trace and to verify the plight of the workers during the eighteenth century and especially at the beginning of the Revolution. He also assessed French industrial development and organization in rural areas and discovered that it varied from village to village. In certain parts of France, rural industry rivalled that of the cities and, in some instances, it was superior. Tarle concluded this section by arguing that, in general, France was far behind Britain in technology and that, during the course of the Revolution, industrial growth declined mainly because of an acute shortage of raw materials.

In the second part of the work, Tarle asserted that as industrial growth declined between 1789 and 1791, unemployment became more widespread. Consequently, in 1791, a

³⁷Sochineniya, Vol. I, p. XVII; B. Mirkine-Guetzevitch, "La Litterature Russe Contemporaine sur la Revolution Francaise," La Revolution Francaise, No. 78 (1925), p. 72.

strike occurred, leading to the enactment of the Le Chapelier Law which was directed against workers' organizations. This act on the part of the government only aggravated the situation. Despite the passage of the Law of Maximum in 1792 which fixed prices in an effort to limit speculation, conditions grew worse. In evaluating the impact of the Law of Maximum, Tarle seemed to express a laissez faire attitude when he stated that it was an illegal intervention by the state in the economic life of France. Instead of improving the situation, from the outset, the Law of Maximum was violated, and therefore failed to alleviate the conditions of the working class, placing an unbearable burden on them. When it was finally suspended, the working class did not demonstrate in favor of its re-enactment.

In the same section, Tarle spent a considerable amount of time assessing the relationship of the working class with various political parties. He maintained that, of all political parties, the Jacobins had the most humanitarian policy with regard to the working class. However, Tarle stressed that the Jacobins' attempt to regulate the economy was economically unsound. And, to make matters worse, it led directly to dictatorship and terrorism, characteristics of the Republic of Virtue under the direction of Robespierre. Tarle continued that throughout the entire period, the workers were not in-

volved in the political intrigues. Instead, they consistently struggled for higher living standards. They did not man the barricades when Robespierre was executed, they were not involved in Babeuf's conspiracy of the Equals, and they passively accepted the coup d'etat of the eighteenth of Brumaire. Tarle concluded his study by stating,

For the entire period under discussion the workers in general did not display a hostile attitude to either the basic economic structure or to any political organizations beginning with the Constituent Assembly and ending with the Consulate.³⁸

Furthermore, he contended,

The awareness of class differences or feeling of solidarity among comrades, rarely, if the innumerable exceptions are not considered, appears in the workers' environment in the period under discussion. Political interests, even as something directly resulting from the needs and aspirations of an economic nature, were³⁹ for them still a distant and complicated abstraction.

In short, Tarle presented a sympathetic picture of a class lacking in political awareness, unity of action, and completely unaware of its potential during the entire course of the revolution.⁴⁰

A final remark must be made in light of the interpretation made by Erusalimskii in the biographical sketch. He

³⁸ Sochineniya, Vol. II, Rabochii Klass vo Frantsii v Epokhu Revolyutsii, p. 570.

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Ibid. This is the thesis of the work.

claimed that Tarle was influenced by Marxism and was testing its methodology.⁴¹ True, the element of class struggle was apparent in the study, but to say that Tarle was influenced by Marxism or was testing its methodology misses the point. The work, indeed, was not inspired by the Marxist conception of history. Trained by members of the "Russian historical school" and steeped in its traditions of social and economic history, Tarle was decidedly influenced by this school. Despite the fact that he placed more emphasis on economic factors, he neither overlooked the political and social conditions, nor failed to stress how they interacted and influenced the economic conditions of France.

Between 1911 and 1913, Tarle undertook further research on the French working class and the Continental Blockade at the Archives of the Lyon Trade Palace, the London Records Office and British Museum, the Hague Archives and Royal Library, the Hamburg State and Commerical Libraries, the Library of Paris, and the Royal Library of Berlin.⁴² The initial results of this research appeared in 1913 when Tarle published a monograph entitled The Continental Blockade: Research on the History and Foreign Trade Policy of France During the Period

⁴¹ Sochineniya, Vol. I, p. XVII.

⁴² Ibid., p. XVIII; Manfred, "Evgenii Viktorovich Tarle," p. 12.

of Napoleon I.⁴³ In part, the study was a continuation of his most recent monograph concerning the history of the French working class. As a departure point for the study of the Continental Blockade, Tarle set forth the following objectives in the introduction which were:

(1) A history of the working class in France during the period of the Consulate and Empire; and (2) the history of the influence of the Continental Blockade on other European states and how it substantially affected the then existing economic relations between them and France.⁴⁴

According to Weintraub and Venturi, prior to Tarle's study very little had been written about the origins and functions of the Continental Blockade.⁴⁵ The first part of the work was devoted to a discussion of Napoleon's domestic policy during the first few years of his reign. He described its influence on the industrial situation in France and concluded this section by evaluating its effects on the working class. Tarle went on to show that a conflict of interest existed between the merchant classes which favored a policy of free trade, and the manufacturing classes which preferred a policy of high protective tariffs. Another problem which

⁴³ Sochineniya, Vol. III, Kontinentalnaya Blokada: Issledovaniya po istorii promyshlennosti i vneshnei trgovli Frantsii v epokhu Napoleona I, pp. 11-507.

⁴⁴ Ibid., predislovie (introduction).

⁴⁵ Venturi, "Evgeni V. Tarle," p. 202; Weintraub, "Blaski i Nedze Dziejow Zycia Prof. Tarlego," p. 85.

confronted Napoleon was the fact that the antiquated French industrial system was not able to compete on the European market with the modern British system. He hoped that by simultaneously forcing British goods off the European market, and building up French industry and commerce, the British economic system would crumble. As a result, Napoleon expected the British to sue for peace on French terms. Thus, according to Tarle, for these reasons, Napoleon initiated the Continental Blockade.⁴⁶

In the last part of the work, Tarle outlined the commercial relationship of France with other states during the period of the Continental Blockade, and then concluded his study by pointing out the reasons for its failure. He argued that from the outset, the Continental Blockade was doomed. In spite of the ruthless economic exploitation of client and conquered states by the French, these areas were still able to compete successfully with nascent French industry. Moreover, the leaders of these states resented French economic as well as political domination. As for the British, they easily circumvented the blockade and, in fact, increased their exports since they controlled the seas. A further outcome of the introduction of the Blockade

⁴⁶V. Butenko, "Nauka novoy istorii v Rosii," Annaly, Vol. II, (1922), p. 163.

was the development of a lively smuggling trade which flourished throughout the entire period. The repercussions of the Continental Blockade were disastrous for French industry. A noticeable decline occurred as industry was unable to procure the necessary raw materials it depended on from foreign markets. As a result, many workers lost their jobs, particularly in the silk and cotton industries which were hit hard by Napoleon's policy. He tried desperately to correct the situation, but, according to Tarle, it was impossible to gauge the long term effects of these reforms, because after 1811 military disasters ensued, officially putting on end to the Continental Blockade and the career of Napoleon.⁴⁷

Once again, Tarle's contemporaries were impressed with this study. One of the most prominent English economic historians, Maurice Ashley, praised him and Paul Vinogradov, a former Russian history professor who was then teaching at Oxford University, proposed that Tarle's Continental Blockade be translated and published in English.⁴⁸ In 1913, Tarle received and accepted an invitation to attend the first

⁴⁷ Sochineniya, Vol. III, pp. 495-506.

⁴⁸ F. Uspenskii, F. Buzeskul, V. Bogoslovskii, and S. Platonov, "Zapiska ob uchenykh trudakh Prof. E.V. Tarle," Izvestiia Akademii Nauk SSSR, XVIII (1927), p. 1558; Weintraub, "Blaski i Nedze Dziejow Zycia Prof. Tarlego," p. 86.

international conference of historians which was held in London, where he presented a paper entitled, "The Economic Consequences of the Continental Blockade."⁴⁹ After returning to Russia, Tarle published a short article about the conference in which he gave a most favorable report of the results of the work of his colleagues in the field of modern European history.⁵⁰

When the First World War broke out, Tarle set aside his differences with the Tsarist government and rallied to its defense. Throughout the war years, he was a dedicated supporter of the Franco-Russian alliance and a confirmed Ententophile.⁵¹ Consequently, most of his publication between 1914 and 1917 were marked by an anti-German bias on the one hand, and a pro-French attitude on the other. Tarle wrote primarily about the relations of the European powers before the outbreak of hostilities in 1914 and the historical-political consequences of the First World War. For example, at the outset of the war Tarle wrote an article entitled,

⁴⁹Sochineniya, Vol. I, p. SVIII; Sochineniya, Vol. III, p. 6; Uspenskii, Buzeskul, Bogoslovskii, and Platonov, "Zapiska ob uchenykh trudakh Prof. E.V. Tarle," p. 1558; Venturi, "Evgeni V. Tarle," p. 203; Erickson, "E.V. Tarle: The Career of a Historian under the Soviet Regime," p. 203.

⁵⁰Sochineniya, Vol. XI, "Mezhdunarodnyi istoricheskii Kongress v Londone (3-9 aprelya, 1913)," pp. 395-398.

⁵¹Venturi, "Evgeni V. Tarle," p. 203; Weintraub, "Blaski i Nedze Dziejow Zycia Prof. Tarlego," p. 86.

"From the History of Russian-German Relations in Recent Times," which was followed by its sequel in 1915, "What Do the Germans Demand of Russia?" Both essays clearly illustrated his anti-German stand.⁵² According to Tarle,

There have been two facts which have always characterized the recent history of Russian-Prussian relations: (1) the economic exploitation of Russia was the chief, basic goal, the achievement of which was desired by the ruling circles of Berlin; (2) they never lost the final hope of attaining this basic aim without the risk of war. However, they almost exclusively made use of their intimate connections with Russia.⁵³

In contrast, Tarle's pro-French views came through clearly in the two most representative articles of this period: "The Alsace-Lorraine Question on the Eve of the Great European War," written in 1915, and "The Franco-Russian alliance: Russia and its Allies in the Struggle for Civilization," published in 1916.⁵⁴ In the former, Tarle argued that the seeds of the war were sowed when Germany annexed Alsace-Lorraine after the Franco-Prussian War. He placed the blame for the War squarely on the

⁵²E.V. Tarle, "K istorii russko-germanskikh otnoshenii v noveyshee vremya," Russkaya Mysl, No. 11, (1914), pp. 83-93; E.V. Tarle, "Chego nemtsy dolzhny trebovat ot Russkikh?" Golos Minushego, II (1915), pp. 263-269.

⁵³Tarle, "Chego nemtsy dolzhny trebovat ot Russkikh?" p. 263.

⁵⁴Sochineniya, Vol. XI, "Elzas-Lotaringskii vopros nakanune velikoy Evropeiskoy voiny," p. 431-443; "Franko-Russkii soyuz," Rossiia i ee soyuzniki v borbe za tsivili-zatsiyu (Moskva, 1916), pp. 73-105.

shoulders of Germany. Its policy created a spirit of revenge among all segments of society within France. Furthermore, he said that Alsace-Lorraine was an integral part of France and the act of annexation permanently mutilated her natural boundaries. In the latter, Tarle presented an unconvincing Manichean interpretation of the war aims of Russia and her allies in which the Entente Powers were depicted as the forces of cultural progress struggling against the reactionary Triple Alliance led by decadent Germany.⁵⁵

Throughout World War I, Tarle remained at his teaching post lecturing and writing in support of Russia's war effort. For this stand, in the characteristic Soviet manner, Tarle was censured by his biographer, Erusalimskii. He asserted that Tarle failed to understand the nature of the First World War in Leninist terms: "It was imperialist on both sides, the Austro-German Alliance as well as the Anglo-French-Russian Entente." Furthermore, "Tarle shared the mood of the bourgeois liberal intelligentsia who, in error, buttressed their position on the principle of self-defence." Finally, Erusalimskii contended,

he did not understand that this great event /World War I/ tore Russia out of the most horrible blood

⁵⁵ Ibid.; Sochineniya, Vol. XI, p. 443: "Franko-russkii soyuz," theme of article.

letting war which freed her from the chains of imperialism, opening a new era in the world for the history of mankind.⁵⁶

Tarle's activities during the war years did not prevent him from writing another significant monograph dealing with the Napoleonic period. In 1916 there appeared The Economic Life of the Kingdom of Italy During the Reign of Napoleon I.⁵⁷ However, during the course of the Bolshevik Revolution almost the entire edition of the book was burned. Later, it was published in French at Paris in 1928 under the title, Le Blocus Continental et Le Royaume d'Italie: la Situation Economique de l'Italie sous Napoleon Ier.⁵⁸

The work was reviewed most favorably by well known scholars. One of the leading historians of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic era, Albert Mathiez, declared,

It is not enough to say that he has repeated this history. He has created something from entirely new fragments. I am overwhelmed with the enormity of the research. His research shows that he understands the forces of this period. He interprets and reinterprets the subject in all its aspects, diplomatic, political, and economic.⁵⁹

⁵⁶ Sochineniya, Vol. I, p. XX.

⁵⁷ Sochineniya, Vol. IV, Ekonomicheskaya zhizn korolevstva Italii v tsarstvovanie Napoleona I, pp. 11-312.

⁵⁸ E.V. Tarle, Le Blocus Continental et le royaume d'Italie: La situation economique de L'Italie sous Napoleon Ier. d'apres des documents inedits (Paris: Felix Alcan, 1928), entire book.

⁵⁹ Quoted in Weintraub, "Blaski i Nedze Dziejow Zycia Prof. Tarlego," p. 86.

Another French scholar, Albert Pignaud concluded, "It is a new work, solid, clear, well documented, well organized, and in its entirety appears definitive."⁶⁰ The famous Italian historian Benedetto Croce, who had been highly critical of Tarle's early work on Italy, stated that "it was a monograph of particular significance based on extensive documentation."⁶¹

Although Tarle used some of the materials and reinforced a few of his conclusions from his previous study of the Continental Blockade, the bulk of this new work was written from unpublished documents collected at the French National Archives, the Archives of the State of Milan, and the Archives of the Kingdom of Italy.⁶² Moreover, the scope and thesis was original as Tarle dealt primarily with the one-sided economic and political relations existing between France and its satellite Italian Kingdom.

Tarle began his study with a description of the economic life of the Italian Republics. Although some commerce continued, by the beginning of the nineteenth century it had declined noticeably and, as a result, Italy, for the most

⁶⁰ Albert Pignaud, Review of Le Blocus Continental, by E. V. Tarle, Revue Historique, No. 157 (April, 1928), p. 388.

⁶¹ Quoted in Weintraub, "Blaski i Nedze Dziejow Zycia Prof. Tarlego," p. 86.

⁶² V. Butenko, "Nauka novoy istorii v Rosii," p. 364.

part, became agrarian. A unique feature of Italy, pointed out by Tarle, was the emergence of an industrial revolution in several northern cities. When Napoleon transformed the area into the Kingdom of Italy in 1805, he expected it to become the reservoir of raw materials for French industry, the trading center for French goods, and the chief supplier of grains for France. He also hoped to eliminate English goods from the Italian market. Napoleon's policy was initially carried out by the introduction of tariffs and customs duties reserved exclusively for the French, thus making Italy economically dependent on France. At the outset, these measures enabled the French to acquire cheap grains and permitted them to sell their manufactured goods without any competition. To protect his interests, Napoleon stationed large numbers of troops whose upkeep was maintained by Italy through the arbitrary imposition of extraordinary taxes.

Despite these measures, a well organized illicit trade, centered at Malta, was carried on between the Italian Kingdom and Britain. British industry required raw silk from Italy and Italy depended on British manufactured goods. Napoleon responded to this situation by initiating the Berlin and Milan Decrees which prohibited the Italian Kingdom, as well as the French Empire, from trading with Britain. In another attempt to eliminate British competition, an Italian-French

treaty of commerce was signed which gave exclusive rights to French products in Italy.

Tarle concluded his study by evaluating the positive and negative aspects of Napoleon's policies toward Italy. He argued that, in a sense, they attained their objectives. French products replaced British products and Italian industry. Italian prosperity was enhanced by the abolition of guilds, the introduction of French codes, and by a highway building program. However, on the other hand, the long term effects on Italy were disastrous. The Continental system all but wiped out the Italian textile, chemical, and metal industries; the price of manufactured goods rose; and seaports, such as Venice, Genoa, and Trieste, declined, which resulted in the loss of trade with the Far East.⁶³

In 1917 Tarle was among the ranks of the intelligentsia who rejoiced over the abdication of Nicholas II and actively supported the newly established Provisional Government. His many articles in the newspaper Den' attacked the idea of concluding a separate peace with Germany and defended the efforts of the Provisional Government to continue the war. Tarle argued that Russia was waging a defensive war for its

⁶³ Sochineniya, Vol. IV, pp. 11-312; see the following reviews of this work: F.E. Melvin, American Historical Review, XXXIV (April, 1929), pp. 587-588; F.C. Montagu, History, XIV (January, 1930), pp. 368-369; Albert Pignaud, Revue Historique, No. 157 (April, 1928), p. 387-388.

survival and that "Nicholas II fell, as the history of all wars and the latest events show, not because he was carrying on the war, but because he was hindering the defense."⁶⁴ In these same articles, Tarle tried to stimulate among the masses the same type of patriotism which was unleashed during the course of the French Revolution. Playing upon examples and drawing analogies from the French Revolution, he wrote that "people who oppose the further continuation of the war are threatened with the possibility of the revolutionary guillotine."⁶⁵ Tarle was also firmly convinced that Russia's Western allies would not let her down and that they would continue to send help. He constantly hammered away at this idea in another effort to bolster the then sagging war effort.

Tarle became directly involved in politics, serving as an agent of the Provisional Government when it was led by Alexander Kerensky. As a special envoy, he was sent to Helsinki to counteract the detachment of Finland from Russia. He also journeyed to Stockholm to confer with Swedish authorities. When the Bolsheviks withdrew from the war and concluded a separate peace with Germany, the disillusioned

⁶⁴Den', No. 4 (March 9, 1919), p. 1; also quoted in Weintraub, "Blaski i Nedze Dziejow Zycia Prof. Tarlego," p. 87.

⁶⁵Ibid.

Tarle characterized the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk as the "death of Russia."⁶⁶

⁶⁶ Zaidel i Tsvibak, Klassoviy Vrag na Istoricheskom Fronte: Tarle i Platonov i ikh Shkoly, pp. 45, 48, and 49.

CHAPTER III

TARLE'S ACTIVITIES DURING THE FIRST TEN YEARS OF SOVIET RULE (1917-1927)

On the eve of the Bolshevik Revolution, E.V. Tarle was a well-established historian, highly regarded by his contemporaries as both a scholar and teacher. He had earned the respect of, and had been praised by, such distinguished French historians as Albert Mathiez for his numerous articles and books pertaining to the French working class during the Revolution and Napoleonic era, and for his work on the origins and effects of the Continental System.¹

When the Bolshevik Revolution broke out in 1917, Tarle was not among the ranks of those intellectuals who championed or actively supported it. He differed from many of his associates, however, who left Russia for reasons of safety after the November Revolution because they were either ideologically opposed to Bolshevism, or had participated in the affairs of the Provisional Government. Unlike them, Tarle decided to

¹Albert Mathiez, "Choses de Russie Sovietique," Annales Historiques de la Revolution Francaise, VIII (1931), pp. 149-158; B. Mirkine-Geutzevitch, "La Litterature Russe Contemporaine sur la Revolution Francaise," La Revolution Francaise, No. 77 (1924), p. 273.

remain in spite of the apparent danger.²

As for his own personal safety and the future of his career, it was fortunate for Tarle that the period between 1918 and 1921 was marked by severe economic and social chaos. The introduction of the disastrous policy of War Communism by the Bolsheviks during the initial stages of the Revolution, compounded by chronic civil war, required the full energies of the new regime to preserve the new order. Thus, the acute domestic problems became the primary concern of the Bolsheviks, diverting their attention, at least for the time being, away from those historians like Tarle who were decidedly anti-Soviet. Moreover, it was precisely for these reasons, and for his later cooperation, that Tarle's position in the academic community was not seriously threatened until the emergence of Stalin.³

In 1918, Tarle was promoted to professor of history at the University of Petrograd where he was allowed to teach and write in the traditional pre-Soviet manner.⁴ In the

²Sochineniya, Vol. I, p. XXI; A.S. Erusalimskii, "Der Sowjetische Gelehrte E.V. Tarle als Historiker und Publizist," Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft, No. 6 (1958), p. 270.

³See Chapter I, pp. 7-8.

⁴Manfred, "Evgenii Viktorovich Tarle," p. 14; Uspenskii, Buzeskul, Bogoslovskii, and Platonov, "Zapiska ob uchenykh trudakh Prof. E.V. Tarle," pp. 1558-1559; Venturi, "Evgeni V. Tarle," p. 204; Weintraub, "Blaski i Nedze Dziejow Prof. Tarlego," p. 87.

same year, he was appointed to a commission which was given the task of reorganizing and restoring the state archives in Petrograd damaged and looted during the Revolution.⁵

Why an admitted opponent of Bolshevism was given a promotion, appointed to an important commission, and permitted to carry on with his activities was not explained by his biographer, Erusalimskii.

The Bolsheviks made these concessions for purely pragmatic reasons. They recognized the general decline of academic standards, the scarcity of historians of Tarle's caliber and reputation, and the need to train a cadre of Marxist historians to fill the many vacancies caused by the exodus of scholars during the Revolution.⁶

The toleration accorded to Tarle and other historians was also in line with one of Lenin's tactical ideological pronouncements of this period. Since many intellectuals had not voluntarily come over to the side of the Revolution, Lenin argued for cooperation, hoping that in time they would accept the ideological and political programs introduced in

⁵Sochineniya, Vol. XI, "Arkhiwokhranilishche Narodnogo Khozyaistva, Prava, Kultury i Byta Leningradskogo Tsentralnogo Istoricheskogo Arkhiva," pp. 585-596; Hösch, Evgenij Victorovic Tarle (1875-1955) und Seine Stellung in der Sowjetischen Geschichtswissenschaft, p. 91; Venturi, "Evgeni V. Tarle," p. 204.

⁶See Chapter I, pp. 12-13.

Russia by the party.⁷

According to Erusalimskii, between 1917 and 1921, Tarle was in a state of confusion since he was neither on the side of revolutionary Marxism nor was he acquainted with Leninism. Consequently, his creativity completely declined as he wrote nothing original during these years.⁸

It is true that Tarle published little during this period, but to say that his creativity ceased because he was unfamiliar with the Marxist-Leninist scheme of history is sheer propaganda. Due to the conditions of the times, scholarly production, for the most part, was at a standstill. Archival repositories and libraries were either closed or short of printing supplies, travel was extremely dangerous, and scholars were not allowed to travel abroad to conduct independent research and then return to Russia.⁹

In spite of the privations, Tarle managed to publish a book in 1918 entitled, The West and Russia, which was comprised of articles that he had written for various journals before the Bolshevik Revolution. The theme of the work focussed on the political and economic relations of Russia with Western Europe from the eighteenth to the

⁷See Chapter I, p. 14.

⁸Sochineniya, Vol. I, p. XXI.

⁹See Chapter I, pages seven and eight, especially the articles by Kagan and Presniakov.

twentieth century.¹⁰ In general, the collection of essays was apolitical in tone. However, in certain sections of the book, Tarle injected political overtones. The work was dedicated to the memory of two martyrs, A.I. Shingarev and F.F. Kokoshkin, both active members of the Constitutional Democratic Party. Shingarev, an outstanding parliamentarian, and one of the leaders of the Cadets, held the position of Minister of Agriculture and later of Finance in the Provisional Government. He was arrested by the Bolsheviki in November, became ill in prison, and, in January of 1918, he was transferred to the hospital. On the following night, he and Kokoshkin, who was also in the hospital, were murdered by a group of revolutionary sailors.¹¹ According to Weintraub, "Later, the Bolsheviki, who were implicated in this political murder, announced that it had been committed by anarchist sailors."¹² Analogies between the policies of the Bolsheviki and those of Nicholas I were subtly drawn by Tarle in one of

¹⁰ Sochineniya, Vol. XII, p. 496. Zapad i Rossiya Stati i Dokumenty po Istorii XVIII-XX VV. Byloe, (1918), 219 pages; G. Gautier, "Histoire de Russie: Publications des Annees 1917-1927," Revue Historique, CLVII (January, 1928), p. 111; B. Mirkine-Guetzevitch, "La Litterature Russe Contemporaine sur la Revolution Francaise," p. 274.

¹¹ Hösch, Evgenij Viktorovič Tarle (1875-1955) und seine Stellung in der Sowjetischen Geschichtswissenschaft, p. 90; Venturi, "Evgeni V. Tarle," p. 204.

¹² Weintraub, "Blaski i Nedze Dziejow Zycia Prof. Tarlego," p. 87.

the essays, "Emperor Nicholas I and French Public Opinion."¹³ In another article, "The English Ambassador and Catherine in 1756-1757," Tarle again alluded to the present. During the twilight of the reign of Elizabeth, Russia was at war with Prussia, England's ally. The British envoy to St. Petersburg, Charles Williams, was assigned the task of trying to get Russia out of the war, or, at the least, to create enough confusion, so as to make Russian participation ineffective. By taking advantage of a power struggle between anti-Prussian and pro-Prussian factions, Williams began to play both groups off against each other to accomplish his mission. He courted the pro-German Catherine, the wife of the heir to the throne and future Tsarina, and simultaneously bribed the anti-Prussian foreign minister Bestiuzhev-Riumin. Tarle concluded his study, knowing that he took a swipe at Lenin's slogan of open diplomacy:

The secret diplomacy of the eighteenth century sacrificed the interests of the state in the same manner as the open diplomacy of our times. We are only now acquainting ourselves with the details of eighteenth century secret diplomacy and, in the future, information concerning socialist diplomacy will be revealed. Baron Bestiuzhev undoubtedly believed that his financial operation would remain outside the range of interested eyes.¹⁴

¹³"Imperator Nikolai I i Frantsuzskoe Obshchestvennoe Mnenie," in Zapad i Rossiya, pp. 28-78.

¹⁴Sochineniya, Vol. IV, "Angliiskii posol i Ekaterina v 1756-1757," p. 480; Weintraub, "Blaski i Nedze Dziejow Zycia Prof. Tarlego," p. 88.

Included in the same collection were two scholarly essays marked by the absence of political overtones, "From the History of 1904-1905," and, "Was Catherine's Russia an Economically Backward State?"¹⁵ In the former, Tarle was the first historian who utilized the then unpublished exchange of telegrams between Nicholas II and William II in 1904 and 1905.¹⁶ In the latter, he attempted to revise the prevailing historical interpretation that during the reign of Catherine the Great, Russia was economically backward when compared with Western European states of that period. By thoroughly examining the views and opinions of contemporary Western Europeans who visited Russia, Tarle discovered that a consensus existed, especially among French, British, and German travelers that Russian industry was only slightly less developed than in their own states. In an unpublished note sent by Calonne in 1786 to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Vergennes, he also disclosed that the French were anxious to conclude a treaty of commerce with Russia.¹⁷

¹⁵ Sochineniya, Vol. IV, "Byla li Ekaterininskaya Rossiya Ekonomicheski Otstaloyu Stranoyu?" pp. 443-468; "K Istorii 1904-1905," pp. 547-565.

¹⁶ Mirkine-Guetzevitch, "La Litterature Russe Contemporaine sur la Revolution Francaise," p. 274.

¹⁷ Sochineniya, Vol. IV, "Byla li Ekaterininskaya Rossiya Ekonomicheski Otstaloyu Stranoyu?" pp. 447-450.

The termination of the civil war brought peace to an economically prostrate Russia. In spite of his ideological justifications for the New Economic Policy, Lenin scrapped the program of War Communism for purely practical reasons because he recognized that it had been one of the major causes for the widespread internal disorder during the war years.¹⁸ As for non-Marxist intellectuals, the initiation of the New Economic Policy paved the way for a short period of relatively peaceful coexistence with the handful of dedicated Marxist intellectuals. The older generation of historians, in particular, was granted a certain amount of freedom by the government, and especially by the Marxist historians of the Pokrovsky school. They were permitted to pursue independent scholarly research and allowed to publish the results as long as the subject was non-political in nature.¹⁹

By the end of 1921, the Bolsheviks began to court well-known historians of the pre-Soviet era who were considered to be politically reliable and fully acquainted with the principles of Marxism. They would be used to disseminate and popularize Marxist ideology. Tarle was among those historians who decided to work actively for

¹⁸See Chapter I, pp. 12-13.

¹⁹See Chapter I, pp. 15-16.

the government. He became a member of two Party sponsored societies, The Petrograd House of Scholars, and The House of Literary Men, helping to organize a series of lectures to Red Army groups, workers clubs, and other organizations. A popular speaker, but not a Marxist himself, ironically enough Tarle was enlisted to teach Marxism to members of the Party. In undertaking his assignments, "Tarle, like Platonov, was ubiquitous and displayed an indefatigable activity that might have served as an example for any Soviet activist."²⁰

Still opposed to any deterministic interpretation of history, and, more specifically, to Marxism, one can only speculate on why Tarle began to cooperate openly with the regime at this time. Perhaps, like others, Tarle rejected the Bolshevik Revolution for both humanitarian and ideological reasons, yet, possibly his sense of loyalty and duty to Russia meant more to him than the sacrifice of his own personal convictions. After being actively involved in the mainstream of Russian intellectual and sometimes political life before the Revolution, and finally given the opportunity to play an active role again, Tarle accepted, compromised his views slightly, and as a result, was able to relieve his sense of frustration and alienation by plunging headlong into

²⁰Shteppa, Russian Historians and the Soviet State, p. 28.

his new work. If his motive was to gain more freedom of movement and greater access to source materials in the Soviet Union and later abroad, then he achieved his purpose, at least for the time being. Whatever the reasons may be, it is apparent that for his untiring activities, Tarle was rewarded by the Government in 1921 by being elected as a corresponding member of the Academy of Science of the U.S.S.R.²¹

Between 1922 and 1924, often referred to as the period of the "Scholarly NEP," government censorship lightened quite considerably. Many historians in the city of Petrograd now began to publish independent historical journals devoted to general history in the Western European tradition, relatively free from governmental control. One such journal, Annals, was co-edited by Tarle.²² Prior to the Revolution, St. Petersburg had been the center for Russian scholars who were Western oriented. The journal Annals clearly fits into this category as

it was an organ of those scholars concentrated around the Academy of Science who were not communists, fought to preserve the independence of scholarship, and who

²¹Sochineniya, Vol. I, p. XXI; Manfred, "Evgenii Viktorovich Tarle," p. 14; Uspenskii, Buzeskul, Bogoslovskii, Platonov, "Zapiska ob uchenykh trudakh Prof. E.V. Tarle," p. 1559.

²²Annaly, Zhurnal Vseobshche Istorii Izdavaimyi Rossiiskoyu Akademiiyu Nauk pod Redaktsiei Akademika F.I. Uspenskogo i Chlena-Korresp. Akademii Nauk E.V. Tarle.

wanted to keep cultural contacts with the West.²³

Above all, the articles published in this journal ostensibly demonstrated that many historians desperately tried to maintain the pre-1917 level of Russian scholarship despite the severe handicap of working within a totalitarian system whose leaders' avowed purpose was, after all, intellectual conformity.

Tarle was not only co-editor of Annals, but also one of its most productive contributors. He wrote the introductory article to the first volume in which he spelled out the immediate tasks of the historian.²⁴ In it he contended that it was useless for the historian to adapt pre-war historical formulas or, for that matter, any deterministic theory in explaining the contemporary scene.²⁵ The events that transpired since 1914 had been so destructive that it now became necessary to revise previously accepted historical concepts so that the historical process might be viewed in a new light. He then contemplated on the dangers which might sidetrack the historian by arguing that in such

²³Weintraub, "Blaski i Nedze Dziejow Prof. Tarlego," p. 89.

²⁴E.V. Tarle, "Ocheredneya Zadacha," Annaly, No. 1 (1922), pp. 5-20.

²⁵No doubt that in this instance Tarle took a swipe at the official Pokrovsky school of history.

cataclysmic periods it was extremely difficult to achieve total scholarly objectivity. In such times the historian was most likely to be caught up in the events. As a consequence, his work was liable to become either apologetic or propagandistic in tone, thus reducing him to the position of a mere "pseudo-historian."²⁶

Toward the end of the article, Tarle argued that another hazard threatened the historian's objectivity. It was possible for him to sink to the same level as the "cameralists," the theorists and philosophers of absolute bureaucracy in Central Europe during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, who approached historical material with preconceived ideas. Like them, "there are historians presently who, in historical data, look not for truth, but for illustrations for their own schemes and theories."²⁷ Tarle concluded the article by criticizing the views of Hegel.²⁸

Other publications by Tarle in Annals warrant comment as they represent sound scholarship indicative of the breath of fresh air generated by the relaxation of controls by the government during the period of the "Scholarly NEP." In an article written in memory of the late James Bryce, the author

²⁶Tarle, "Ocherednaya Zadacha," pp. 13-14.

²⁷Ibid., p. 19.

²⁸Ibid.

of a classic work on American democracy and the Holy Roman Empire, he captured the spirit and character of the renowned English historian. Writing sympathetically, Tarle stressed that the moral values found in Bryce's works were a mirror of his private life.²⁹

The political problems of Europe arising from the changes that occurred on the international scene after the First World War prompted many historians to investigate the present situation and, subsequently, to challenge the validity of the post-war settlement. Like many historians of this period, Tarle began to question the Versailles Treaty, arguing that it had created more problems for Europe than it had solved. Probably influenced by the French occupation of the Ruhr, Tarle expressed his dissatisfaction with the Versailles Settlement in an article written in Annals in 1922, entitled, "Three Catastrophies: The Peace of Westphalia, the Peace of Tilsit, the Versailles Treaty."³⁰ He argued,

It is apparent that the Versailles Treaty gives peace neither to Germany nor to Europe. There is no doubt that it has only prolonged the war by other means. As a result, the future of Europe, as well as the whole world, will be fraught with exceptional dangers and unhealthy conditions.

²⁹E.V. Tarle, "Lord Dzhems Brais," Annaly, No. 1 (1922), pp. 5-20; Weintraub, "Blaski i Nedze Dziejow Prof. Tarlego," p. 90.

³⁰E.V. Tarle, "Tri Katastrofy: Vestfalskii Mir, Tilsitskii Mir, Versalskii Mir," Annaly, No. 2 (1922), pp. 59-94; Manfred, "Evgenii Viktorovich Tarle," p. 13.

Clemenceau, who was instrumental in writing the Treaty, and Poincare, President of the Republic at that time, sanctioned each of the 440 statutes and initiated the Council of Four. Now in the role of Prime Minister, Poincare does everything within his power to enforce the treaty, thus bringing the victors into a special disagreement with the vanquished who are in a situation of hopeless despair.³¹

Tarle, however, saw some hope for the future of Europe.

He wrote,

On the question of the immediate future, different answers are given. Some believe in an early, and others believe in a late approach of social cataclysm in Germany, France, and other capitalist powers which will sweep away the Versailles Treaty;³² to others it seems that the victorious states will finally declare themselves against French claims, and, in this way, they will weaken the Versailles grip of France; a third group is convinced that in spite of the nearness of the recent war, divergent interests will develop among the victorious states and, as a result, the Versailles Settlement will automatically cease to exist; finally the pacifists, many of them French, nurture the hope that the government of the "National Bloc" will gradually realize that its policies have been harmful to French economic and political life and they will voluntarily agree to a substantial retreat.³³

In another article, "The Hegemony of France on the Continent," published in Annals in 1923, Tarle pinpointed this theme by evaluating the growing differences in policy

³¹Tarle, "Tri Katastrofy," p. 59.

³²Tarle again was referring indirectly to the inevitability of revolution in capitalist states characteristic of the Bolshevik estimation of the Western powers at this time.

³³Tarle, "Tri Katastrofy: Vestfalskii Mir, Tilzitskii Mir, Versalskii Mir," p. 59.

of Britain and France toward Germany.³⁴ The occupation of the Ruhr was denounced by the British press as a move on the part of France to dominate continental affairs at the expense of Britain. A lively debate was touched off when the French press responded by defending the policies of its government and attacking, at the same time, its British counterpart.³⁵ After carefully analyzing editorials, as well as statements made by Lloyd George and other leading political personalities, Tarle discovered that, in general, the British were weighing the possibility of a rapprochement with Germany, and, as a first step in this direction, they were considering the feasibility of the reduction of reparation payments. Although Tarle wrote favorably about the likelihood of the reduction of tensions by such a concession on the part of the British, he nevertheless viewed the German question as a European problem whose final solution depended on the cooperation of all states. In his opinion, Germany would never become an integral part of the European state system, let alone a viable state, until the Ruhr and the Rhineland were handed back to her.³⁶ From the Soviet point of view,

³⁴Sochineniya, Vol. XI, "Gegemoniya Frantsii na Kontinente," pp. 523-584.

³⁵Ibid., pp. 524-525.

³⁶Ibid., pp. 583-584.

Tarle's interpretation of the German problem contained serious shortcomings:

He did not take into account the increasing international role of the Soviet Union which had already contemplated the aim of the ruling class of France and other powers to make use of the aggressive forces of German reaction for the struggle against the Soviet Union, the international worker, and democratic movements in Europe.³⁷

The third volume of Annals, which appeared in 1923, contained another interesting article written by Tarle.³⁸ In it he reviewed the reasons for the development of the diplomatic struggle between Russia and Britain in the nineteenth century over the Ottoman Empire. Tarle argued that up to the First World War, British policy was dedicated to the maintenance of the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire, which meant, in fact, the containment of the historical designs of an expansionist Russia in this direction. The British stand was based on geographic and political factors, for they feared a Russian penetration into this area, or a possible take-over of the Ottoman Empire, would challenge their supremacy in the Mediterranean and endanger their position in the Far East. Despite the changes that had occurred as a result of the post-war settlement, and contrary to the slogans made by the Bolsheviks, Tarle

³⁷ Sochineniya, Vol. XI, p. 6.

³⁸ E.V. Tarle, "Angliya i Turtsiya: Istoricheskie Kornii i Razvitie Konfliktov," Annaly, No. 3 (1923), pp. 21-71.

concluded that the fundamental geographic-political conditions remained the same, and therefore Europe ought to anticipate the same Russian-English antagonism over Turkey in the future.³⁹

Even though the government permitted the publication of Annals, Marxist historians criticized it in their monthly publication, Pechat' i Revolyutsia, for errors in both methodology and interpretation. M.N. Lukin, a close associate of Pokrovsky, also complained that the journal was closed to Communists. Realizing the possible danger of such an accusation, Tarle invited one of the Petrograd Marxist historians to work with him in editing the journal. This move probably saved the publication from being suspended by the government.⁴⁰

During the Annals interlude, Tarle continued to teach, edit source materials, and publish articles in other journals. At the University of Petrograd, he lectured about the French Revolution. Before two thousand students, he spoke about the life and works of Aulard, a leading historian and ardent

³⁹Ibid., pp. 70-71; René Martel, "Quelques études d'histoire Russe," Le Monde Slave, No. 5 (May, 1926), p. 318; Weintraub, "Blaski i Nedze Dziejow Prof. Tarlego," p. 91.

⁴⁰Weintraub, Ibid.

defender of the French Revolution.⁴¹ One particular work, "The Press in France Under Napoleon I," was reviewed as "a valuable contribution to the history of the reign of Napoleon I."⁴² Originally published by Tarle in 1913, it appeared in a revised form in 1922.⁴³ Based primarily on the correspondence of Napoleon and source materials from the French National Archives, Tarle ably presented an almost complete picture of the state of the French press during the period of the Empire. By tracing Napoleon's relations with the press in particular, he clearly illustrated its servile character. For its excessive zeal in carrying out its assigned tasks, the press sometimes provoked the police to enact a series of measures, more repressive than previous laws, designed to muzzle it temporarily. He also showed that many Frenchmen privately expressed their indignation, and even a few dared to object publicly, to the constant harrassment of the press. In addition, Tarle compared the subservience of the press in France with Russia

⁴¹Mirkine-Guetsevitch, "La Litterature Russe Contemporaine sur la Revolution Francaise," pp. 275-276.

⁴²B. Mirkine-Guetsevitch, "La Litterature Russe Contemporaine sur la Revolution Francaise," La Revolution Francaise, No. 77 (1924), p. 136.

⁴³Sochineniya, Vol. IV, "Pechat' vo Frantsii pri Napoleone I," pp. 483-543.

at that time and concluded that the situation was similar in many respects.⁴⁴ Perhaps in this instance he was alluding to the censorship policies of the Soviet government.

According to the Bulletin of the Academy of Science in 1921, Tarle was thinking about revising two studies: The History of Italy and The Decline of Absolutism in Western Europe.⁴⁵ He was also planning to publish a short monograph on the subject of Russian finances during the period of the Napoleonic Wars, and was contemplating the possibility of writing another book in the Continental Blockade series dealing exclusively with Spain. The bulletin stated, however, that it would not be possible to publish this last work unless Spanish archival materials were made available.⁴⁶ This last projected study never materialized.

The suspension of the publication of traditional scholarly journals, including Annals, in 1924 marked the end of the period of the "Scholarly NEP" as well as the beginning of a concerted effort by the regime to control

⁴⁴Ibid.; Mirkine Guetzevitch, "La Litterature Russe Contemporaine sur la Revolution Francaise," p. 137.

⁴⁵Istoriya Italii v Srednie Veka (1906), 197 pages; Padenie Absolyutizma v Zapadnoy Evrope (1906), 207 pages.

⁴⁶"Izvestia Akademii Nauk CCCP," 1921, p. 72; Weintraub, "Blaski i Nedze Dziejow Zycia Prof. Tarlego," p. 92.

intellectual life by wiping out all suspected instances of non-conformity. And even though a certain amount of toleration was still accorded to non-Marxist intellectuals who either cooperated with the regime or compromised their views, it was evident that a showdown was rapidly approaching. Only when Stalin finally defeated his political rivals, and emerged as the undisputed leader of the party in 1928, was the policy, which had been initiated in 1924, ruthlessly enforced.

As for Tarle, until 1924 he had cooperated with the government by teaching Marxism to the masses, by helping in the reorganization of libraries and archival repositories, and by serving on officially sanctioned societies, such as The Research Institute for Modern and Contemporary History, in Petrograd, and The Commission for the Study of the Teaching of the History of Labor in Russia. For his cooperation Tarle was allowed to retain his membership in the following Western scholarly organizations: The Academy of Political Science of Columbia University, The Historical Society of the Great War, The Committee of Historical Research of the International Institute For the Cooperation of Intellectuals, The Society of the History of the French Revolution, and The Society of

Modern History.⁴⁷ Even more significant was the fact that he was permitted to publish a new journal, to write articles for it, and to contribute to historical literature in general, within the confines of governmental censorship of course, but conspicuously marked by the absence of Marxist-Leninist ideology. Due to his obviously dual role in the Soviet scene, historians have speculated on the question of whether or not Tarle was indeed a Marxist. Some have argued that the transformation occurred before the liquidation of Annals, and others have contended that the suspension of Annals made him compromise his views and accept Marxist principles. According to Venturi, Tarle showed "strong Marxist tendencies; he accepted Marxist schemes without the theory, he was less categorical and more eclectic, but, unlike Soviet historians, he did not make a dogma out of it."⁴⁸ Shteppa wrote that "Tarle was a 'pseudo-Marxist,' an economic materialist, and a liberal who was almost a Marxist."⁴⁹ Hosch agreed with Shteppa by concluding that during the period of the twenties, Tarle

⁴⁷ "Perevybory prezidenta Akademii Nauk SSSR," Izvestiia, May 12, 1927, p. 1; Hosch, Evgenij Viktorovic Tarle (1875-1955) Seine Stellung in der Sowjetischen Geschichtswissenschaft, p. 100.

⁴⁸ Venturi, "Evgenij V. Tarle," p. 211.

⁴⁹ Shteppa, Russian Historians and the Soviet State, pages 13 and 27.

was a "pseudo-Marxist."⁵⁰ In mentioning Tarle, Tompkins asserted that, "He was a Marxist, but not a Communist."⁵¹ Weintraub contended that "until 1924 Tarle's position was uncompromising as he was hostile to the regime and its ideology. But after seven years of struggling he decided to compromise."⁵² The official Soviet version printed in Borba Klassov in 1931, stated: "After our victory in the Civil War, Tarle ostensibly attempted to adapt himself to the Soviet regime and even proclaimed himself a Marxist."⁵³

All these interpretations have some validity, except for the Soviet version, which must be dismissed in light of Tarle's arrest at that time for his supposedly anti-Marxian and counter-revolutionary activities. It is also an oversimplification to label Tarle as an economic materialist, a "pseudo-Marxist," or a historian who showed strong Marxist tendencies. It is true that before 1917 he emphasized the economic side of history, but it should also be remembered

⁵⁰ Hösch, Evgenij Viktorovic Tarle (1875-1955) Seine Stellung in der Sowjetischen Geschichtswissenschaft, pp. 89-100.

⁵¹ Tompkins, "Trends in Communist Historical Thought," p. 306.

⁵² Weintraub, "Blaski i Nedze Dziejow Zycia Prof. Tarlego," p. 93.

⁵³ S. Mokhov, "Intervent Tarle pod Zashchitoy Vostokova," pp. 120-121.

that Tarle never neglected to point out the importance of political and social factors and how they interacted with economic phenomena. Tarle's cooperation with the government after 1917 does not conclusively prove that he was a Marxist. Until 1924 his publications were free of both Marxist terminology and theory and Soviet revolutionary jargon. For the most part, his work was reviewed favorably by Western historians who were critical of Marxism, especially the Soviet version. As Weintraub suggested, it was not until after 1924 that Tarle compromised his position and began to write articles and books within a Marxian framework. It should be kept in mind, though, that Tarle did not capitulate completely. He did not accept the theories of the official Pokrovsky school which considered history as merely a weapon to serve the needs of the state, or, as Pokrovsky himself succinctly put it, "History is merely politics projected into the past."⁵⁴ If anything, only after 1924 might Tarle be called a "pseudo-Marxist" as he developed his own brand of Marxism which was strikingly different from that of the Pokrovsky school. By sprinkling his work with revolutionary slogans, and by quoting the masters, Marx, Engels, and Lenin, he satisfied government

⁵⁴Chapter I, page eleven, especially footnotes 22 and 23.

ensorship for the time being, thus gaining a certain amount of freedom to express his unorthodox Marxism, as well as his traditional historical views. Moreover, for compromising he was allowed to leave the Soviet Union to lecture in France, to undertake several research projects while visiting that country, and to publish his results in French and Soviet journals. Finally, from the standpoint of the government, foreign policy considerations might have played a part in the toleration extended to Tarle. Prior to 1924, Soviet relations with the Weimar Republic were friendly. Consequently, Marxist historians responded to the political realities by carrying on normal and cordial relations with German scholars. However, at the same time, the Pokrovsky school was engaged in bitter polemics with historians of the former Entente powers which reflected the strained relations with France and Great Britain. When trade agreements were concluded with Britain and France, and when diplomatic channels were opened with the two Western states, Tarle was used by the government to serve its immediate needs, for no one was more acceptable than he to patch up the animosity between Soviet and French historians.⁵⁵

In 1924, Tarle was extended an invitation by the College des Science Sociales to lecture on the economic

⁵⁵Weintraub, "Blaski i Nedze Dziejow Prof. Tarlego," p. 93.

history of the French Revolution. Permission was granted by the authorities, and for the next few years Tarle frequently commuted between the Soviet Union and France.⁵⁶ While in France he was able to establish a somewhat tenuous understanding between historians of the respective states. Most of his time, however, was spent in renewing old acquaintances, serving as a guest lecturer, undertaking research projects in the French archives, and occasionally writing articles for the French press. Two of his works, Napoleon I and the Economic Interests of France and The Continental Blockade and the Kingdom of Italy, well received by French scholars, were translated and published in France.⁵⁷ As for his research, it was primarily centered on two topics: the history of the French working class during the Bourbon Restoration, and the causes of the First World War.⁵⁸

Tarle's frequent appearances in France never side-

⁵⁶ Sochineniya, Vol. I, p. XXII; Sochineniya, Vol. XI, "Arkhivnoe Delo na Zapade," p. 613; Mathiez, "Choses de Russie Sovietique," pp. 149-158; Weintraub, "Blaski i Nedze Dziejow Prof. Tarlego," p. 93; Uspenskii, Buzeskul, Bogoslovskii, and Platonov, "Zapiska ob uchenykh trudakh Prof. E.V. Tarle," p. 1559.

⁵⁷ E.V. Tarle, "Napoleon Ier et les Interets Economiques de la France," Napoleon. (March-April, 1926), pp. 117-137; E.V. Tarle, Le Blocus Continental et le Royaume d'Italie. La Situation Economique de L'Italie sous Napoleon Ier. D'apres des documents inedits. (Paris: Felix Alcan, 1928), entire book.

⁵⁸ Sochineniya, Vol. I, p. XXII.

tracked him from his responsibilities at home. He continued to teach at the University of Leningrad (formerly Petrograd) where he conducted a popular seminar in research techniques. He also helped to establish the Leningrad Historical Institute. In 1926 he was invited to join the Society of Marxist Historians, and in the following year, he was elected as a full member of the Academy of Science.⁵⁹

The tightening of censorship by the authorities in 1925 had forced all independent publishing houses and journals to close down. From this time on, Tarle's articles and books, outside of those published in France, appeared in the government controlled press. He also began to edit documentary materials for Red Archives, the only government organ for such publications. In 1927, he wrote his first article for Istorik Marksist, "The Flight of William II."⁶⁰

Despite his work for the government and the compromise he made with Marxism, Tarle still maintained some

⁵⁹ Sochineniya, Vol. I, XXIII; Izvestia, May 12, 1927, p. 1; Alfred Meusel, "Zum Andenken E.V. Tarle," Zeitschrift Fur Geschichtswissenschaft, III (1955), p. 149; Manfred, "Evgenii Viktorovich Tarle," p. 14.

⁶⁰ E.V. Tarle, "S. Yu. Vitte, Frantsuzskaya Pressa i Russkie Zaimy," Krasny Arkhiv, III (1925), pp. 36-37; "Aleksandr III i General Bulanzhe," Krasny Arkhiv, I (1926), p. 260-261; "Doneseniya iz Berlina S.S. Tatishcheva V.K. Pleve v 1904," Krasny Arkhiv, IV (1926), pp. 186-187; "Pismo V.K. Pleve k A.A. Kireevu," Krasny Arkhiv, Vol. V (1926), p. 201; "Begstvo Vilgelma II," Istorik Marksist, IV (1927), pp. 62-72.

freedom of opinion. In 1927 a bomb exploded in the Leningrad Discussion Club, wounding several people. In connection with this event, a meeting was held at the Institute of History, where a government sponsored resolution was introduced condemning this act. Serving as chairman of the committee, Tarle rejected it and substituted his own motion which expressed sympathy for the injured. According to a later Soviet account of this event, Tarle acted in this manner "because he felt the Institute of History was an academic institution and not a political one."⁶¹

In 1929, when Tarle was under attack for his historical and political views by Pokrovsky, he refused to take part in the proceedings directed against the famous Russian archaeologist V. Zhebelev, who had sent his work to an emigree journal, published in Prague. The government tried to ram through a resolution at Leningrad University denouncing Zhebelev for his actions, but Tarle refused to sign it, and moreover, spoke out against it.⁶²

⁶¹Zaidel and Tsvibak, Klassoviy Vrag na Istoricheskom Fronte: Tarle i Platonov i ikh Shkoly, p. 176; Weintraub, "Blaski i Nedze Dziejow Zycia Prof. Tarlego," p. 94.

⁶²Zaidel and Tsvibak, Klassoviy Vrag na Istoricheskom Fronte: Tarle i Platonov i ikh Shkoly, pp. 166-170; Weintraub, "Blaski i Nedze Dziejow Zycia Prof. Tarlego," p. 94.

CHAPTER IV

TARLE AND THE SUBJUGATION OF HISTORICAL SCHOLARSHIP TO THE PARTY LINE

The emergence of Stalin as practically undisputed leader of the party after a long struggle with his political rivals during the twenties completely shattered the existing, but eroding, relationship between the non-party and party historian.¹ Beginning with the introduction of the First Five Year Plan in 1928,

The party demanded that the historian must not only accept Marxist theory, but also unite that theory and proletarian practice, investigating only those subjects necessary for immediate practical tasks and reaching only those conclusions demanded by the political line.²

The onslaught by the regime on the historical front was organized and carried out by the ubiquitous M.N. Pokrovsky who launched a two pronged offensive to eliminate all traces of historical non-conformity. He initiated

¹See Chapter I, pp. 16-17.

²Aron, "M.N. Pokrovsky and the Impact of the First Five Year Plan on Soviet Historiography," Essays in Russian and Soviet History, p. 301; Hall, "Mikhail Nikolayevich Pokrovsky (1868-1932)," Some Historians of Modern Europe, pp. 349-366.

systematic purges of existing scholarly institutions and simultaneously inaugurated an all out ideological attack upon the views and works of several prominent "bourgeois" historians.³ The initial step taken by Pokrovsky to subjugate scholarship to current politics in order to create a monolithic historical front began in 1928 when he convened the first in a series of conferences of Marxist historians to discuss ways to implement the party's policy.⁴ These conferences were used as a springboard to mount a steady campaign against the non-party historians who were accused of ideological and political crimes. The so-called offenses committed by these historians were well publicized in a sensational manner in the party controlled press to convince the Soviet public of an impending plot to topple the government.⁵ By the end of 1931, Pokrovsky had accomplished his

³Aron, Ibid., pp. 283-302; Hall, Ibid.; M. Pokrovsky, "Novye Tcheniya v Russkoy Istoricheskoy Literature," Istorik Marksist, VII (1928), pp. 3-17; Pokrovsky, "Institut Istorii i Zadachi Istorikov Marksistov," pp. 3-12; Shteppa, Russian Historians and the Soviet State, p. 47; Szamuely, "The Elimination of the Opposition Between the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Congresses of the CPSU," pp. 318-338.

⁴"Trudy Pervoy Vsesoyuznoy Konferentsii Istorikov Marksistov," Vol. II, (Moskva, 1930), pp. 25-45.

⁵"Burzhuaznye Istoriki Zapada v SSSR (Tarle, Petrush-evskii, Kareev, Buzeskul i dr.)," pp. 44-86; Mokhov, "Inter-vent Tarle pod Zashchitoy Vostokova," pp. 120-121; Zaidel i Tsvibak, Klassoviy Vrag na Istoricheskom Fronte: Tarle i Platonov i ikh Shkoly, entire book.

goals. Independent historical scholarship had been virtually obliterated by means of wholesale arrests, followed by show trials which resulted in exile for some historians, and for others, execution.⁶

Although Tarle had cooperated with the regime, and had compromised his views somewhat, he became the object of an unrelenting attack by Pokrovsky and his associates during this period. In 1930 he was arrested along with the rest of the leading pre-revolutionary historians, and spent about a year and half in a Leningrad jail. At his trial in the spring of 1931, he was accused of being a Russian bourgeois historian, a chauvinist of World War I, an irreconcilable enemy of Bolshevism, a protector of the warmongers of the First World War, an anti-Marxist, and an ideological torch bearer of the general imperialist front directed against the Soviet Union.⁷ Convicted of this long list of charges, Tarle was exiled in the summer of 1931 to the remote town of Alma-Ata

⁶Chernavin, "The Treatment of Scholars in the USSR," pp. 710-714.

⁷Kagan, "La Crise de la Science Historique Russe," p. 4; Mehnert, Stalin Versus Marx, p. 13; Mokhov, "Inter-vent Tarle pod Zashchitoy Vostokova," pp. 120-121; George von Rauch, "Grundlinien der Sowjetischen Geschichtsforschung im Zeichen des Stalinismus," p. 3424; Yakobson, "Postwar Historical Research in the Soviet Union," p. 124; Zaidel i Tsvibak, Klassoviy Vrag na Istoricheskom Fronte: Tarle i Platonov i ikh Shkoly, pp. 6, 45, and 176.

(Kazakhstan) in Central Asia.⁸

The drive to eliminate Tarle from the historical scene began in 1928 when Pokrovsky published an article in Istorik Marksist entitled "New Trends in Russian Historical Scholarship."⁹ From the tone of the article alone, it was obvious that Pokrovsky purposefully intended to discredit Tarle. Pokrovsky attacked Tarle personally and castigated him specifically for his historical views in his latest work, Europe in the Epoch of Imperialism first published in 1927.¹⁰ Although the interpretations in this study concerning the causes of the First World War led to his subsequent downfall, ironically enough, as some historians have suggested, it was the first work Tarle wrote which was within a consistent Marxist frame of reference.¹¹ Despite his Marxist analysis, Tarle produced a volume which can be viewed in

⁸Chernavin, "The Treatment of Scholars in the USSR," p. 712.

⁹Pokrovsky, "Novye Tcheniya v Russkoy Istoricheskoy Literature," pp. 3-17.

¹⁰E.V. Tarle, Evropa v Epokhu Imperializma: 1871-1919 (Moskva-Leningrad, 1927). The revised edition of the work appears in Sochineniya, Vol. V, pp. 24-509.

¹¹Epstein, "Die Marxistische Geschichtswissenschaft in der Sovetunion Seit 1927," p. 79; Tompkins, "Trends in Communist Historical Thought," p. 307; Venturi, "Evgeni V. Tarle," p. 211; von Rauch, "Grundlinien der Sowjetischen Geschichtsforschung im Zeichen des Stalinismus," p. 3424; Vostokov, "Les Sciences Historiques en Russie," p. 459; Weintraub, "Blaski i nedze dziejow Zycia Prof. Tarlego," p. 94.

many respects as "revisionist" historical literature. Like many Western historians of that time, he questioned the validity and justice of the "War Guilt" clause of the Versailles Treaty which blamed Germany and her allies for the outbreak of hostilities in 1914. Thus Tarle's purpose in writing Europe in the Epoch of Imperialism was to explain the reasons for World War I from a Marxist point of view and to determine which power or alliance bloc ought to be held responsible for starting the conflict.¹²

The bulk of the research for this book came from recently edited historical literature from the Soviet Archives and from the Vincennes Library in France, where Tarle spent a few years pouring over the excellent collection of unpublished source materials concerning European international relations before and during the war and the period after 1919 while he was a guest in that country.¹³ In the first thirteen chapters of the work, he analyzed the attitude and the conditions of the working classes and evaluated the relationship between the domestic and foreign scene prior to the outbreak of the war.¹⁴ In chapters fourteen through twenty, he assessed the

¹²Sochineniya, Vol. V, pp. 24-39.

¹³Sochineniya, Vol. I, p. XXII; Sochineniya, Vol. V, pp. 498-507 and 569-580; Manfred, "Evgenii Viktorovich Tarle, p. 13.

¹⁴Sochineniya, Vol. V, pp. 27-317.

foreign policy of the war years and gauged the impact of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk on the Entente powers.¹⁵ In the concluding two chapters he apprised the Versailles Settlement and surveyed the conditions of capitalism after 1919.¹⁶

Tarle attributed the major cause of World War I to the economic competition among imperialist states, especially the protracted struggle between Germany and Great Britain. He argued that after 1870, industrial capital began to expand rapidly, and as it developed, it attempted to secure new markets. Tarle referred to the political side of this phenomenon as imperialism of the industrial powers. The struggle for new markets was marked by the creation of new colonies, protectorates, and spheres of influence which made war inevitable. According to Tarle, the most acute conflict developed between German and British imperialism as the ruling circles of both states, that is those who controlled industrial capital, were preparing for an eventual showdown as early as 1900. Thus he concluded that the political events between 1870 and 1914 were conditioned primarily by the economic forces of this period.¹⁷

¹⁵Ibid., pp. 318-448.

¹⁶Ibid., pp. 449-497.

¹⁷Ibid., pp. 27-39.

From the point of view of the party line at that time, Europe in the Epoch of Imperialism was both ideologically and politically unacceptable. In the work Tarle declared that he was a Marxist but

he saw in Marxism a method for the understanding of reality and did not think that facts necessarily had to be fitted into previously established formulas or subordinated to political goals.¹⁸

It must be remembered that, up to this time, Tarle was considered as merely a "bourgeois" historian who sympathized with the regime. Now this unorthodox Marxist interpretation of a crucial period in recent history by Tarle, "the pagan turned heretic," was regarded by Pokrovsky as an attempt to destroy the official version of Marxism which he had monopolized since the Bolshevik Revolution and had also equated with the immediate political needs of the regime.¹⁹

Three specific conclusions of Tarle came under heavy criticism by Pokrovsky and his associates. By denying that the class struggle became more intense before 1914, he completely contradicted the views expounded by Lenin in his

¹⁸Shteppa, Russian Historians and the Soviet State, p. 58.

¹⁹See Chapter I, pages eight through twelve and page seventeen; Hall, "Mikhail Nikolayevich Pokrovsky (1868-1932)," pp. 349-366.

pamphlet Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism.²⁰

Whereas Lenin had argued that the class struggle would intensify in this period, causing class contradictions to become more aggravated as capitalism began to falter, and Pokrovsky had reaffirmed this doctrine when he declared that "Marxism-Leninism carries with it not only the fact of the class struggle, but also its inevitable result--the socialist revolution,"²¹ Tarle insisted on defending his thesis while subjected to Pokrovsky's attack. He declared,

Indeed I am wholly convinced that one of the serious, real, deep down causes of the catastrophe of 1914 was the very fact that in the working masses the disposition to check the strivings of the imperialistic plunderers by every means was not sufficiently developed. . . . The political heterogeneity of the working class must be admitted as a fact. . . . I wished to point out the relative infrequency of revolutionary manifestations of the workers' struggle in the 1872-1914 period.²²

In essence, Tarle's interpretation meant that

the workers' class of the Western European countries did not prevent war, either because it could not, or did not want to do so, signifying that either there was a relaxation of the class struggle during the period of imperialism--a complete impossibility in the light of

²⁰V.I. Lenin, "Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism," Vol. V; V.I. Lenin: Selected Works, ed. J. Fineberg (12 Vols.; New York: International Publishers, N.D.), pp. 3-119.

²¹Pokrovsky, "Novye Tcheniya v Russkoy Istoricheskoy Literature," p. 11.

²²E.V. Tarle, "K Voprosu o Nachale Voyny: (Otvét M.N. Pokrovskomu)," Istórik Marksist, IX (1928), pp. 101, 102, and 105; Also quoted in Shtéppa, Russian Historians and the Soviet State, p. 59.

the Leninist Theory of Imperialism; or the Western proletariat was hopeless as an ally in the future war for "world revolution." Such a conclusion could play a tremendous role in the ever-sharpening dispute, which then disturbed the Party, on the matter of permanent revolution.²³

In addition to this unforgivable ideological blunder, Tarle made matters worse for himself by committing another serious error. In the first place, he blamed Germany, not the Entente powers, for plunging Europe into war in 1914. Moreover, he argued that ever since the Franco-Prussian War, German economic and political development had been geared for future military aggression, thus making war practically inevitable. Tarle also reiterated his view that the direct responsibility for the outbreak of hostilities must be attributed to Germany because of the unconditional support she gave to her ally, Austria-Hungary. Without the "blankcheck," Austria-Hungary would never have sent such an unacceptable ultimatum to Serbia following the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand at Sarajevo.²⁵

Tarle was sharply rebuked by Pokrovsky for placing the blame of the war squarely on the shoulders of Germany. Pokrovsky emphatically stated that the problem of guilt must

²³Shteppa, Russian Historians and the Soviet State, p. 62.

²⁴Sochineniya, Vol. V, pp. 27-40, 56-68, and 140-168.

²⁵Ibid., pp. 274-317.

never be approached in this manner, but rather on the basis of class analysis. It was the capitalist classes of Europe who were responsible for the war, not just the German representatives of this class.²⁶ In arguing that Germany was the guilty party, and not England, France, or Tsarist Russia for that matter, Tarle merely compounded his ideological sins, for he plainly invited Pokrovsky to attack his political views.

If Tarle points to the Germans as the aggressor, this is only evidence of his former sympathy for the allies, having faith in that political system which he professed before the war. What we have in the book is one of the attempts of polemics carried on by Entente representatives against the Germans.²⁷

The editors of Istorik Marksist also criticized Tarle for his "Entente-philism" and explained precisely why the Entente powers, especially Great Britain, must be blamed for the war.

It is important to clear up the matter of England in 1914 down to its deepest roots because it explains to us the position of England in 1928. The fact that there are some people who share nothing in common with our world outlook of Marxism and take up the study of recent history, the history of events closely connected with our present day political realities, is a fact of profound sadness shameful for our Marxist historians.²⁸

The reasons for the indictment of Tarle by Pokrovsky and the editors of Istorik Marksist seemed obvious at the time.

²⁶ Pokrovsky, "Novye Tcheniya v Russkoy Istoricheskoy Literature," p. 12.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ "Ot Redaktsii," Istorik Marksist, IX (1928), p. 108.

First, if it was Germany, and not the Entente, who began the war, or at least bore the responsibility for it (though only primarily), that in itself removes the responsibility, or, at least, a considerable share of it, from the tsarist government as well as from the Western nations, France, and more especially England, who in 1928 was considered the chief enemy and the greatest danger for the Soviet Union. Not without reason did the answer to Tarle state clearly that the position of England in 1928 could only be explained by her position in 1914. Why? One explanation might be that, although this violated not only the historical facts but also the laws of dialectic, it nevertheless harmonized well with the tasks of current policy.²⁹

Finally, Tarle was denounced for his interpretation of the Treaties of Brest-Litovsk and Versailles because he contended that

the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, or, more exactly, the behavior of Germany in the east following this treaty served as a stimulus to the further consolidation of the Entente, and consequently, as a cause for the decisive military defeat of Germany and the Versailles Treaty which followed.³⁰

Pokrovsky replied, and unequivocally declared, that the Treaty of Versailles had been prepared as early as 1914. Furthermore, he asserted that Tarle was completely wrong in placing the blame on the "stupid Bolsheviks," especially Lenin, for contributing both to the defeat of Germany and to the victory of the Entente.³¹ In essence, Tarle had committed

²⁹ Shteppa, Russian Historians and the Soviet State, p. 61.

³⁰ Ibid., p. 59; Sochineniya, Vol. V, "Brest-Litovskii Mir i ego Znachenie v Istorii mirovoy voyny," pp. 387-393.

³¹ Pokrovsky, "Novye Tcheniya v Russkoy Istoricheskoy Literature," pp. 15-17.

two more serious ideological errors. First, he failed to take into account the party struggle, specifically the role of Lenin, prior to the conclusion of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. Second, unaware of the fact that "participants in this struggle had not left the stage, Tarle poured water on the mill wheel of the Party opposition, whose liquidation was bound to come."³²

In an article entitled, "Concerning the Question of the Outbreak of the War," published in Istorik Marksist soon after Pokrovsky's attack, Tarle answered the charges of his protagonist and defended the views he expounded in his book, Europe in the Epoch of Imperialism.³³ He complained first about the polemical nature of Pokrovsky's article and asked the readers of his book to decide whether or not the aggressive tone was justified. In concilliatory prose he wrote that "Pokrovsky ascribes to me views, tendencies, and conceptions with which I have nothing in common, and therefore it is possible /to assume/ that there has been some misunderstanding."³⁴ He also rebutted the accusations of Pokrovsky, namely that he was pro-Entente and that the

³²Shteppa, Russian Historians and the Soviet State, p. 61.

³³Tarle, "K Voprosy o Nachale Voyny: (Otvét M.N. Pokrovskomu)," pp. 101-107.

³⁴Ibid., p. 101.

Bolsheviks, in negotiating the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, indirectly contributed to the defeat of Germany and the Versailles Settlement. Tarle stated,

M.N. Pokrovsky accuses me of Entente-philism although many times I have repeated that the Entente and Germany were equally matched and deserved each other and that the clumsy publicists of these states have tried zealously to blame one another for the guilt which is a common crime.³⁵

In answering the second charge, Tarle agreed with Pokrovsky that the Versailles Treaty was formulated three years before the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, but he also contended,

It was two diplomatic errors on the part of the Germans that caused this program to be put into effect: their ruthless submarine warfare . . . and the Ludendorff finale, the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, both its plunderous nature and the way in which it was carried out.³⁶

Although Tarle promised to clarify his views in a second edition of his book which was being printed at the time of his reply to Pokrovsky, he nevertheless failed to satisfy the editors of Istorik Marksist who, obviously, had already convicted him on two counts: his entire methodological approach and his use of facts in explaining the causes of World War I. They wrote:

³⁵ Ibid., p. 102.

³⁶ Ibid.; Shteppa, Russian Historians and the Soviet State, p. 60.

³⁷ Tarle, "K Voprosu o Nachale Voyny: (Otvét M.N. Pokrovskomu)," p. 101; "Ot Redaktsii," pp. 107-108.

And if in his answer, Tarle is still a greater and even a more flagrant fatalist than in his book, then it means that fatalism comprises the essence of his convictions, he frankly imagines that Marxism is a fatalism, and that it makes no difference to Marxism by whom, how, or when one thing or another has been accomplished, granted that it was sociologically inevitable.³⁸

In short, Tarle's unorthodox Marxism conflicted with the party's version which was geared to justify and support the political policies of the regime. The editors concluded their article by issuing Tarle a stern warning:

For E.V. Tarle there will be no future in Marxism for it is beyond his capabilities of course to understand in general our opinions in discussing subjects with him. He complains about the tone of the remarks in Istorik Marksist. Excuse us for this tone, but we always converse in this manner with our class enemies, so spoke Marx, Engels, Plekhanov, and Lenin. Whoever is not pleased with this tone, let him not interfere in the class struggle, let him not defend the point of view of those or other imperialists against Marxist analysis.³⁹

The mounting criticism directed against Tarle was not exclusively confined to the pages of Istorik Marksist. At the first All Union Conference of Marxist Historians held in Moscow at the end of December, 1928, and January of 1929, Europe in the Epoch of Imperialism became the subject of a lively discussion among the members of the committee for Western European history, who unanimously agreed to condemn

³⁸ "Ot Redaktsii," p. 108.

³⁹ Ibid., pp. 108-109.

the work. Following the lead of Pokrovsky, who previously stated that the book was well-written, the committee explained that its "beautiful style" was precisely its greatest danger, for it was widely read in general, but in particular by Soviet youth, who were being corrupted and persuaded by Tarle that Germany was responsible for the outbreak of the First World War.⁴⁰

A second, but shorter, edition of Europe in the Epoch of Imperialism, which Tarle had promised the editors of Istorik Marksist, appeared at the end of 1928.⁴¹ Through a play on words, Tarle naively attempted to convince Pokrovsky and his associates that he had accepted their critical suggestions and had incorporated them into the revised edition of his work. But it was obvious that he maintained his former views and merely tried to save face. For example, in the first edition, Tarle wrote about the role of the working class prior to 1914:

A fourth characteristic feature of the period 1871-1914 was the considerable weakening of the menacing force of the socialist parties in the area of foreign policy. Perhaps one should give a much more broader formula:

⁴⁰ "Trudy Pervoy Vsesoyuznoy Konferentsii Istorikov Marksistov," pp. 25-45.

⁴¹ Sochineniya, Vol. V, Evropa v Epokhu Imperializma: 1871-1919. (izdanie vtoroe dopotnennoe Moskva-Leningrad: Gosudarstvenoe Izdatelstvo, 1928), pp. 24-509.

the working class as such in this period, especially in the last fifteen or twenty years, continuously and to a lesser and lesser degree opposed the adherents of the idea of a show of force in the administration of their policy.⁴²

Concerning the same subject in the second edition, Tarle stated,

Regarding the working class during this period-- obviously it broadened and strengthened its class consciousness as the social democrats were able to organize the masses and communicate with them also through the proletarian press; but, as the situation became more complicated to the working class, especially in the area of international problems and colonial policy, the less threatening they became, or at least the less threatening they became in the eyes of the ruling circles who previously feared that the working class with its entire mass would reply to mobilization with revolutionary outbursts.⁴³

As for the violation of Belgian neutrality by Germany, which prompted England to declare war, Tarle related in the first edition,

For England, German domination of Belgium by peaceful means or by war, was such a terrible economic and political wrong, that England could in no way reconcile itself to it.⁴⁴

In the second edition he wrote:

⁴²Evropa v Epokhu Imperializma: 1871-1919, (izdanie Pervoy--first edition), p. 14.

⁴³Sochineniya, Vol. V, Evropa v Epokhu Imperializma 1871-1919, p. 19.

⁴⁴Evropa v Epokhu Imperializma: 1871-1919, (izdanie Pervoy--first edition), p. 287.

Obviously, it had already been known for a few years in England that the Germans would violate the neutrality of Belgium. Now, however, the English pretended that this was something completely unexpected; the agitation for war began immediately and at once a pretext was found to declare war. The English considered the domination of Belgium by Germany, whether it be by peaceful means or by means of war, a terrible political and economic wrong, 45 to which they could never in any way reconcile themselves.

When writing about the working class in England in the first edition, Tarle asserted, "In 1911, the danger of the revolutionary movements of the working class was already substantially less in England than when the liberal government came into power."⁴⁶ In the second edition, he posed a question: "In 1914 was the danger of the revolutionary movements of the working class already smaller in England than when the liberal government took power?"⁴⁷

Shortly after the publication of the revised edition of Europe in the Epoch of Imperialism, a critical review written by N. Rubinshtein appeared in Istorik Marksist evaluating the new work in light of the corrections demanded by Pokrovsky and the editors.⁴⁸ Rubinshtein carefully analyzed

⁴⁵ Sochineniya, Vol. V, Evropa v Epokhu Imperializma: 1871-1919, pp. 308-309.

⁴⁶ Evropa v Epokhu Imperializma: 1871-1919, (izdanie pervoe--first edition), p. 51.

⁴⁷ Sochineniya, Vol. V, Evropa v Epokhu Imperializma: 1871-1919, p. 55.

⁴⁸ N. Rubinshtein, "Kriticheskie Stati-Otstuplenie v Boevom Besporyadke," Istorik Marksist, XI (1929), pp. 157-162.

the second edition, especially those sections which were considered objectionable for ideological and political reasons. He recognized that Tarle had made some changes and had second thoughts about his former conclusions:⁴⁹

These reservations show that E.V. Tarle had been aware of the steps to take in view of the observations and opinions of Pokrovsky. It was especially intolerable for him to consider the conclusion of the Brest-Litovsk peace as a factor in strengthening the Entente.⁵⁰

Rubinshtein concluded the review by summarizing the corrections that Tarle had made in the second edition:

Once again they show that at best his means of defending the Marxist position continues to remain nothing but a decisive attack on it. Under the pressure of Marxist criticism, E.V. Tarle has been forced to retreat in confusion along the entire front. The repudiation of his errors in the first edition is both incomplete and inconsistent. In his attempts at reservations, Tarle changes the stress, trying to integrate his erroneous formulas, but in doing this, he acknowledges his errors by his transition to another historical scheme, refusing to acknowledge his obvious sin of fatalism by failing to understand the historical process. The second edition . . . once and for all decides the question about "misunderstanding," "inaccuracies," and "careless reading" alluded to by E.V. Tarle. Europe in the⁵¹
Epoch of Imperialism was understood as it was written.

The changes that have occurred on both the international and domestic scene since 1928 have forced Soviet historians to revise Pokrovsky's views of Europe in the Epoch of

⁴⁹Ibid., p. 157.

⁵⁰Ibid., p. 161.

⁵¹Ibid., pp. 161-162.

Imperialism and place it in a contemporary political frame of reference.⁵² In volume five of the collected works of Tarle, which includes the second edition of Europe in the Epoch of Imperialism, the editor, V.M. Khvostov, stated,

The reader without difficulty will see that E.V. Tarle does not hold to the position of the Leninist theory of imperialism, but, nevertheless, there is a definite, and besides, a great influence of this theory on him.⁵³

Erusalimskii, the chief editor of the collected works of Tarle said,

Even though he was not completely successful in relating the profound economic and class antagonisms resulting from the first imperialist war, he succeeded in exposing many aspects of imperialist diplomacy, showing those methods by which it speedily adapted itself in preparing and unleashing the war, and how, during the course of the war, they /the imperialist powers/ planned the redivision of the world.⁵⁴

In his concluding remarks about the book, Khvostov contended, "The book was weak and one-sided because of the author's prejudiced attitude in placing the major share of the blame for the outbreak of the war on Germany."⁵⁵ However, he also declared that

although Tarle struck with an acute pen and with a special passion, namely at German imperialism, he also stressed the guilt of the Entente powers. The book,

⁵² Sochineniya, Vol. I, pp. XXII and XXIII; Sochineniya, Vol. V, pp. 5-6.

⁵³ Sochineniya, Vol. V, p. 6.

⁵⁴ Sochineniya, Vol. I, p. XXIII.

⁵⁵ Sochineniya, Vol. V, p. 6.

moreover, maintains its political presence and it will maintain this presence in the future as it concerns itself with the extreme measures of that time, while humanity did not care to save itself from the terror of German imperialism and militarism and from the danger of renewed German aggression.⁵⁶

It is interesting to note that neither Erusalimskii nor Khvostov attacked Tarle for his interpretation of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk.

In 1928 Tarle wrote an important monograph entitled, The Working Class in France in the First Period of Machine Industry: From the Fall of the Empire to the Workers Uprising in Lyons.⁵⁷ A sequel to his two previous studies on this subject, it was the first work of this type published by the Institute of Marx and Engels in the series Research on the History of the Proletariat and its Class Struggle.⁵⁸ The book was primarily based on unpublished materials gathered from the French National Archives, reports of the Prefecture and the Minister of Internal Affairs, and the correspondence of the Minister of Justice.⁵⁹ In the study Tarle traced the

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ Sochineniya, Vol. VI, Rabochii Klass vo Frantsii v Pervye Vremena Mashinnogo Proizvodstva ot Kontsa Imperii do Vosstaniya Rabochikh v Liöne, pp. 9-260.

⁵⁸ Sochineniya, Vol. VI, p. 5; Manfred, "Evgenii Viktorovich Tarle," p. 14; Kareev, "Les Études sur l'histoire de France en Russie depuis Vingt Ans," p. 386.

⁵⁹ Sochineniya, Vol. VI, pp. 557-709.

growth of industry during the period of the Bourbon Restoration, he assessed the conditions of the working class and the development of their economic and political grievances up to the July Monarchy, and concluded the work with an evaluation of the Lyons Uprising of 1831.⁶⁰ The book was written within a Marxist framework and marked by the consistent use of Marxist terminology to explain the actions of the working class. Tarle stated,

We will not forget that the French working class played a tremendous role in all revolutionary movements of the nineteenth century; universal history will not forget the significant part played by the workers in the revolutionary uprising in Lyons in 1831. If one does not know the details of the history of the working class in France, it is impossible to understand the Lyons uprising, the history of socialism as it developed in France, and to understand correctly all of French history in so far as the working class always appeared as the vanguard of the revolution.⁶¹

In spite of the Marxian overtones and terminology, the study was panned by the Pokrovsky school, which considered it a non-Marxist work. A review in Istorik Marksist cautioned the reader to exercise great care so as not to be misled by the Marxist phraseology used in it. The review likewise pointed out the fact that several problems were treated in a methodologically incorrect manner. It was admitted begrudgingly, however, that the book was well-written and especially valu-

⁶⁰ Ibid., pp. 9-260.

⁶¹ Sochineniya, Vol. I, p. XXIV.

able because the author used new materials.⁶²

Another Tarle work, published in 1929, was Essays in the (Most) Recent History of Europe, 1812-1919. Primarily an introductory textbook for nineteenth century history, it was violently attacked in Istorik Marksist for its factual and methodological errors, and especially for the author's complete ignorance of the writings of Marx and Engels.⁶³

S. Monosov, who reviewed the book, concluded,

We believe that what has been said about the book has clearly unmasked it, and also made clear to us the character and quality of the book. We have before us a book written hastily, extremely slipshod, and from every page and from every line of the book there emerges the face of a liberal bourgeois historian who clumsily and awkwardly screens the book with a thin mask of Marxist terminology Moreover, all the achievements and conclusions of Marxist historical science greet with monstrous scorn the author's ignorance of the principles of Marxism . . . we categorically recommend /that everyone/ refrain from using this book. Otherwise, untrained readers will receive lies, false impressions, and a distorted presentation of the leading themes of history from the Congress of Vienna to the Treaty of Versailles.⁶⁴

Despite the persistence and the viciousness of the attacks on Tarle, for the time being at least, they did not

⁶² Akademik E. Tarle. Rabochii Klass vo Frantsii v Pervye Vremena Mashinnogo Proizvodstva ot Kontsa Imperii do Vosstaniya Rabochikh v Liöne, Istorik Marksist, XI (1929), pp. 189-193.

⁶³ S. Monosov, Review of Ocherk Novyeshye Istorii Evropy (1814-1919), by Akademik E.V. Tarle, Istorik Marksist, XII (1929), pp. 235-238.

⁶⁴ Ibid., p. 238.

cause him any undue hardships or practical consequences. He was still able to maintain his contacts with the West and was invited to participate in the International Congress of Historians at Oslo in the summer of 1928 as a member of the Soviet delegation.⁶⁵ In a letter sent from Paris, Tarle expressed his regrets that he was unable to attend the meeting due to illness.⁶⁶ Even though he was not present, an announcement was made at the Congress concerning Tarle's forthcoming study of "The Working Class in France on the Eve of the Revolution of 1848."⁶⁷

At this point in his career, Tarle's position was indeed paradoxical; he was ruthlessly condemned for his historical opinions at home, but abroad, particularly in France, he was viewed as a distinguished representative of Soviet historiography and a recognized authority on the domestic events of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic period.⁶⁸

⁶⁵Pokrovsky was the only Soviet historian to attend this conference.

⁶⁶Tompkins, "Trends in Communist Historical Thought," p. 307.

⁶⁷"VII Congres International des Sciences Historiques. Résumes des Communications" (Oslo, 1928), p. 291.

⁶⁸Mathiez, "Choses de Russe Sovietique," pp. 149-158; Tompkins, "Trends in Communist Historical Thought," p. 307; Weintraub, "Blaski i Nedze Dzejow Zycia Prof. Tarlego," p. 103.

Tarle spent the year before his arrest in France, where he lectured at the Sorbonne, wrote articles for historical journals, and collected source materials for future publications.⁶⁹ On November 30, 1929 he gave a public lecture at the Sorbonne entitled, "The Economic Unity of the European Continent under Napoleon," possibly unaware of the political implications connected with such a topic. In the course of his address, Tarle contended that Napoleon's long range objective had not been to dominate Europe, but instead, to create a community of economic interests on the European continent with France sharing only as an equal partner.⁷⁰ The Rector of the Sorbonne, M. Charlety, who followed Tarle to the rostrum, added to the political character of his speech when he stated that the League of Nations was merely a continuation of Napoleon's idea. Just a few weeks before, the French Foreign Minister, Aristide Briand, had spoken before the Chamber of Deputies and proposed his own project for a

⁶⁹ Sochineniya, Vol. VI, p. 5; Mathiez, "Choses de Russe Soviétique," p. 157; E.V. Tarle, "L'Insurrection Ouvrière de Lyon," Revue Marxiste, No. 2 (1929), pp. 132-153, and 265-294; E.V. Tarle, "L'Insurrection Ouvrière de Lyon," Revue Marxiste, No. 4 (1929), pp. 412-428; E.V. Tarle, "L'Union Économique du Continent Européen sous Napoleon," (Idée et Réalisations) Revue Historique, CLXVI (January-April, 1931), pp. 239-255.

⁷⁰ "Burzhuaznye Istoriki Zapada v SSSR (Tarle, Petrushevskii, Kareev, Buzeskul i dr.)," p. 60; Tompkins, "Trends in Communist Historical Thought," p. 307.

United States of Europe. It must be remembered that the Soviet Union at that time violently opposed the League of Nations, considering it to be a tool of Western imperialism, especially of France, whose purpose from its inception was the destruction of Bolshevism. In light of what the Rector of the Sorbonne and the French Foreign Minister had said, Tarle's address was interpreted by Soviet authorities "as a tacit approval of the scheme for a Pan-Europe under French hegemony."⁷¹

The introduction of the policy of forced collectivization and "dekulakization" coincided with the Party's final showdown with the "bourgeois historians." In September, 1929, S.V. Rozhdestvensky was the first well-known scholar to be arrested. A mass purge of all the renowned pre-revolutionary historians followed, including the arrest of Tarle on December 18, 1930; and by the end of 1931, they were completely eliminated from the academic scene.⁷²

While Tarle languished in prison awaiting trial for his ideological and political transgressions, his troubles were compounded by the fact that his name was linked with

⁷¹"Burzhuaznye Istoriki Zapada v SSSR (Tarle, Petrush-evskii, Kareev, Buzeskul i dr.)" p. 60; Mathiez, "Choses de Russe Sovietique," p. 157; Tompkins, "Trends in Communist Historical Thought," p. 308.

⁷²"Burzhuaznye Istoriki Zapada v SSSR (Tarle, Petrush-evskii, Kareev, Buzeskul i dr.)" p. 59; Chernavin, "The Treatment of Scholars in the USSR," pp. 710-714.

the "Workers Peasant Party" and the Prompartia.⁷³ According to Party officials, the members of both organizations had conspired with the ruling circles of Great Britain and France to overthrow the Soviet government and to replace it with a bourgeois-capitalist regime. The chief defendant in the Prompartia trial, N. Ramzin, an engineer in charge of the electrification program, admitted that while travelling in England and France in 1927 and 1928 on official business, he had reached such a clandestine agreement. Ramzin also disclosed that a slate had been prepared which comprised the members of the new government. Tarle's name appeared on it as Minister of Foreign Affairs. Another list released in 1930 revealed that Tarle and Paul Milyukov were both being considered as prime candidates for the post of Foreign Minister.⁷⁴

During the course of the Prompartia trial, a number of articles were written by Party historians, whose task and purpose it was to justify the wholesale arrests of the pre-revolutionary "bourgeois" historians. One publication in

⁷³Zaidel and Tsvibak, Klassoviy Vrag na Istoricheskome Fronte: Tarle i Platonov i ikh Shkoly, p. 8.

⁷⁴Mathiez, "Choses de Russie Sovietique," pp. 154-155; Tompkins, "Trends in Communist Historical Thought," p. 308; Zaidel and Tsvibak, Klassoviy Vrag na Istoricheskome Fronte: Tarle i Platonov i ikh Shkoly, p. 8.

particular, based on several meetings of the Institute of History and the Leningrad branch of the Society of Marxist Historians in January and February of 1931, was devoted exclusively to the careers of the two most prominent jailed historians, Tarle and S. Platonov.⁷⁵ Of the two, however, Tarle received much more attention, indicating that he was the primary target of the Party. The section of the book which concerned Tarle was written by G. Zaidel, a historian who had worked together with him at the Marx-Engels Institute in 1927 and 1928 on publications about the history of the working classes in Western Europe.⁷⁶ Even though Zaidel knew that Tarle was the object of the bitter attack by Pokrovsky for alleged anti-Marxist tendencies, he nevertheless boldly defended Tarle's work at the Institute at the first All-Union Conference of Marxist Historians in Moscow in 1928.⁷⁷

⁷⁵ "Burzhuazye Istoriki Zapada v SSSR (Tarle, Petrush-evskii, Kareev, Buzeskul i dr.)" pp. 44-86; V. Altman, "Chto Chitat o Mirovoy Voine," Borba Klassov, No. 2 (1931), pp. 120-123; Mokhov, "Intervent Tarle pod Zashchitoy Vostokova," pp. 120-121; S. Piontokovsky, "Velikoderzhavniye Tendentsii v Istoriografii Rossii," Istorik Marksist, XVII (1930), pp. 21-26; S. Piontokovsky, "Velikorussskaya Burzhuaznaya Istorioografiya Poslednego Desyatelitiya," Istorik Marksist, XVIII-XIX (1930), pp. 157-176; Zaidel and Tsvibak, Klassoviy Vrag na Istoricheskom Fronte: Tarle i Platonov i ikh Shkoly, p. 3.

⁷⁶ Sochineniya, Vol. XII, pp. 498-499; Manfred, "Evgenii Viktorovich Tarle," pp. 13-14.

⁷⁷ Weintraub, "Blaski i Nedze Dzejow Zycia Prof. Tarlego," p. 101.

Because of his close association with Tarle and the defense of his work, it would seem likely that Zaidel agreed to co-author this polemical book as an act of penance in order to convince the Party that he was a loyal historian actively engaged in the class struggle against enemies of the state, such as Tarle, one of the leading representatives of bourgeois historiography.

In general, Zaidel's objective in the book was to prove beyond a doubt that Tarle had committed serious methodological, political, and ideological errors throughout his career. To achieve this goal, Zaidel contended that Tarle consistently deviated from Marxism, especially Pokrovsky's version of it, that he had never been a Marxist in the first place, and that instead he had always been a spokesman for the class interests of the bourgeoisie. Thus, according to Zaidel, Tarle's major studies of the working class in France were not only anti-Marxist tracts, but also worthless falsifications of history because they were written exclusively from a bourgeois point of view. Furthermore, Zaidel argued, Tarle had taken an uncompromising stand against Bolshevism since the Revolution. As evidence, Zaidel pointed to Tarle's active participation in the affairs of the Provisional government and the pro-Entente outlook which was a feature of his

works during the "Scholarly NEP" period.⁷⁸

In the first chapter, Zaidel evaluated the early works of Tarle, particularly those which were published between 1906 and 1916.⁷⁹ He stated that this was the period in which Tarle produced his most significant studies and formulated his methodological views. However, Zaidel declared that the works were the product of a reactionary historian because they were written during the most reactionary decade in Russian history. In addition, for synthesizing the views of prominent bourgeois historians and for incorporating them into his publications, Tarle was accused of methodological eclecticism.⁸⁰ Zaidel concluded this section of the book stating,

Thus from the first days of his scholarly-literary activities, Tarle concealed his bourgeois essence and carried out the social ideas of the Russian bourgeoisie, that is, to take the proletariat in tow and to use it as a tool for strengthening the bourgeois state. The methodological eclecticism reveals that Tarle used these tools in order to achieve the political goals of the bourgeoisie.⁸¹

In the second chapter of the book, Zaidel evaluated Tarle's interpretation of the role of the working class during

⁷⁸ Zaidel and Tsvibak, Klassoviy Vrag na Istoricheskom Fronte: Tarle i Platonov i ikh Shkoly, theme of the book.

⁷⁹ Ibid., "Metodologicheskie Vzglady Tarle," pp. 8-22.

⁸⁰ Ibid., p. 22.

⁸¹ Ibid.

the French Revolution.⁸² Tarle had concluded his two volume work on this subject by stating,

For the entire period under discussion the workers in general did not display a hostile attitude to either the basic economic structure or to any political organization beginning with the Constituent Assembly and ending with the Consulate. The awareness of class differences or feeling of solidarity among comrades, rarely, if the innumerable exceptions are not considered, appears in the workers' environment in the period under discussion. Political interests, even as something directly resulting from the needs and aspirations of an economic nature, were for them still a distant and complicated abstraction.⁸³

Zaidel argued that this view contradicted the Marxist-Leninist scheme of the French Revolution and was similar to traditional reactionary historiography which considered the proletariat as the submissive servants of the bourgeoisie in the historical process.⁸⁴ According to Zaidel, Marx explained the French Revolution and the role of the working class in the following manner:

The revolutionary movements began in 1789 in the Social Clubs, during its course it had many spokesmen, but in time it finally sustained a defeat with the suppression of the conspiracy of Babeuf--this movement gave rise to the birth of the communist idea and also to the idea of a new proletarian order.⁸⁵

⁸² Ibid., "Tarle, Kak Istorik Rabochego Klassa vo Frantsii," pp. 22-37.

⁸³ Chapter II, page 52.

⁸⁴ Zaidel and Tsvibak, Klassoviy Vrag na Istoricheskome Fronte: Tarle i Platonov i ikh Shkoly, p. 25.

⁸⁵ Ibid., p. 30.

Zaidel insisted that Tarle naturally was forced to falsify history to prove his thesis since he relied exclusively on bourgeois sources which ignored Marxist historical doctrines, particularly the class struggle. As a result,

Tarle underestimated the development of industry in France, he overlooked a series of important events during this period, he absolutely glossed over the distinction between the Thermidorean counter-revolution and the revolutionary dictatorship, and finally, he distorted the true role of Babeuf when he argued that Babeuf was the only radical in the Revolution, but not a communist.⁸⁶

Zaidel closed this chapter by declaring, "From the past until the present day, Tarle's ideology has been clearly apologetic to the bourgeoisie and it has been quite obviously the enemy of the working class."⁸⁷

Tarle was also accused by Zaidel of being the foremost spokesman for Russian neo-imperialism.⁸⁸ To support this contention, Zaidel analyzed a few articles which Tarle wrote during the First World War. He noted his pro-French attitude. After the February Revolution, Tarle became the spokesman for the Kerensky regime as his articles, which appeared in the newspaper Den', supported the government's policies, especially its efforts to continue on with the war.

⁸⁶Ibid.

⁸⁷Ibid., p. 37.

⁸⁸Ibid., "Tarle--Ideolog Russkogo Neoimperializma," pp. 37-49.

His political activities on behalf of the Provisional Government were indicative of his ideological stand, which Zaidel denounced as anti-Bolshevik and anti-revolutionary.

As we have seen, from the first days of the February Revolution, Tarle seriously took part in foreign policy, he even took it upon himself to volunteer for the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs, travelling to Helsinki and Stockholm. He apparently believed he would become Minister of Foreign Affairs.⁸⁹

Zaidel also spent considerable time reviewing Pokrovsky's criticism of Tarle's work, Europe in the Epoch of Imperialism.⁹⁰

The articles that Tarle wrote for the journal Annals were systematically attacked by Zaidel.⁹¹ He stated that during this period,

there can be no doubt that in the journal Annals, Tarle tried to revive in all its crudeness the school of bourgeois historiography. He determined the political program and was concerned with the foreign relations of the Soviet Union; in particular its /future/ foreign policy. In short, his program can be described as a return to the restoration of capitalism.⁹²

In the final chapter, Zaidel summarized the reasons why Tarle was guilty and why he should be punished.⁹³ He

⁸⁹ Ibid., p. 47.

⁹⁰ Ibid., pp. 40-44.

⁹¹ Ibid., "Annaly. Shkola Tarle," pp. 49-60.

⁹² Ibid., p. 60.

⁹³ Ibid., "Zaklyuchenie. Nauchnaya tekhnika Istoricheskikh Rabot Tarle," pp. 60-66.

concluded:

From the first days of his scholarly literary activity, Tarle was clearly a bourgeois historian who falsified history to satisfy the class interests of the capitalist historical process. His methodological eclecticism, a combining together of the ideas of Luchitskii, Kant, Rodgers, Struve, and Bernstein, showed that from the beginning, Tarle adopted a few supposedly Marxist views. These circumstances, and in addition the themes and skills to use radical phraseology and being able to combine it with a beautiful style, promoted the idea that Tarle was a leading scholar and thus for a long time, he played the role of a first class progressive. Taking from the first days of the February Revolution a counter revolutionary position, Tarle concealed it masterfully from the Soviet government by publishing nearly always Marxist works whose quality was supposedly friendly to the Soviet State, but in reality he formed an alliance with the double-dyed reactionary school of Platonov, and in his bourgeois work he slandered the working class and became an apologist for Entente imperialism and for Russian neo-imperialism. This ideology of sabotage combines with it a bad quality which in essence is the destruction of the relationship between the /historian/ and the documents; he /Tarle/ gathers documents under a definite reactionary point of view, he neglects important printed sources, and he substitutes critical analysis for self-glorification with disdain for the views of the work of others.

The proletariat learns nothing from the studies of the type of historians such as Tarle. Not only do the sabotaging schemes of Tarle have to be discarded, but also the documentation of this historian which has been revised in a radical manner. Tarle does not have the right to be called a historian of the working class, the history of which he has falsified in order to satisfy the bourgeoisie. Neither the workers of the Soviet Union, nor the proletariat of other states have been able to recognize his sabotaging conception. By firmly establishing proletariat historiography in the USSR, once and for all this will put an end to Tarle and his friends on the historical front.⁹⁴

⁹⁴Ibid., pp. 65-66.

The second part of the book contained a series of speeches by Marxist historians who gave additional support to the accusations directed against Tarle and Platonov by Zaidel and Tsvibak. P. Shchegolev, who had previously criticized Tarle in 1928 for his work on the Continental Blockade, set the mood for the rest of the speeches when he denounced Tarle again in an extremely hostile manner.⁹⁵

Soviet historians of Marxism who work in the field of Western European history, because of a series of objective conditions, rarely have the opportunity to turn to such sources which would be unknown to the bourgeois historian. If we were to accept Tarle's attitude and were to be guided by his directives, then we would have to enclose ourselves in the framework of historical diagnosis which in essence would mean the complete immobilization of the work of our historians of the West.

Another aspect of Tarle's method would mean the following: To concentrate exclusively on raw material of archives means to believe in all the conclusions that Western historical science has made up to now. This orientation, on the other hand, would mean that the existing Marxist literature would be taken out of circulation. This attitude would mean that Marxist historical literature would come to a complete standstill and that in a whole series of problems, Marxist historical science would have to lay down its arms.⁹⁶

In short, Shchegolev was saying that Tarle's traditional use of sources to document his works was contrary to the methods

⁹⁵ P. Shchegolev, Review of Le Blocus Continental et le Royaume d'Italie, by E.V. Tarle, Istorik Marksist, IX (1928), pp. 281-283.

⁹⁶ Zaidel and Tsvibak, Klassoviy Vrag na Istoricheskom Fronte: Tarle i Platonov i ikh Shkoly, p. 127.

employed by the Pokrovsky school which unquestionably possessed the key to the secret of scholarly procedures for historical research. The works of historians of this school, especially Pokrovsky's, were marked by the almost complete absence of references to sources.

A peculiarity of Shchegolev's speech was his attack on Tarle's monograph Germinal and Prairial, not published until 1937.⁹⁷ Just how Shchegolev obtained the unfinished manuscript was not explained. Nevertheless he declared,

If this work would have been completed then, we would not have obtained a history of Germinal and Prairial, but we would have gotten only a bourgeois falsification of these movements of the Parisian proletariat.⁹⁸

From a moral point of view, the most infamous part of the book was the appendix. There, former students, as acts of humility and penance, cleansed themselves by condemning their imprisoned mentor, Tarle. N.N. Rosenthal, without mentioning Tarle's name wrote,

If I do not have the proper Bolshevik hatred toward our class enemies, it cannot be explained by my wavering in basic matters, but rather by my bourgeois intellectual psychology /developed under Tarle/.⁹⁹

⁹⁷Sochineniya, Vol. VI, Zherminal' i Prerial' (Moskva, 1937), pp. 321-562.

⁹⁸Zaidel and Tsvibak, Klassoviy Vrag na Istoricheskom Fronte: Tarle i Platonov i ikh Shkoly, pp. 135-136.

⁹⁹Ibid., pp. 228-229.

Ya. Zakher, who later became a professor at Leningrad University and the author of several books dealing with the French Revolution and the Revolutions of 1848 in Germany, sent a letter from Leningrad in which he stated:

In my political viewpoints since 1928, I began to lean in the direction of right opportunism. The result of this was my under evaluation of the sharpening of class warfare in the Soviet Union and the necessity for sharpening the struggle with the class enemies on the ideological front. It was for this reason that I did not understand the need for unmasking the anti-Marxist viewpoint of Tarle when it was suggested that I take a stand against him. I acted in a two-faced manner, thus bringing down upon myself the justified punishment of my exclusion from the VKP (b) and the taking away of my work. I now feel that if I had subjectively directed myself to make the final break with my former teacher, then considering the matter objectively, I protected not only an anti-Marxist, but also a counter revolutionary, which, of course, I realized only later.¹⁰⁰

Tarle's arrest caused a tremendous reaction among French historical circles. Such prominent historians as C. Bloch, A. Mathiez, P. Renouvin, H. Hauser, H. See, Ch. Seignobos, and S. Levi sent a note to Soviet authorities protesting the imprisonment of Tarle. In it they pointed out the contributions that Tarle had made to the literature of the history of the French working classes during the period of the Revolution and Restoration and to the causes and consequences of the Continental Blockade. They also reminded Soviet officials that he was instrumental in creating an

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., pp. 226-227.

atmosphere of good will and understanding between scholars of both countries. In conclusion, they stated,

We are not preoccupied with politics, but we consider it as our duty as scholars to raise our voices to attest to the honor, the worth, and the perfect loyalty of our colleague, and we wish that you make this testimony known to all in the Soviet Union.¹⁰¹

Albert Mathiez, who extended the invitation to Tarle to lecture at the Sorbonne, published an article in which he likewise objected vehemently to the arbitrary arrest of Tarle. A renowned historian of the French Revolution, close to being a Marxist, and an admirer of Robespierre, Mathiez at one time was a staunch advocate of close Franco-Soviet scholarly collaboration. This relationship never developed fully because of the blind acceptance of Soviet historians of the Marxist-Leninist ideology set down by Pokrovsky through the Party. Tarle's arrest further disillusioned Mathiez as he realized that cooperation with Soviet historians was impossible, especially when they persecuted their own colleagues rather than defending them against attacks from the regime. To those historians loyal to the regime he wrote,

You have abdicated your independence. You are nothing more than tools in the hands of the government. You embellish your capitulation in the name of Marxism, . . . in the Russia of Stalin, there is no longer a place

¹⁰¹Mathiez, "Choses de Russe Sovietique," p. 157.

for independent scholarship, for free and impassionate scholarship, in short, for all science. History notably is nothing more than a branch of propaganda Stalin is God and you are his prophets.¹⁰²

Soviet historians responded to Mathiez declaring that his historical views had nothing in common with Marxism, and were therefore completely erroneous.¹⁰³ In spite of the protests by French scholars, Tarle was tried and exiled for his alleged crimes.

¹⁰²Ibid. pp. 153-154 and p. 156.

¹⁰³C. Fridliand, "Kazus Matieza," Borba Klassov, No. 2 (1931), pp. 100-105; M.N. Lukin, "Noveishaya Evolyutsiya Alberta Matieza," Istorik Marksist, XXI (1931), pp. 38-43.

CHAPTER V

TARLE AS HISTORICAL SPOKESMAN FOR POLICIES OF THE REGIME (1934-1945)

The changes that occurred on the international scene during the thirties, such as the triumph of Nazism in Germany, the spread of fascism throughout Europe, and the menace from Japan in the Far East, posed a threat to Soviet security. At the same time, the Soviet Union was faced with severe domestic problems. The introduction of forced collectivization and rapid industrialization caused economic and social chaos. In light of the events on the foreign and domestic scene, Stalin and his clique initiated a drastic revision of the writing of history. Now historians were ordered to stress nationalism and patriotism, particularly the traditional heroism of the Russian people and the progressive nature of the Western European Democracies as a means of bolstering morale at home and gaining friends abroad. As a result of the inauguration of this policy, the once official anti-nationalistic and anti-Western historical school of Pokrovsky became a political liability for the regime. Within a few years after the death of Pokrovsky, his historical views were condemned. Most of his close associates were tried and convicted of crimes against

the state in a manner similar to the purge of the "bourgeois historians" in 1931.¹

As the posthumous denunciation of Pokrovsky and his school intensified and the revision of historical writing proceeded, Tarle returned unnoticed from exile sometime in 1933 or 1934. He soon took up his former academic position at the University of Leningrad.² Why Soviet authorities permitted Tarle to return remains a matter of conjecture. According to Weintraub, while he was in Russia a story circulated that when Edouard Herriot, the Chairman of the French Society of Friends of the Soviet Union, visited Moscow in

¹See Chapter I, pp. 18-23. The following articles, books, and decrees deal with the new trends in Soviet historiography and the denunciation of the Pokrovsky school. V Stalin, S. Kirov, and A. Zhdanov, "Zamechaniya po Povodu Konspekta Uchebnika po Istorii SSSR," Pravda, August 8 and 9, 1934, p. 2; J. Stalin and V. Molotov, "Na Fronte Istoricheskoy Nauki," pp. 60-66; Karl Radek, "Nedostatki Istoricheskogo Fronta i Oshibki Skholy Pokrovskogo," pp. 53-66; N. Rubinstein, "Nedostatki v Prepodavanii Istorii VKP(b)," Bolshevik, No. 8 (1936), pp. 4-22; A. Shchegalov, "Metodologicheskiye Istoki Oshibok M.N. Pokrovskogo," Pod Znamenem Marksizma, No. 5 (1936), pp. 55-69; J. Stalin, "Ob Uchebnike Istorii VKP(b)," Bolshevik, No. 9 (1937), pp. 8-10; P. Drozdov, "Istoricheskaya Shkola Pokrovskogo," Izvestiia, March 21, 1937, pp. 2-3; Protiv Istoricheskoy Kontseptsii M.N. Pokrovskogo (Moskva-Leningrad: Adademii Nauk SSSR, 1939-1940).

²Leo Yarish, "The Campaign of 1812," Rewriting Russian History, p. 269; Erickson, "E.V. Tarle: The Career of a Historian Under the Soviet Regime," p. 204; Hosch, Evgenij Viktorovic Tarle (1875-1955) und Seine Stellung in der Sowjet-Geschichtswissenschaft, p. 117; Mehnert, Stalin Versus Marx, p. 13; Meusel, "Zum Andenken an E.V. Tarle," p. 149; Weintraub, "Blaski i Nedze Dziejow Zycia Prof. Tarlego," p. 115. There is no agreement as to the date when Tarle returned from exile. Meusel says he taught at the University of Leningrad from 1932 until 1948. Soviet sources make no mention of his arrest and exile.

1934, he asked V. Molotov as a personal favor, to allow him to meet with Tarle.³ Molotov supposedly consented, ordered a plane to fly to Alma-Ata to bring him back, and, within a short period of time, Tarle became the leading political-historical propagandist for the government.⁴ Weintraub also admitted that the accuracy of the story was difficult to determine.⁵ In spite of its dubious nature, if the story were true, then it is likely that the decision to release Tarle was a gesture of friendship toward France which might have been a step, albeit a small one, in the direction of the normalization of relations between the two states. However, it appears more likely that the reinstatement of Tarle was inspired by "reason of state" which could be used by the regime for propaganda purposes in the West, especially in the French intellectual community, to promote the idea that a new liberal policy had been introduced in the Soviet Union. From the standpoint of the Soviet government, it was obviously in dire need of the services of historians of Tarle's caliber to help implement the new historical line. Even though he

³Weintraub, Ibid.

⁴Sochineniya, Vol. I, pp. XXIV-XXXII; Hosch, Evgenij Viktorovic Tarle (1875-1955) und Seine Stellung in der Sowjetischen Geschichtswissenschaft, p. 117.

⁵Weintraub, "Blaski i Nedze Dziejow Zycia Prof. Tarlego," p. 115.

had been purged by the Party in 1931, Tarle still enjoyed his scholarly reputation among historical circles abroad.⁶ His many contacts and friends, particularly those in the academic community and government circles of France, could also be used, as in the twenties, to further the major objective of Soviet diplomacy which was at that time aimed at containing Fascism. In 1934 the Soviet Union entered the League of Nations, and, in the same year at Geneva, Maxim Litvinov and Jean Louis Barthou conferred about the possibility of concluding a mutual assistance pact. In May 1935, a Franco-Soviet Pact was signed which provided for mutual aid and assistance in case of an unprovoked attack by a third power.⁷ Finally, Tarle's historical views were no longer considered unorthodox. Tried and imprisoned in 1931 for alleged anti-German, anti-Marxist, pro-French, and generally pro-Western sentiments, which he expressed in numerous works written between 1914 and 1928, his historical conceptions were now considered correct. After all, they were the antithesis of the defunct Pokrovsky school and precisely those

⁶ See Chapter IV, pp. 129-131.

⁷ George F. Kennan, Russia and the West Under Lenin and Stalin (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1961), pp. 304-305; Schapiro, The Communist Party of the Soviet Union, p. 382; Donald W. Treadgold, Twentieth Century Russia (Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1964), pp. 317-318.

encouraged by the regime in its gigantic effort to rewrite history to support its present policies.

In 1934 there appeared two publications by Tarle: he translated the personal papers of Talleyrand and wrote an introduction to a revised and more complete edition of his memoirs. Both these books provided him with the necessary primary source materials to write additional studies of Talleyrand.⁸

Tarle's first major work, a biography of Napoleon, was published in 1936.⁹ In the opinion of Erusalimskii, "It surmounted those dead, lifeless sociological schemes of the Pokrovsky school¹⁷ which existed at one time in Soviet historical scholarship."¹⁰ M. Nechkina, who wrote the introduction to volume seven of the collected works which contains Napoleon and Napoleon's Invasion of Russia, contended that, unlike Tarle,

Pokrovsky was unsuccessful in creating a correct Marxist conception of the teaching of the patriotic phenomena. He justified the aggression of Napoleon. He failed to examine the nature of his expansionist policies and he

⁸Tarle: Memoirs. Stary rezhim. Velikaya revolyutsiya. Imperiya Restavratsiya (Moskva-Leningrad, 1934); Predislovie i perevoda: Taleiran Memoirs (Moskva-Leningrad, 1934).

⁹Napoleon (Moscow, 1936) in Sochineniya, Vol. VII, pp. 13-430; The work appeared in English in 1937 entitled Bonaparte, trans. John Courson (New York: Knight Publication, 1937).

¹⁰Sochineniya, Vol. I, p. XXVI; Sochineniya, Vol. VII, pp. 7-8.

even dismissed calling the War of 1812 the "Fatherland War." He disclaimed the patriotism of the people and their role in the defense of the country. He concealed the activities of distinguished Russian generals, particularly N.M. Kutuzov. And he believed that the French army was responsible for burning the provisions which they desperately needed, rather than the heroic Russian people who made these sacrifices.¹¹

In the biography of Napoleon, even though Tarle criticized the followers of Carlyle who had stressed the role of the individual in history, he nevertheless recognized the impact of Napoleon's personality on this important period of European history, as well as subsequent developments in the nineteenth century.¹² In the introduction he wrote,

Only in romantic or idealistic conceptions of history, and especially in the species that is known as the "heroic school" was there ascribed to Napoleon the role of creator of his epoch, conferring upon it its ideas as well as its significance in the development of civilization. It does not mean, however, that we should underestimate the gigantic personality standing in the centre of this dual conflict and imposing upon it the impress of his tragic destiny.

The grandiose Napoleonic epic has had almost as strong a hold on political philosophers and theoreticians as on historians, publicists, and poets. Beginning with the Hegelians and ending with the revolutionary Marxist writers, there has been no single noticeable current of social and philosophic thought which, in one fashion or another, has not been influenced by Napoleon.¹³

Russian figures, such as Marshall Kutuzov and the leader of the partisan forces, Efim Chetvertakov, were juxtaposed with

¹¹Sochineniya, Vol. VII, p. 7.

¹²Ibid., p. 403.

¹³Bonaparte, pp. 10-11.

Napoleon and portrayed as additional, although minor, creative agents of history. At the time of the publication of the biography, Stalin had already introduced, as a major part of his policy, the "cult of the personality," and Tarle's portrait of Napoleon and leading Russian personalities fit in with this conception of history.¹⁴ In addition, the biography of Napoleon was similar to Tarle's numerous pre-revolutionary works in that he stressed the role of the individual in history.

Besides emphasizing the importance of the personality in history, Tarle interpreted the Napoleonic period within a Marxist framework. In the introduction he wrote,

For us the Napoleonic Empire is the birth of the stubborn conflict of new social and economic forces, a conflict which did not begin with Napoleon or end with him, and whose basic significance consisted in the victorious assault of the middle class against the feudal and semi-feudal order in France and Europe. The struggle was complicated by the simultaneous conflict between the French and the economically more powerful English commercial and industrial groups for control of the more backward countries. This, and the wars of national liberation which followed, succeeded in placing Europe on the road to free capitalism.¹⁵

¹⁴Erickson, "E.V. Tarle: The Career of a Historian under the Soviet Regime," p. 206; Leo Yaresh, "The Role of the Individual in History," Rewriting Russian History, pp. 77-106; The major criticism of this work by Soviet historians today is precisely Tarle's emphasis of the role of the individual in history; Sochineniya, Vol. I, p. XXVII.

¹⁵Bonaparte, pp. 10-11.

Furthermore, he argued,

In the realm of foreign policy, Napoleon's imperialistic tendencies, dictated by the interests of the bourgeoisie, brought him into conflict with the rotting, actively decomposing semi-feudal world of Europe, which could not successfully cope with his initial onslaught. At the same time, the blows which the Emperor's policy inflicted on English economic conditions were reflected in the intensified revolutionary mood of the English working classes.¹⁶

In the conclusion, Tarle attacked those historians who had contended that Napoleon consolidated the victory of the French Revolution.

This is not the case. He borrowed from the Revolution those reforms designed to further the economic development of the French bourgeoisie, but in so doing he also extinguished the revolutionary flame which had been burning so fiercely for ten years. He did not so much complete the Revolution as liquidate it. . . . That the Revolution ended with the inauguration of Napoleon's dictatorship signified above all the victory of the upper bourgeois masses, over the plebian storm which from 1789 to 1794 had directed the course of the Revolution. . . . The Napoleon who repressed the workers and shot down the Jacobins, who made himself an autocratic monarch and transformed the surrounding republics into kingdoms which he parceled out among his relatives and marshals can hardly be called the "fulfiller of the Revolution."¹⁷

In light of Stalin's pronouncements and directives concerning the way history should be written, it was evident that Tarle had committed two serious errors in his biography of Napoleon. He rejected the idea that the peasants were

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 407.

¹⁷ Ibid., pp. 406-407.

instrumental in the defeat of Napoleon and denied that the character of the War of 1812 was a "People's" or "National War." According to Tarle, during this period in Russian history the position of the peasant closely resembled that of the Negro slave; and if Napoleon had issued a proclamation to liberate the peasants, the Russian army would have disintegrated as a fighting force because it was comprised mainly of serfs. As a result, a rebellion similar to the Pugachev uprising would have broken out.¹⁸ To support his view that the War of 1812 was not a "National" or "People's War," Tarle contended,

Never did Napoleon or his marshals, or their companions in arms speak of the War of 1812 as a "National War" in the same sense that they spoke of the Spanish guerilla war as a "National War." Nor could they compare the two phenomena. The war in Russia lasted six months, the first three saw Napoleon constantly victorious as he advanced along a direct line from Kovno to Vilna to Smolensk to Moscow, interrupted by battles and petty skirmishes with the regular Russian army. There was, however, not a single national mass revolt against the French--neither then nor after Napoleon's entry into Moscow.¹⁹

He went so far as to suggest that the peasants welcomed the French as liberators and even collaborated with them.

Indeed, there were occurrences of quite a contrary nature, as when the peasants of Smolensk complained to

¹⁸Ibid., pp. 288-290.

¹⁹Ibid., p. 302.

the French authorities that their master, the landowner Engelhardt, had been guilty of betraying the French.²⁰

As for what caused Napoleon's defeat, Tarle argued that it was neither the Russian army nor the peasants, but rather the terrible winter.²¹

During 1937, the biography of Napoleon was reviewed three times. The first, which appeared in Istorik Marksist, was generally favorable. N. Lukin, the reviewer, stated,

It is necessary to say that E.V. Tarle's book is well written and its format belongs to the scholarly-popular type. The author is solely concerned with the Napoleonic period, and one can easily see that the work is based on the author's study of the vast amount of primary sources and secondary literature. The book is a lively, popular, and simple account designed for the general reader so he can acquire a familiarity with the important facts of the history of the great bourgeois revolution at the end of the eighteenth century, the period of the Consulate, and the Empire. Needless to say, the book will be read with interest from the beginning to the end.²²

Lukin's major criticism of the book was Tarle's "incorrect" interpretation of the part played by the masses in the defeat of Napoleon.²³

On June 10, an essay entitled, "History and the Present"

²⁰Ibid.

²¹Ibid., pp. 303-304.

²²N. Lukin, "Kriticheskie Stat'i i Obzory," Review of Napoleon, by E. Tarle, Istorik Marksist, No. i (1937), p. 159.

²³Ibid., p. 158.

appeared in Pravda.²⁴ The author, A. Konstantinov, not only criticized the biography of Napoleon, but also subjected Tarle to a brutal personal attack. The reasons for Konstantinov's denunciation of Tarle can be attributed to two factors. Although the Soviet government needed his services and protected him, Tarle was still not accepted in historical circles. In fact, Konstantinov's article was indicative of the general hostility toward Tarle as he reprimanded the handful of historians who had befriended him in any way and reminded them of his past.

It has been known for some time that Tarle was a falsifier of the French Revolution, the classic bourgeois revolution. It has been the practice of this man not to oppose theoretical views; suffice it to remember that he figured prominently as Minister of Foreign Affairs in the government of the saboteur Ramzin, who was judged guilty by a Soviet Tribunal in 1930.²⁵

More important was the fact that Tarle's sponsor, Karl Radek, the editor of the book, had been tried and convicted of plotting to overthrow the Soviet regime. At approximately the same time, N. Bukharin, who had praised the work, was being accused by the Party of certain crimes against the state,

²⁴A. Konstantinov, "Istoriya i Sovremennost," Review of Napoleon, by E. Tarle, Pravda, June 10, 1937, p. 4.

²⁵Ibid., p. 4; Kagan, "La Crise de la Science Historique Russe," pp. 32-33; Weintraub, "Blaski i Nedze Dziejow Prof. Tarlego," pp. 118-119.

particularly his affiliation with the so-called Anti-Soviet Bloc of Rights and Trotskyites. Hence, Tarle's checkered past and the fact that the book had been lauded by Radek and Bukharin, now considered enemies of the people, prompted Konstantinov to write,

In the book Tarle has attempted to rehabilitate Bonapartism, which was contrary to the opinions of Lenin. It is well known that Bonapartism has been used by Japanese-German-Trotskyite protagonists, spies, and infiltrators who were acting on Gestapo orders. Under the guise of Bonapartism the secret fascist policies, and the agents of it, Trotsky and Bukharin, have derived their inspiration. Trotsky tried to justify his criminal plan which called for the restoration of capitalism in Russia by means of historical analogies with the period of the Restoration. This is the bandit-like concept that Tarle's prattling tries to establish.²⁶

The following day in Pravda, the editors apologized for the harshness of Konstantinov's review and presented the regime's opinion of the biography for the purpose of silencing any further criticism of it.²⁷ They demanded that Tarle make certain corrections. However, they placed the blame for the errors squarely on the shoulders of the jailed Karl Radek. The editors also criticized the publishers of the book who, they claimed, had failed to help Tarle prepare the work. In spite of the shortcomings, the editors concluded, "In any case, of all the non-Marxist books devoted to Napoleon,

²⁶Konstantinov, "Istoriya i Sovremennost'," p. 4.

²⁷"Ot Redaktsii," Pravda, June 11, 1937, p. 1.

Tarle's is the best, his approach is the most realistic, and it is the closest to the truth."²⁸

In 1936 Tarle wrote a series of essays for Izvestiia entitled, "Historical Parallels."²⁹ He analyzed the origins and the development of democratic institutions in the West and then compared them with those introduced in Russia since the Bolshevik Revolution. The final article in this series, entitled "Concerning Bourgeois Democracy and the New Constitution of the Soviet Union" was published in Istorik Marksist.³⁰ It was the most important of the group, especially with regard to Tarle's position vis a vis the government. It would seem that the publication of this essay also marked the turning point in Tarle's career. Not only was he admitted into the top echelon of Marxist historians, but from this time on Tarle also assumed the position of chief historical spokesman and apologist for the foreign and domestic policies of the Soviet regime.³¹

²⁸ Ibid., p. 4; Kagan, "La Crise de la Science Historique Russe," p. 33; Weintraub, "Blaski i Nedze Dziejow Prof. Tarlego," p. 119.

²⁹ "Istoricheskie Paralleli," (Organizatsiya vlasti v SSSR i na Zapade). (K proektu Konstitutsii SSSR). Izvestiia, June 23, August 12 and September 15, 1936.

³⁰ E. Tarle, "O Burzhuznoy Demokratii i Novoy Konstitutsii SSSR," Istorik Marksist, No. I (1937), pp. 125-138.

³¹ Hosch, Evgenij Viktorovic Tarle (1875-1955) und Seine Stellung in der Sowjetischen Geschichtswissenschaft, p. 119;

In the essay Tarle argued that,

On the one hand our Stalinist Constitution appears to be the completion and full realization of all the principles of democracy which were achieved in Europe and America only after a long bloody struggle; on the other hand, it /the Constitution of 1936/ introduces into constitutional law a series of new aspects, principally those conditions for great social change, which have already occurred in our country. On both points the Stalinist Constitution is an act of exceptional historical significance.³²

According to Tarle, in the constitutions of Western European states, the rights of individuals were based on merely postulates and good intentions. For the first time in history, the rights of all citizens would be protected since they were now founded on the realities of social life. Although Tarle admitted that some provisions in Western constitutions, such as the secret ballot, outwardly appeared to be more democratic than the provisions of the Soviet Constitution, he claimed that

it is universally known that in industrial areas in the West, before elections, capitalists threaten the workers and make it known to them that if they vote for the Socialist Party, they /the capitalists/ might limit production, or close their factories.³³

Kagan, "La Crise de la Science Historique Russe," p. 32;
Weintraub, "Blaski i Nedze Dziejow Zycia Prof. Tarlego,"
p. 119.

³²Tarle, "Burzhnaznoy Demokratii i Novoy Konstitutsii SSSR," p. 126.

³³Ibid.

Tarle also criticized the British policy of ministerial responsibility. During the First World War, Lloyd George governed England without the consent of Parliament. This trend led Tarle to conclude that parliamentarianism was declining in the West. The rise of Fascist movements in France and in Great Britain accelerated this tendency, and eventually the movements of Charles Maurras and Oswald Mosely would succeed in toppling the existing, but ever weakening, democratic governments.³⁴

In 1937 Tarle's final study devoted to the history of the French working class during the period of the French Revolution was published.³⁵ The work, Germinal and Prairial, was based almost exclusively on unpublished source materials. It was reprinted in 1951 and translated into French in 1959.³⁶ Tarle argued that the insurrections which occurred during the months of Germinal and Prairial "were the last mass uprisings of the masses (plebeians) of the suburbs during the period

³⁴Ibid., pp. 132-133.

³⁵E.V. Tarle, Zherminal' i Prerial' (Moskva: Gosudarstvennoe Sotsial'no-Ekonomicheskoe Izdatel'stvo, 1937); Sochineniya, Vol. VI, pp. 321-562; See Chapter IV, p. 128.

³⁶Jean Dautry, Review of Germinal et Prairial, by Eugene Tarle, Annales Historiques de la Revolution, XXXII (January - March, 1960), pp. 331-335.

of the French Revolution, the greatest of the bourgeois revolutions of the European past."³⁷ The masses revolted principally because of poor economic conditions. Thieves and speculators, according to Tarle, had become wealthy at the expense of the starving population of Paris. Prior to the uprisings, an unsuccessful attempt was made by a few political groups to organize the masses. The insurrections failed precisely because of the lack of political organization and the absence of dynamic leadership. Tarle wrote:

There was neither an acknowledged leader, nor a fully worked out political program adopted by the workers which would further their demands for the restoration of the Constitution of 1793 and measures to combat famine and high prices. There was not even any preparation for the coordination of activities and actions between the revolutionary masses and the petty bourgeoisie, the last of the Montagnards, who paid with their lives for their personal activities on the First of Prairial, a sacrifice which seemed to be politically fruitless. The lack of a workers' party, the absence of political organization, a class leader, and tactical plans cruelly tell the story of what happened on the first, second, third, and fourth days of Prairial.³⁸

Even though the insurrections were destined to fail, Tarle concluded,

In the history of the world proletariat, these days will have a tremendous meaning and will forever have a memorable place despite the fact that it was not purely

³⁷Sochineniya, Vol. VI, p. 321.

³⁸Ibid.

a proletarian uprising: it was an uprising of the metropolitan plebeian masses in which the workers participated only as one of the components. . . . In the history of the world struggle of the exploited against the exploiters, the gloomy heroes of *Germinal* and *Prairie*, as they were called by Herzen, will never be forgotten.³⁹

When the Soviet Union honored the one hundred-fiftieth anniversary of the French Revolution, Tarle wrote several essays devoted to various phases of it, praising particularly the patriotism and heroism of the French people.⁴⁰ Much of his emphasis was placed on the important part the masses played during the early stages of the Revolution, especially their efforts in helping to drive out Prussian and Austrian armies from France in 1792. In the same year, he collaborated with V.G. Volgin, a prominent modern European historian, in the preparation of a collection of essays by Soviet historians concerning the historical problems of the French Revolution. The work was completed and published in 1941 under the title, The French

³⁹ Ibid., pp. 321-324.

⁴⁰ Sochineniya, Vol. I, p. XXV; For example, see the following: "Vzyatie Bastilii," Voenno-Istoricheskii Zhurnal, No. 1 (1939), pp. 55-63; "Zhan-Pol' Marat, drug naroda," Novy Mir, No. 7 (1939), pp. 183-201; "Neopublikovannye Dokumenty po Istorii Frantsuzskoy Revolyutsii," Pravda, January 9, 1939; "Frantsuzskaya Revolyutsiya v Bor'be s Interventami," Literaturnaya Gazeta, July 10, 1939; "Bor'ba s Interventsiei" (B epokhu Frantsuzskoy Burzhuznoy Revolyutsii) Pravda, July 14, 1939; "Osada i Vzatie Bastilii," Izvestiia, July 14, 1939.

Bourgeois Revolution 1784-1794.⁴¹

Tarle's new study of Napoleon, replete with the corrections suggested by the editors of Pravda, appeared in 1938.⁴² The publication of the work reflected the changing trends of Soviet historiography in the 1930's.⁴³ In it Tarle clearly took into account the new historical directives announced by the Party, which stressed patriotism, glorified the Russian peasant, and resurrected those important and progressive personalities in Russian history who had previously been maligned by members of the Pokrovsky school.⁴⁴

The importance of this work lay in the fact that it was written brilliantly by a recognized scholar and that the author expressed views directly contrary to those which he had defended two years earlier. The impression was created that the author, in taking a new position on the evaluation and the nature of the 1812 campaign, not only was declaring war on the views of earlier Soviet historiography, but was even refuting himself. In fact--and this is certainly not to Tarle's credit--nowhere in his new book did he mention the change, nor did he explain it.⁴⁵

⁴¹V.G. Volgin and E.V. Tarle red. Frantsuzskaya Burzhuaznaya Revolyutsiya 1789-1794 (Moskva-Leningrad, 1941); Sochineniya, Vol. I, p. XXV.

⁴²Nashestvie Napoleona na Rossiyu (Moskva, 1938); Sochineniya, Vol. VII, pp. 435-738.

⁴³Erickson, "E.V. Tarle: The Career of a Historian Under the Soviet Regime," p. 209.

⁴⁴See Chapter I, pp. 21-22.

⁴⁵Leo Yaresh, "The Campaign of 1812," Rewriting Russian History, pp. 261-289; Almost the same view was expressed by M. Nechkina in the introduction to volume

One of the major differences between the biography Napoleon and Napoleon's Invasion of Russia was the emphasis that Tarle now gave to patriotism, exhibited especially in the heroism of the Russian people. Contradicting his former view about the role of the peasants during the War of 1812, Tarle now wrote,

For Russia the consequences of the Fatherland War were indeed tremendous. It was neither the cold nor the vast expanse of Russia which defeated Napoleon; it was the resistance of the Russian people which defeated him.⁴⁶

Furthermore, he explained,

The Russian people defended their right to an independent national existence and did this with an indomitable will to victory with such esteem, with such disdain in making a fuss out of every act of heroism, with such an awakening of the soul, that no other people in the world at the time could be compared with them, except possibly the Spanish.⁴⁷

Tarle concluded with a stirring tribute to the heroic actions of the Russian peasant.

The partisan movement which began immediately after the Battle of Borodino, as we shall see further, became successful only because of the most active voluntary aid

seven which contains this work. Napoleon's Invasion of Russia appeared soon after the resolutions of the Party and the Government about the errors of the Pokrovsky school. For the most recent interpretation of the historiography on the War of 1812, see Barry Hollingsworth, "The Napoleonic Invasion of Russia and Recent Soviet Historical Writing," Journal of Modern History, XXXVIII (March, 1966), pp. 38-52.

⁴⁶ Sochineniya, Vol. VII, p. 736.

⁴⁷ Ibid., pp. 628-630.

so sedulously rendered by the Russian peasantry. This insatiable hatred toward the usurpers, marauders, and oppressors, ignorant of whence they came, was expressed by the way in which the Russian peasants joined the army of 1812 and how they fought.

The national character of this war showed itself in the way the army was organized. . . . Further in describing the retreat of the French Army, I shall speak in detail about the guerilla warfare, about the peasant participation in it. According to the unanimous opinion of the French, absolutely nowhere, except in Spain, did the peasantry in the villages show such desperate resistance as in Russia. At our approach "each village was turned into a bonfire or a fortress," so wrote the French afterwards. . . . It was chiefly the Russian peasant who destroyed the magnificent cavalry of Murat, first in the world, under whose victorious onslaught all European armies fled; it was this very army that the Russian peasant destroyed. . . . Indeed, the war against the invading Napoleon was solidly a national war. In his strategy Napoleon counted the number of his troops and the troops of Alexander, but he had to fight against the Russian people, about whom he had forgotten. It was the Russian people, who delivered the fatal blow to the greatest commander in the history of the world.⁴⁸

In the 1936 publication, Tarle had stated that the invasion of Russia in 1812 was just another one of Napoleon's wars. However, in the new work, he again changed his interpretation without any explanation.

Of all of Napoleon's wars, the War of 1812 was the most openly imperialistic, the one dictated in the interests of the predatory policies of Napoleon and the French Bourgeoisie.⁴⁹

According to Tarle, Napoleon's primary objective was

to make Russia economically subject to the interests of the French bourgeoisie and to create a permanent threat

⁴⁸ Ibid., pp. 628-630.

⁴⁹ Ibid., p. 438.

against Russia in the form of a Vassal Poland to which Lithuania and White Russia were to be joined.⁵⁰

Another theme stressed by Tarle in his biography of Napoleon was the Marxist conception of class struggle. Due to the emphasis on patriotism in his new work, Tarle assigned a secondary role to this notion, although he did not ignore it completely.⁵¹ He stated,

Of course, the class struggle, that is the struggle of the peasants against the landlords, did not stop in 1812. It did not stop in one year, one month, or after 1812. The expulsion of the enemy from the territory of Russia became the primary task of the Russian peasants during the second half of 1812.⁵²

In short, the French threat merely postponed the peasants' struggle against the landed gentry.

It has been suggested that Napoleon's Invasion of Russia was shaped by the pre-war tensions on the international scene. Tarle seemed "to envisage an impending German attack and turned to the past for guidance and assurance."⁵³ When the work was translated into English in 1942, Tarle wrote a new

⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 439.

⁵¹ Erickson, "E.V. Tarle: The Career of a Historian Under the Soviet Regime," p. 207.

⁵² Sochineniya, Vol. VII, p. 621.

⁵³ Sir Lewis Namier, Facing East (New York: Harper and Row, 1966), p. 99; See also the following reviews of Napoleon's Invasion of Russia: George M. Dutcher, Journal of Modern History, XIV (December, 1942), pp. 537-538; O.J. Frederiksen, Russian Review, II (Autumn, 1942), pp. 115-116; Dietrich Gerhard, The American Historical Review, Vol. 48 (January, 1943), pp. 309-312.

introduction in which he compared the Napoleonic invasion with that of the Nazis, pointing out that the Germans would be destroyed like the French.⁵⁴

The Soviet press received Tarle's new study of Napoleon with great enthusiasm. N. Kruzhkov, who reviewed the book in Pravda declared, "It is a book dealing with the heroism of the Russian people. All who hold dear the heroic past of Russia will read Tarle's book with great interest."⁵⁵ Eruslimskii, the chief editor of the collected works of Tarle, stated, "Both studies of Napoleon were shaped by the traditions of bourgeois historiography and written in the atmosphere of the cult of the personality."⁵⁶ However, in spite of these shortcomings,

the books, Napoleon and Napoleon's Invasion of Russia, played a positive role in stimulating patriotism among wide circles of Soviet people. They will be reminded and they will recall the great lessons of history and fate which inevitably awaits all who have the foolish idea that they can subjugate the Soviet people.⁵⁷

Until the conclusion of the Non-Aggression Pact in 1939, Tarle supplied the regime with numerous anti-Fascist

⁵⁴ Eugene Tarle, Napoleon's Invasion of Russia, trans. G.M. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1942); Sochineniya, Vol. VII, pp. 759-762.

⁵⁵ N. Kruzhkov, Review of Nashestvie Napoleona na Rossiyu, by E. Tarle, Pravda, July 13, 1938, p. 4.

⁵⁶ Sochineniya, Vol. I, p. XXVII.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

tracts which served to counter the anti-Communist propaganda being produced in Germany. These articles were written within the spirit of the so-called Popular Front policy to give the impression in the Western Democracies that the Soviet Union was the leader in the struggle against Fascism. In many respects, they were similar to the anti-German essays which Tarle wrote during the First World War.⁵⁸ One of the first articles in this vein, written specifically for the commemoration of the one hundred twenty-fifth anniversary of Borodino, appeared in Red Star.⁵⁹ Tarle declared,

The Russian people who had their national independence threatened in 1812 did not have the slightest reason to be frightened. Neither do the Russian people today need to be alarmed, particularly when some ridiculous pygmies divide up Russia on the map.⁶⁰

Although the historical opinions of Pokrovsky had been condemned by the government, his theory that the Entente Powers caused the First World War had not been revised. In 1938 Tarle presented the new official view of the origins of the First World War.⁶¹ He rejected the politically outmoded

⁵⁸Chapter II, pp. 57-60; Sochineniya, Vol. I, p. XXIX; Hosch, Evgenij Viktorovic Tarle (1875-1955) und Seine Stellung in der Sowjetischen Geschichtswissenschaft, p. 121.

⁵⁹"Borodino. k 125-Letiyu," Krasnaya Zvezda, September 2, 1938, p. 1.

⁶⁰Ibid.

⁶¹"Novye Pokazaniya o Mirovoy Imperialisticheskoy Voine," Sochineniya, Vol. XI, pp. 743-751.

thesis of Pokrovsky and placed the blame for the war squarely on Germany.

The greatest part in the responsibility for the outbreak of the First World War rests on Germany, on the German bourgeoisie, on the landed aristocracy, and the military clique. Whatever the vain attempts at deliberate lies originating in Fascist Germany and Japan and presented by their sergeant majors of "scholarship," this truth will not be shaken in the present and in the future.⁶²

In an article devoted to the Spanish Civil War, Tarle voiced the sentiments of the Soviet government.⁶³ He praised the heroic actions of the Spanish people who were the first victims of Fascist aggression.

Every day we read about the selfless heroic struggle carried on by the men and women of Spain against the armed to the teeth Fascist troops who have at their disposal the military arsenals of the Fascist states-- Germany, Italy, and Portugal.⁶⁴

Tarle was quick to respond to the Nazi policy of Lebensraum proposed by Hitler in Mein Kampf. In a long essay in Istorik Marksist entitled, "Eastern Living Space and Fascist Geopolitics," which was later included in the book Against the Fascist Falsification of History, Tarle challenged the "pseudo-scientific" validity of this thesis

⁶²Ibid., p. 751.

⁶³"Ispanskii Narod v Bor'be za Svobodu," Sochineniya, Vol. XI, pp. 642-652.

⁶⁴Ibid., p. 642.

by Nazi ideologists.⁶⁵ He argued that the science of geopolitics was being distorted by the Nazis in a theoretical attempt to justify their plans for eastward expansion. In reality, it was a scheme to establish German hegemony first in Europe and later throughout the world.⁶⁶ A few months before the conclusion of the Non-Aggression Pact, Tarle delivered a major speech at Leningrad State University as part of the program celebrating its one hundred twentieth anniversary. In it he denounced the "infamous Fascist falsifiers of history."⁶⁷

The signing of the Non-Aggression Pact with Nazi Germany in 1939 surprised Soviet historians. On the one hand, they were ordered to treat the arch enemy of the Slavs, the Germans, as friends of the Russian people; while on the other hand, they were urged to point out the traditional hostility which existed between Russia and the West. As a result, until the Nazi attack in 1941, historians tried desperately to rewrite history to support the new departure

⁶⁵E. Tarle, "Vostochnoe Prostrantsvo i Fashistskaya Geopolitika," Istorik Marksist, No. 2 (1938), pp. 89-105; E.V. Tarle, A.F. Efimov, A.V. Mishulin, S.D. Skazkin, A.D. Ubal'tsov, S.V. Zinich i F.I. Nomovich (ed.). Protiv Fashistskoy Falsifikatsii Istorii (Moskva: Akademii Nauk SSSR, 1939).

⁶⁶Tarle, "Vostochnoe Prostrantsvo i Fashistskaya Geopolitika," theme of article; Sochineniya, Vol. I, p. XXVI, Sochineniya, Vol. XI, p. 7.

⁶⁷Sochineniya, Vol. I, p. XXVI.

in Soviet foreign policy.⁶⁸

During this period, Tarle stopped writing anti-German articles and turned his attention to Western diplomacy, particularly the tactics employed by Great Britain and France in their relations with Russia. Just before the German attack, he contributed several articles to a work entitled The History of Diplomacy which was edited by V.P. Potemkin, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs.⁶⁹ The essays in this book were chiefly a comparison of the "progressive" nature of Soviet foreign policy with the contemptuous methods of "bourgeois" diplomacy.⁷⁰ This theme was expounded upon by Tarle in a chapter entitled, "The Methods of Bourgeois Diplomacy." He wrote,

The strategy and tactics of the diplomacy of the capitalist world is extraordinarily diversified and individualistic. Thus it is difficult to determine the principle tactics and lines of it /bourgeois diplomacy/, especially when it changes not only every day, but sometimes in the course of a few hours.⁷¹

Tarle continued to denounce "bourgeois" diplomacy:

On the one hand, it tried to hide its aggressiveness with defensive tactics; and on the other, with supposedly

⁶⁸ See Chapter I, p. 26.

⁶⁹ V.P. Potemkin, (ed.) Istoriya Diplomatii, 3 Vols. (Moskva, 1941-1945).

⁷⁰ Sochineniya, Vol. I, p. XXVIII.

⁷¹ "O Priemakh Burzhuaznoy Diplomatii," Istoriya Diplomatii, Vol. 3, p. 702; Sochineniya, Vol. I, p. XXIX.

ideological motives. These tactics were merely peace loving masks used by the imperialists in their aggressive plans to destroy world communism and the Soviet Union.⁷²

He concluded by declaring that

imperialist diplomacy has always sought to intervene in the internal affairs of states by using the struggle of two opposing political factions to further the ends of its aggressive plans.⁷³

A recent reviewer stated the relevance of this work:

Although the essays in this work by E.V. Tarle were written on the basis of his experience with the materials of the period of the First World War and its preparation and also on the origins of World War II, the methods of imperialist diplomacy can be applied to the aggressive powers on the contemporary historical scene; they confirm the correctness of his conclusions and observations.⁷⁴

The most significant work produced by Tarle between 1939 and 1941 was the first volume of his study of the Crimean War.⁷⁵ Before this publication, Tarle wrote several articles during this period devoted to various aspects of the Crimean War which were marked by their anti-British and French tendencies.⁷⁶ In the most scathing of these essays, "Anglo-

⁷² Sochineniya, Vol. I, p. XXIX.

⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ E.V. Tarle, Krymskaya Voina. 2 Vols. (Moskva-Leningrad, 1941-1943); Sochineniya, Vol. VIII, pp. 5-559; Sochineniya, Vol. IX, pp. 7-625.

⁷⁶ See the following articles, "Nakanune Krymskoy Voine," Krasnaya Nov', No. 11-12 (1940), pp. 217-269; "Angliiskaya Politika ot Krymskoy Kampanii do Nashikh Dnei," Literaturny Sovremennik, No. 7 (1940), pp. 136-152; "Posol'stvo Menshikova

French Diplomacy and the Crimean War," Tarle argued that as a rule the British had always been disposed to wage wars at the expense of their allies.⁷⁷ One of the main features of British policy had been the development of a traditional hatred directed against Russia. The English had always planned to destroy Russia, but this scheme had failed. To implement this program, the British tried to conclude several alliances with the French, who, for reasons of state, refused to become involved in such a plan which they considered contrary to their long range diplomatic objectives.⁷⁸

In the first volume of The Crimean War, Tarle analyzed pre-war British diplomacy. He argued that it was marked by duplicity, indicative of the traditional English hatred of Russia. From the standpoint of British-Russian affairs at that time, perhaps it was an attempt by Tarle to remind the Russian public of the historical antagonisms which existed between the two states in order to justify the apparent good relations with Nazi Germany.⁷⁹ It must be pointed out that

i Razryv mezhdru Rossiei i Turtsiei 1853," Literaturny Sovremennik, No. 10-11 (1940), pp. 135-161; "Anglo-Frantsuzskie Otnosheniya v Period Krymskoy Voyny," Uchitel'skaya Gazeta, March 5, 1940; "Baltiiskaya Kampaniya 1854 Goda," Leningradskaya Pravda, December 17 and 18, 1940.

⁷⁷ "Anglo-Frantsuzskaya Diplomatiya i Krymskaya Voina," Voенно-Istoricheskii Zhurnal, No. 4 (1940), pp. 98-112.

⁷⁸ Ibid., theme of article.

⁷⁹ Weintraub, "Blaski i Nedze Dziejow Zycia Prof. Tarlego," p. 127.

Tarle reversed his opinion about the role played by Lord Aberdeen prior to the outbreak of hostilities. In a review of Harold Temperley's book, England and the Near East: The Crimea which appeared in Istorik Marksist in 1937, Tarle wrote,

The final chapters of the book which are devoted to the initial steps of the diplomacy of the Crimean War are fully captured in an interesting manner. The thoughtless "headlong" diplomacy of Nicholas I, Menshikov's mission to Constantinople and his provocative escapades, the violent struggle during meetings of the British cabinet between Lord Aberdeen who did not want war with Russia, and Lord Palmerston who, as early as 1852, considered war with Russia inevitable--all this was described very clearly, with numerous new details.⁸⁰

Tarle now contended that the aims of the Lords Stratford de Redcliffe, Palmerston, and Aberdeen were similar: to involve Russia in a war. In Constantinople, Redcliffe bolstered the Turkish determination to resist Russian demands; in London, Palmerston continually clamored for a declaration of war; and Aberdeen held friendly discussions with Ambassador Brunnow informing him that the British would do everything possible to avoid a conflict. Upon receiving Brunnow's reports, Nicholas I thought he had been given a free hand in the Ottoman Empire by the British and consequently his policy

⁸⁰E.V. Tarle, Review of England and the Near East: The Crimea, by Harold Temperley, Istorik Marksist, No. 3 (1937), p. 191.

toward the Turks became more uncompromising. It was the villain Aberdeen, however, who skillfully provoked war with Russia "by concealing British objectives under the guise of a peace loving policy."⁸¹

Like his Napoleon's Invasion of Russia, Tarle accentuated the themes of patriotism and heroism. In spite of the economic backwardness of serfdom-bound Russia, the shortage of weapons, equipment and ammunition, the ineptitude of Nicholas I, and the incompetence of statesmen and generals; the Russian soldier, sailor, and especially the people performed magnificently during the course of the war in the face of these overwhelming obstacles. Two military figures, Admiral Nakhimov, and V.A. Kornilov, marvelous examples of the Stalinist "cult of the personality" distinguished themselves even though they were hampered in their efforts by Nicholas I and his bungling bureaucracy.⁸²

Tarle was awarded the Stalin Prize First Class for the first volume of his Crimean War, considered by one Soviet historian as "a model of simplicity and of clear exposition based on a wide range of published and archival materials,"⁸³

⁸¹Sochineniya, Vol. VII, p. 7, theme of the work.

⁸²Sochineniya, Vol. I, p. XXXI.

⁸³Sochineniya, Vol. VII, p. 8.

and by a leading Western scholar of Russian history as

the most important contribution to the history of the Crimean War made by a Russian historian since the appearance between 1908 and 1912 of Zaionchkovsky's incompleated work, which only reached the end of 1854.⁸⁴

These attributes notwithstanding, Tarle neglected several important aspects of the Crimean War. He failed to cover at length the economic origins of the conflict. He gave little attention to the domestic scene during the reign of Nicholas I. Above all, he overlooked the financial situation and the horrible economic and social condition which created unrest among units of the army, and discontent among the peasants. These last factors contributed significantly to the defeat of Russia.⁸⁵

When German forces invaded the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, Tarle quickly responded to the needs of the government by taking an active role in helping to implement the emergency historical directives set down by the Party.⁸⁶

The main task of present day Soviet historians is to help to educate millions of Soviet patriots in the spirit of the fighting historical tradition of our heroic past as well as to expose German imperialism.

⁸⁴B.H. Sumner, Review of Krymskaya Voina (The Crimean War), by E.V. Tarle, The Slavonic and East European Review, XXV (April, 1947), p. 578.

⁸⁵Ibid., p. 579; Sochineniya, Vol. VIII, p. 8.

⁸⁶E. Yaroslavskii, "O Blizhaishikh Zadachakh Istoricheskoy Nauki v SSSR," Istoricheskii Zhurnal, No. 6 (1942), pp. 17-24.

The reactionary part played by the Germans throughout all of Russian history must be made clear and even with reference to the early medieval history of Western Europe, it must be shown that it was the Slavs, and not to the Germans that belonged a really creative role.⁸⁷

During the initial stages of the war, when it looked as if the Soviet Union would be defeated, Tarle wrote several patriotic pamphlets designed to stiffen the will of the masses to resist the invading Nazis. The best example of this type of literature produced by Tarle was an article entitled "The Beginning of the End" which appeared in the journal Bolshevik during the bleak days of 1941. Tarle compared Napoleon's invasion of Russia with the recent German attack and praised the part played by the people in helping to destroy the French army. Just as the defeat of Napoleon was inevitable, so would the Germans be crushed on the soil of Russia and the supremacy of Fascism in Europe would come to an end.⁸⁸

Through the use of historical examples, Tarle also helped to raise the morale of the Red Army. His article,

⁸⁷ From V.G. Volgin, E.V. Tarle, and A.M. Pankratova (ed.). Dvadsat' Pyat' Let Istoricheskoy Nauki v SSSR (Moskva-Leningrad: Akademii Nauk SSSR, 1942). Reviewed by Michael Karpovich, The American Slavic and East European Review, IV (August, 1945), p. 228.

⁸⁸ "Nachalo Kontsa," Sochineniya, Vol. XII, pp. 11-18; Sochineniya, Vol. VII, p. 6; Sochineniya, Vol. I, p. XXXI; See also "1812-1941/42" and "Pervoe Avgusta," Sochineniya, Vol. XII, pp. 58-63.

"The Teutonic Knights and Their Successors," in which he glorified the crushing defeat inflicted on the Order by Alexander Nevsky, was written expressly for this purpose.⁸⁹

The anti-patriotic historical views of Pokrovsky were also savagely attacked by Tarle during the war years. While this school dominated historical scholarship,

what went on in essence was the moral disarmament of the Russian people. If a nation consists only of Oblomovs, is such a nation worth much? Is it possible that the "fair-skinned Aryans" are really right in committing their atrocities? Is General Reichanau right in saying that there are no cultural values in Russia? Many who showed this tendency in their historical work did not think of these consequences and might have been horrified if they had seen them. But, objectively, their work was harmful.⁹⁰

When Stalin began to belabor the West to open a second front in Europe, Tarle echoed this policy in several articles. He continually wrote that it would hasten the defeat of Germany and its military-political satellites; but he also argued that the United States, which had promised

⁸⁹ "Tevtonskie Rytsari i ikh Nasledniki, "Sochineniya, Vol. VII, pp. 44-58; See also E.V. Tarle "Geroicheskie Traditsii Russkogo Flota," Krasnoflotets, No. 3 (1944), p. 32; E.V. Tarle "Istoricheskaya Zasluga Krasnoy Armii," Ogonek, No. 5 (1944), p. 7.

⁹⁰ B.D. Grekov and E.V. Tarle, "Soviet Historical Research," p. 231; Also quoted in Anatole G. Mazour, Modern Russian Historiography, p. 210; In Dvadsat' Pyat' Let Istoricheskoy Nauki v SSSR, the Pokrovsky school was denounced for "vulgar economic materialism, naked sociologizing, and a nihilistic attitude to greatness in history. It damaged the cause of educating the young generation in the spirit of Soviet patriotism by ignoring the heroic tradition of the Russian people."

to open a second front as soon as possible, had failed to live up to its pledge.⁹¹

Besides his publications, Tarle undertook several propaganda tours of the Soviet Union during the war. In 1943 he spoke in several large cities as well as in small towns and villages. His lectures were devoted to patriotic themes, the problems of the war, and the international position of the Soviet Union. He also gave several lectures to front line army units, particularly about the War of 1812. In September of 1943, as the featured speaker at a general meeting of the Academy of Science, he gave an address entitled, "The Crimes of Hitler Germany." Tarle also served as a ranking member of the Extraordinary State Commission for the Investigation of the Crimes of the German Fascist Invaders.⁹²

⁹¹"Koalitsionnye Voyny" and "Vtoromu Antifashistskomu Mitingu Sovetskikh Uchenykh," Sochineniya, Vol. XII, pp. 69-74.

⁹²Sochineniya, Vol. I, pp. XXXI-XXXII; E. Tarle, "Pis'mo v Redaktsiyu Zhurnala Bolshevik," Bolshevik, No. 19 (1951), p. 71.

CHAPTER VI

COLD WAR HISTORIOGRAPHY AND THE LAST TEN YEARS OF TARLE'S CAREER (1945-1955)

Tarle's unique relationship with the regime until his death in 1955 best serves to illustrate the political nature of Soviet historiography since the end of World War II. As a leading historian and an important public figure who functioned as ideological spokesman for the post-war policies of the Soviet Union, Tarle played a major role in helping to propagandize the anti-Western line adopted by the Party. In his numerous articles, books, and speeches during this decade, he repeatedly denounced the "aggressive" actions of the United States and Great Britain, the wartime allies of the Soviet Union, who, after 1945, were considered enemies of mankind. Despite his lofty position, Tarle was attacked by the Party for failing to revise some of his conclusions in his pre-war works. Now regarded as either distortions or perversions of historical truth, these views were no longer compatible with the Cold War policies inaugurated by the Party soon after the end of hostilities.¹

¹See Chapter I, pp. 26-34; E.V. Tarle, "O Krymskoy Voyne," Istoricheskii Zhurnal, No. 4 (1945), pp. 112-113; S. Kozhukov, "K Voprosu ob Otsenka Roli M.I. Kutuzova v

As the expedient wartime friendship and cooperation between the Soviet Union and the West began to deteriorate rather quickly after 1945, Stalin directed historians to promote the idea that Russia had single-handedly saved Europe and Asia from Nazi domination. Stalin's pronouncement prompted Tarle to deliver a significant lecture on April 3, 1945 at Moscow State University, in which he claimed that during World War II the United States and Great Britain contributed very little to the defeat of Nazi Germany. He also asserted that since the Napoleonic Wars, Russia had either liberated or helped to rid Europe of French and German despotism. To support his thesis, Tarle argued that Russian armies crushed the forces of Napoleon in the "Fatherland War" of 1812, and during World War I they played a key role in the struggle against the hordes of Kaiser William II. Above all, however, in Russian and Soviet history, loomed the Red Army which earned and rightly deserved the title "the savior of mankind," for, during the Second World War, it prevented the triumph of fascism and thus saved the world from enslavement.²

Otechestvennoy Voiny 1812 Goda," Bol'shevik, No. 15 (August, 1951), pp. 21-35; E.V. Tarle, "Pis'mo v Redaktsiyu Zhurnala 'Bol'shevik,'" Bol'shevik, No. 19 (October, 1951), pp. 71-77; "Ot Redaktsii Zhurnala 'Bol'shevik,'" Bol'shevik, No. 19 (October, 1951), pp. 77-80.

²Sochineniya, Vol. I, pp. XXXIV and XXXV; Sochineniya, Vol. XII, pp. 7-8; Sochineniya, Vol. XII, "9 Maya," pp. 218-222; Sochineniya, Vol. XII, "SSSR-Mirovaya Derzhava," pp. 239-

A week after Winston Churchill delivered his "Iron Curtain" speech at Fulton, Missouri, Tarle wrote a critique of it for the Party in Izvestiia.³ He contended that Churchill had two major objectives: he tried to create an anti-Soviet climate of opinion in the United States to destroy the traditional friendship which existed between the American and Russian people; and he deliberately attempted to maneuver America's policy makers into taking an uncompromising stand in their relations with the Soviet Union. Eventually this situation would lead to a major confrontation between the two states and, as a consequence, a third world war would begin.⁴ According to Tarle, a showdown between Russia and America was unnecessary because both powers had traditionally enjoyed friendly relations despite the fact that since the Bolshevik Revolution, reactionary circles in the United States had been hostile to the Soviet Union. The case of Great Britain, however, was vastly different. Historically, England had been the natural enemy of Russia and America and, for that reason, Tarle argued for the maintenance and continuation of cordial

248; Frederick C. Barghoorn, "Great Russian Messianism in Postwar Soviet Ideology," Continuity and Change in Soviet Thought, ed. Ernest J. Simmons (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1955), p. 540.

³Sochineniya, Vol. XII, "Po Povodu Rechi Cherrchillya," pp. 211-218.

⁴Ibid., p. 215.

relations between the two states. It also appeared that Tarle was hinting about the possibility of the conclusion of an anti-British pact between the United States and the Soviet Union.⁵ From the vantage point of the Soviet government in the spring of 1946, Great Britain was the foe, not the United States. It was Churchill, who, after all, had warned the West of Russia's aggressive designs and had suggested in his "Iron Curtain Speech" that the United States take the lead to check any Soviet attempt to dominate Europe.

For a number of reasons, Tarle's optimistic observations about the possibility of continued Soviet-American friendship and cooperation never materialized. In the summer of 1946, Andrei Zhdanov, Stalin's chief assistant, launched a full scale anti-Western ideological campaign which set the stage for the Cold War.⁶ The following year, Russian-American relations worsened when President Truman decided that the United States must take an active role in European affairs to prevent any further Soviet expansion, especially in the area of the Balkans. The Truman Doctrine was announced precisely for this purpose. It was designed to supply economic and technical assistance to Greece, then threatened by Communist insurrectants who were being supported by Moscow, and to Turkey, which was being subjected to constant Soviet diplomatic pressure.

⁵Ibid., pp. 215-222.

⁶See Chapter I, pp. 27-29.

Two months after the Truman declaration, the Marshall Plan, a long range coordinated program of massive aid aimed at bolstering the economic recovery of Europe, was inaugurated.

The introduction of the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan ended any hope for a détente between the United States and the Soviet Union. The Truman Doctrine was denounced in the Soviet press as a

new intrusion of the United States into the internal affairs of other states, a violation of the United Nations Charter, and an example of the post-war imperialistic policy of the United States.⁷

The Marshall Plan was condemned as

an American scheme to control Europe, an attempt to divide Europe into two camps, and a plot by Wall Street and American monopolies to avert the approaching depression.⁸

Soon after the Truman proclamation and the introduction of the Marshall Plan, Tarle became the Party historian for foreign affairs. Until his death in 1955, he defended the "peaceful" objectives of Soviet foreign policy, attacked the aggressive aims of American diplomacy, and voiced Stalin's view that the Soviet Union was a beleaguered fortress of

⁷See editorials in Pravda, Izvestiia, and other newspapers and journals following the announcement of the Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan.

⁸Ibid., "Zhdanov on the Founding of the Cominform," Russia and the West from Peter to Khrushchev, ed. L. Jay Oliva (Boston: D.C. Heath and Company, 1965), pp. 241-243.

socialism existing in the midst of a hostile capitalist world.⁹ The first significant article written by Tarle in this vein appeared in Izvestiia on New Years Day of 1948.¹⁰ In it, he attacked Truman, Marshall, Vandenberg, Hoover, Dulles, and Dewey, the chief architects and spokesmen for United States expansionism and imperialism.¹¹

If the tireless activities of Truman, Marshall, and numerous representatives and senators of both branches of Congress has been to bring about some kind of consolidation of the forces of world reaction, then there is no way for the ringleaders of this policy to try to disguise it in any way. This has¹² been their major political goal for the past year.

Tarle contended that the Marshall Plan was designed to "liquidate the independence of all states and Bizonia was created for the purpose of resurrecting German terror once again."¹³ As for the future, he wrote,

The struggle between two world outlooks and two systems, the struggle of ideologies and the diplomatic struggle, will naturally continue. However, the results of 1947 show quite clearly the consolidation of the

⁹Sochineniya, Vol. I, pp. XXXII-XXXV; Sochineniya, Vol. XII, pp. 7-8; Barghoorn, "The Soviet Union Between War and Cold War," p. 2.

¹⁰"Bor'ba za Mir i Demokratiyu," Sochineniya, Vol. XII, pp. 254-258.

¹¹Ibid., p. 254.

¹²Ibid., p. 256.

¹³"Konets Balkanskoy Porokhovoy Bochki," Sochineniya, Vol. XII, p. 261.

forces of world democracy which is an ill omen for the forces of reaction gathered together under the banner of Wall Street. People do not want to serve the God of war and gold. The struggle for peace and for democracy now, in essence, becomes the equivalent concept.¹⁴

In 1948 a revised edition of Tarle's biography of Talleyrand, based on many previously unknown sources discovered by the author in the Russian Archives, was published.¹⁵ Tarle apparently rewrote his previous (1939) study of Talleyrand to foster the anti-Western line adopted by the regime. The work obviously reflected the Party's historical directives concerning the way Soviet scholars ought to interpret European history and those significant personalities of the past who had been glorified in numerous books written by "bourgeois" historians of the West.¹⁶ Thus, one objective of the Talleyrand biography was to destroy the legendary "genius like"

¹⁴"Bor'ba za Mir i Demokratiyu," Sochineniya, Vol. XII, p. 258.

¹⁵E.V. Tarle, Talleyrand (Moskva-Leningrad: Akademii Nauk SSSR, 1948); Sochineniya, Vol. XI, pp. 11-232; Jacques Godechot, Review of Talleyrand, by E.V. Tarle, Annales Historiques de la Revolution Francaise, XXXIII (January-March, 1961), p. 136; Franco Venturi, "E.V. Tarle," Historiens Du XX Siècle (Genève: L'Institut d'Historie de la Faculté des Lettres de L'Université de Genève, 1966), p. 135.

¹⁶Sochineniya, Vol. I, p. XXVIII; See Chapter I, pp. 26-34; Godechot, Review of Talleyrand, p. 136; A. Molok, Review of Talleyrand, by E.V. Tarle, Voprosy Istorii, No. 10 (October, 1948), p. 157; D. Fedotoff White, Review of Talleyrand, by E.V. Tarle, The American Historical Review, LX (October, 1949), p. 125; Venturi, "Evgeni V. Tarle," p. 217.

image of Talleyrand, which, in Tarle's view, had been created in the works of such well-known "bourgeois" historians as Crane Brinton, Duff Cooper, d'Emile Dard, Guglielmo Ferrero, and others.¹⁷ Tarle portrayed Talleyrand as one of the "founders of bourgeois diplomacy" whose entire career as a statesman was predicated on "bourgeois principles," namely, acts of treachery and deceit, which were so typical of the methods employed by current diplomats of the Western powers.¹⁸

Another purpose in revising the biography of Talleyrand, according to Tarle, was "to distinguish Talleyrand's style of diplomacy from the traditional practices of the past which made him a successful diplomat."¹⁹ Tarle wrote,

Talleyrand was a diplomat who ascended from the bourgeois class at the beginning of the period of middle class domination, the triumph of capitalism, and the downfall of the feudal-manorial system. It was Talleyrand who first discovered the modifications which would take place in old diplomatic practices and precisely the direction in which these practices would follow.²⁰

Although Talleyrand double-crossed almost everyone he served, and became wealthy by selling secret documents to the enemies

¹⁷ Sochineniya, Vol. XI, pp. 228-232; Godechot, Review of Talleyrand, pp. 137-138.

¹⁸ Sochineniya, Vol. I, p. XXVIII.

¹⁹ Sochineniya, Vol. XI, "Taleiran--Diplomat Rannego Burzhuaznogo Perioda," p. 11.

²⁰ Ibid.

of France, Tarle argued that he never betrayed his class interests which were those of the aspiring bourgeoisie. Talleyrand believed that the victory of the middle class was inevitable. In Tarle's opinion then, the key to Talleyrand's successes was derived from the fact that he was able to adjust to the changing socio-economic conditions marked by the rise to prominence of the middle class.²¹

Despite the fact that the biography of Talleyrand was a good example of Cold War historiography, Western historians, nevertheless, reviewed it favorably. Jacques Godechot claimed that

after one reads beyond the initial pages where Marxist-Leninist principles of history are strongly asserted, Tarle's biography of Talleyrand is scarcely different from any work which would be written by a conscientious historian, regardless of the country.²²

D. Fedotoff White stated,

After offering . . . Marxist-Leninist propositions, Tarle, having done what is considered the right thing in Soviet Russia, proceeds to write a brilliant and well-informed popular life of Talleyrand in a clear, readable prose In short, this book is an interesting, if one sided, story of Talleyrand's life.²³

Franco Venturi asserted, "One could accept a Marxist framework,

²¹Ibid; See also Godechot's and White's Review of Talleyrand.

²²Godechot, Review of Talleyrand, p. 136.

²³White, Review of Talleyrand, p. 126.

and still write a book full of movement and life. Tarle has accomplished this in his unbiased interpretation of Talleyrand."²⁴ One Soviet historian, on the other hand, who evaluated the book in light of its political importance, perhaps came closer to the true meaning of the work.

In his book, E.V. Tarle debunks the cult of Talleyrand popularized in America. He brings down the father of bourgeois diplomacy from his pedestal and exposes those corrupters of a historical figure by showing who the bourgeois chooses for its hero. Tarle also strikes a blow at the unprincipled self-interests of contemporary imperialistic diplomacy. He understands perfectly that the time of complete domination by bourgeois diplomacy has already gone forever and that in the world today the most progressive influence lies in Soviet diplomacy which expresses the interests of socialist societies.²⁵

As for any Soviet criticism of the biography, another reviewer wrote,

It is only a pity that the author did not develop in greater detail his thesis that Talleyrand, as one of the founders of bourgeois diplomacy in France, employed methods in his activities which were different from the methods of feudal-absolutist diplomacy.²⁶

Tarle's biography of Talleyrand was his last major monograph to deal with the subject of Western diplomacy. However, as the Cold War intensified, he began to publish numerous short, popular articles for the Party, on the same

²⁴Venturi, "E.V. Tarle," Historians Du XX Siècle, p. 135.

²⁵Sochineniya, Vol. I, p. XXVIII.

²⁶Molok, Review of Talleyrand, p. 160.

topic, which appeared in newspapers and journals. In all of them, Tarle repeatedly denounced Western foreign policy, planned and organized by reactionary circles in both the Pentagon and Wall Street for the purpose of waging war against Russia, and praised Soviet diplomacy which, by its nature, consistently struggled for peaceful solutions.

When a scheme for Franco-German cooperation was formulated, Tarle condemned the plan in an essay published in Izvestiia entitled "The European Council and Franco-German Relations."²⁷

Tarle resurrected an old thesis which viewed France and Germany as traditional enemies. In reality, he argued, the plan was a step toward the revival of German militarism. Any agreement between the two states was necessary in the long range preparation for a third world war in which German and French armies would be used as cannon fodder by the United States against the Soviet Union. France in this case, said Tarle, was merely a tool of Wall Street and the "gangster" bankers of Paris. He concluded the article, reminding the French that the Soviet Union had saved them from "Hitlerism."²⁸

In December 1949, Tarle wrote an essay in Trud entitled,

²⁷ E.V. Tarle, "Evropeiskii Sovet i Franko-Germanskii Otnosheniya," Izvestiia, September 11, 1949, p. 3.

²⁸ Ibid.; See also E.V. Tarle, "Severo-Atlanticheskii Pakt," Novyi Mir, No. 5 (January, 1949), pp. 270-272; E.V. Tarle, "Voll-Strit-Khozyain S.Sh.A.," Novyi Mir, No. 10 (July, 1949), pp. 260-262.

"The Victorious Stalinist Foreign Policy."²⁹ The article was important because, for the first time, Tarle glorified Stalin, a mandatory order of the Party, especially for historians, and in keeping with the intensification of the "cult of the personality."³⁰ Tarle asserted,

Comrade Stalin will go down in the history of world politics as not only an exceptional strategist and organizer of unparalleled victories, but also as a wise leader of the foreign policy of the first socialist state. Stalin approaches the seventieth birthday of his glorious life at the pinnacle of his political successes, strength, and glory. The gigantic scale of these successes in the sphere of foreign policy is explained by the striking variety and exceptional power of his gifts. A scientific analysis gave Stalin a breadth of historical foresight of which there is no sign among the leaders of the capitalist camp.³¹

After his tribute to Stalin, Tarle promptly condemned United States policy. He denounced Truman's order to drop the Atom Bomb on the defenseless population of Hiroshima which killed over ninety thousand innocent civilians. According to Tarle, the leaders of the United States, particularly Forrestal,

²⁹CDSP, Vol. I, No. 35 (January 24, 1950), pp. 44-45; E.V. Tarle, "The Victorious Stalinist Foreign Policy," Trud, December 21, 1949, p. 4. It is interesting to note that this particular article does not appear in the bibliography compiled by the editors of the collected works of Tarle. Perhaps it was omitted for political reasons. During the time of publication, Stalin and the "cult of the personality" were denounced by Khrushchev and the Party.

³⁰See Chapter I, pp. 33-34.

³¹Tarle, "The Victorious Stalinist Foreign Policy," p. 4.

wished to annihilate the people of the Soviet Union in the same manner.³² Tarle ended the article by spelling out the objectives of Soviet diplomacy.

The main motive of the foreign policy of our state is to struggle for the establishment of an enduring peace Soviet diplomacy categorically states that the principle of full national independence of great and small powers is an axiom which does not require any proof.³³

After Tarle published his first New Years Day article, it seemed that a tradition had been established. On the first day of the year, the Party expected him to write an essay in which he analyzed and compared the policies of the Soviet Union with the United States. In 1950, an excellent example of this type of literature, "Two Worlds--Two Tallies," appeared in the first issue of Izvestiia.³⁴ Tarle argued that during the past year, the United States and its puppets had suffered repeated setbacks. American imperialism had been crushed in China and the Marshall Plan had failed. The renegade and and fascist Tito, along with his clique, had been exposed by

³² Ibid.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ E.V. Tarle, "Dva Mira-Dva Itoga," Izvestiia, January 1, 1950, p. 2; See also the following articles which appeared on New Years Day: E.V. Tarle, "K Istorii Antisovetskoy Politiki Amerikanskogo Imperializma," Bol'shevik, No. 1 (January, 1951), pp. 57-69; E.V. Tarle, "Filosofy Atomnoy Bomby v Razdume i na Rasput'e," Voprosy Filosofii, No. 1 (January-February, 1952), pp. 141-144.

Stalin as a lackey of United States imperialism. The refusal of the United States to share its Atom Bomb secrets with Great Britain, revealed the inherent weakness of NATO. In fact, Tarle contended, Franco-German and Anglo-American differences were so pronounced, that they precluded any possibility for these states to reach a joint military agreement, or for that matter, a common policy. Whereas United States imperialism had failed, Tarle asserted that the peaceful foreign policy of the Soviet Union had been successful. He pointed to the creation of the German Democratic Republic and the establishment of friendly relations with China as examples of pacific Russian victories, scored at the expense of the bellicose West. Under Stalin's leadership, the Soviet Union had made its intentions quite clear to the world at the United Nations. It had repeatedly argued to ban the Atom Bomb and for all states to devote their energies to "peaceful domestic reconstruction."³⁵

When the Party unleashed its violent attack against all manifestations of bourgeois culture, Tarle wrote several articles to support this policy. His attention, however, was centered on Western historiography, particularly its British and American spokesmen, labeled by Tarle as "falsifiers of

³⁵Tarle, "Dva-Mira-Dva Itoga," p. 2.

history."³⁶ In his first essay of this type, entitled "English Falsification concerning the Origin of the Crimean War," published in Voprosy Istorii, he assessed G.H. Temperley's and G.B. Henderson's new book, Crimean War Diplomacy and Other Historical Essays.³⁷ Tarle also evaluated Temperley's England and the Near East: The Crimea, a work which he had reviewed favorably in Istorik Marksist in 1937.³⁸ Later he revised his opinion of the book in his two volume study of the Crimean War. In this publication, Tarle not only reaffirmed his negative judgment of the Temperley work, but, for good measure, he also condemned the recent Henderson-Temperley study as well.

These two new samples of British writing concerning the Crimean War are useful in two respects; in the first place, they show how not to write the history of the origin of the great mid-nineteenth century clash; in the second place, they are an added reminder to Soviet scholars of their vital duty of scholarship and to the fatherland. That duty is to struggle against the poisonous weapons of historical falsification, concealment, and distortion, which our enemies use so often in depicting the Russian past and present under all kinds of covers and for a variety of reasons.³⁹

³⁶E.V. Tarle, "Angliiskie Fal'sifikatsii o Nachale Krymskoy Voyny," Voprosy Istorii, No. 3 (1949), pp. 119-125; E.V. Tarle, "Vtoraya Mirovaya Voyna v Krivom Zerkale" (Po povodu fal'sifikatsii istorii Vtoroy mirovoy voyny anglo-amer. istoriografiei), Bol'shevik, No. 21 (November, 1949), pp. 60-70; Tarle, "K Istorii Antisovetskoy Politiki Amerikanskogo Imperializma, pp. 71-77.

³⁷Tarle, "Angliiskie Fal'sifikatsii o Nachale Krymskoy Voyny," pp. 119-125.

³⁸See Chapter V, p. 160.

³⁹Tarle, "Angliiskie Fal'sifikatsii o Nachale Krymskoy Voyny, p. 125.

In another article, Tarle attacked the Western interpretation of the Second World War.⁴⁰ He argued that the works produced on this subject by American, British, and French historians, "the falsifiers of history," were merely "scientific rubbish" and "cock and bull stories."⁴¹ To support this thesis, Tarle stated that these historians slandered the Soviet Union by contending that its foreign policy was an extension of the aggressive tendencies of Tsarist diplomacy. Thus, the Soviet Union was made to appear as a state which sought to aggrandize its territory.

Tarle defended the conclusion of the Non-Aggression Pact with Nazi Germany in 1939. He declared that at the time, Great Britain and France, in secret collusion with the United States, had egged Hitler on to attack the Soviet Union. According to Tarle, this was exactly the current policy of these states. Their purpose in creating the West German Federation was to revive Hitlerism in order to prepare for another attack on the Soviet Union.⁴²

In Tarle's opinion, the anti-Soviet literature published in the United States and Great Britain had two specific aims. First,

⁴⁰Tarle, "Vtoraya Mirovaya Voyna v Krivom Zerkale," pp. 66-70.

⁴¹Ibid., pp. 60-61.

⁴²Ibid., p. 65.

to show that the role of the Soviet Union during World War II was by no means great and its participation was not as indispensable to victory as the whole world admitted it to have been in 1945 when Hitlerite Germany capitulated.⁴³

And second,

to show that both Western Europe and the United States committed a terrible blunder in allowing Russia to insist on Germany's unconditional surrender instead of concluding peace and restoring the German war machine for future German revenge upon the Soviet Union in conjunction with the Anglo-Saxons.⁴⁴

Tarle concluded the article and reminded the Western powers that Soviet armies had saved their forces from almost certain defeat during the Battle of the Bulge after several German divisions had broken through American lines.⁴⁵

Tarle also reprimanded American historians of Soviet Russia who maintained that the attitude of the United States government toward the Soviet regime "was once based on the principle of benevolent non-intervention in Russian affairs and on an unwillingness to harm in any way the young Soviet Republic."⁴⁶ This interpretation was "a lie and a fabricated legend," he maintained.⁴⁷ The truth, Tarle claimed, was

⁴³Ibid., pp. 66-67.

⁴⁴Ibid.

⁴⁵Ibid., p. 69.

⁴⁶Tarle, "K Istorii Antisovetskoy Politiki Amerikanskogo Imperializma," pp. 57-58.

⁴⁷Ibid., p. 58.

that since the Bolshevik Revolution, the United States had deliberately plotted against the Soviet government and, on occasions, even resorted to force in an attempt to crush it. Between 1918 and 1921, American troops were dispatched to Northern Russia and Siberia; during the Civil War, the United States actively supported counter-revolutionary forces. In the 1930's, it extended unlimited credit to Nazi Germany, which helped Hitler immeasurably to prepare for the attack on the Soviet Union. Even during the "Great Fatherland War" the United States begrudgingly assisted the Soviet Union. Its leaders realized that without Soviet aid, the United States could never hope to defeat the combined forces of Germany, Italy, and Japan. As for the Cold War, Tarle claimed that it began because "Wall Street, the State Department, President Truman, and the semi-official imperialist American press were organized to harass the Soviet Union."⁴⁸ In short then, from 1917 to 1950 American ruling circles conspired to destroy the Soviet Union.⁴⁹

Soon after the end of World War II, the Party, in a move reminiscent of the thirties, launched a new campaign to stimulate Soviet patriotism. It was expected that all

⁴⁸ Ibid., pp. 65-66.

⁴⁹ Ibid. This is the thesis of the article.

intellectuals would help to implement the program in some way, for the Party considered it to be the patriotic duty of all Soviet citizens. Naturally, an important role was assigned to the historian.⁵⁰

Several studies written by Tarle reflected this trend. More significant was the fact that he combined this aspect of post-war Soviet historiography with the Party directive which ordered the historian to denigrate Western interpretations of Russian history.⁵¹

Tarle not only shed new light on the important phases of patriotic history, but he also revised many of the conclusions made by the noble and bourgeois schools of historiography which belittled the significant part played by the Russian fleet in the struggle against the armed might of Napoleonic France on the Mediterranean Sea.⁵²

Tarle wrote many books and articles about the heroic exploits of the Russian Navy and its brilliant commanders.⁵³ A typical example was his short monograph, Admiral F.F. Ushakov on the Mediterranean Sea, 1789-1800, a work based on unpublished Naval documents, materials from the various State Historical

⁵⁰ See chapter I, pp. 28-34; Barghoorn, "Great Russian Messianism in Postwar Soviet Ideology," pp. 531-549; Barghoorn, "Stalinism and the Russian Cultural Heritage," pp. 178-203.

⁵¹ Sochineniya, Vol. I, p. XXXI; Sochineniya, Vol. X, pp. 6-8.

⁵² Sochineniya, Vol. I, pp. XXXII-XXXIII; Sochineniya, Vol. X, p. 5.

⁵³ As examples, see the following books: M. Nakhimov; Russkii Flot i Vneshnyaya Politiki Petra I; Admiral Ushakov na

Archives of the Soviet Union, Western sources, and personal papers of Ushakov, the commander of the Russian squadron during the Mediterranean expedition.⁵⁴ Besides portraying Admiral Ushakov as a great naval officer, who even surpassed the feats of his British counterpart, Lord Nelson, Tarle also showed that

the true creators of the prominent victories scored by the Russian Navy were the simple folk--seamen and non-commissioned officers--who distinguished themselves courageously, but after every battle were modest in describing their exploits.⁵⁵

On the behest of the Party in the Fall of 1949, Tarle agreed to devote most of his time to preparing a three volume study which focused on the theme of "The Russian People in the Struggle Against Aggressors from the Eighteenth to the Twentieth Centuries."⁵⁶ After accepting this assignment, Tarle wrote in the newspaper Trud, "Never in the course of my long life have I worked upon a theme of inspiration and ardor comparable to

Sredizemnom More (1798-1800); Chesmenskii Boy: Pervaya Russkaya Ekspeditsiya v Arkhipelag (1769-1774); Ekspeditsiya Admirala Senyavina v Sredizemnoe More (1805-1807).

⁵⁴ Admiral Ushakov na Sredizemnom More (1798-1800), Sochineniya, Vol. X, pp. 95-175; Sochineniya, Vol. X, pp. 5-7; Sochineniya, Vol. I, p. XXXII.

⁵⁵ Sochineniya, Vol. X, p. 5 and pp. 222-229; Tarle's glorification of the heroic exploits of the seamen and non-commissioned officers is similar to the picture he presents of the common soldier in his previous studies of Napoleon and the Crimean War.

⁵⁶ E.V. Tarle, "Podzhigatelyam Voiny ne Udastsya Zapugat' Svobodolyubivye Narody," Trud, October 2, 1949, p. 2; Sochineniya, Vol. I, p. XXXIII.

this."⁵⁷ The projected plan for this multi-volume work was

to show how the patriotic efforts of the masses in the struggle for national independence during three critical periods of history, the Swedish invasion of 1708-1709, the Napoleonic invasion of 1812, and the German-Fascist invasion of 1941, helped to foil the attempts of aggressors from enslaving the Russian people.⁵⁸

Tarle never completed the project, as he died in 1955. However, in 1958 his research on the first period of history provided the basis for the posthumous publication of a long book, entitled The Great Northern War and the Swedish Invasion of Russia.⁵⁹ The heroes in the struggle against the armies of Charles XII were the Russian people and their tsar, Peter the Great. Throughout the course of the war, the peasant continuously made tremendous sacrifices, and the ordinary soldier fought bravely. Peter's dynamic personality, his ability as a military commander, and his reforms, particularly the modernization of the Russian army and the creation of a navy were likewise important factors in the decisive

⁵⁷ Tarle, "Podzhigatelyam Voyny ne Udastsya Zapugat' Svobodolyubivye Narody," p. 2.

⁵⁸ Sochineniya, Vol. I, p. XXXIII; Sochineniya, Vol. X, p. 6 and pp. 366-367; Ibid.

⁵⁹ Severnaya Voyna i Shvedskoe Nashestvie na Rossiyu Sochineniya, Vol. X, pp. 363-800; Prior to the publication of this work, Tarle wrote several articles on this theme. For example, see the following: "Severnaya Voyna i Shvedskoe Nashestvie na Rossiyu (Referat Doklada)," Vestnik Akademii Nauk SSSR, No. 7 (1949), pp. 61-63; "Karl XII v 1708-1709," Voprosy Istorii, No. 6 (1950), pp. 22-56; "Poltavskaya Pobeda," Krasnyi Flot, July 8, 1949; "Poltavskaya Pobeda," Literaturnaya Gazeta, July 9, 1949.

defeat of the Swedish invaders. In Tarle's view, this combination was too much for the Swedes and their capable leader, Charles XII, to overcome. As a result, they were forced to sue for peace on Russian terms. In glorifying the role the masses played during the Great Northern War, Tarle rejected the conclusions of such "Russian bourgeois historians" as Klyuchevsky, who contended that, "It was not the heroism of the Russian people which paved the way for the victory at Poltava, but rather the mistakes made by the inept Charles XII."⁶⁰ However, Tarle's assessment of Russia's international posture after the war with Sweden, especially its position vis a vis Great Britain was similar to Western "bourgeois historians." Like B.H. Sumner and others, he concluded that after the Treaty of Nystadt, Russia replaced Sweden as the dominant northern European state. Beginning with Peter I, Russia became a major power which played an increasingly important part in continental affairs.⁶¹

Despite his tireless activities on behalf of the regime after 1945, Tarle was nevertheless censured by the Party for certain erroneous conclusions in two of his pre-war works, Napoleon and Napoleon's Invasion of Russia. His views now conflicted with a series of Party directives which required

⁶⁰ Sochineniya, Vol. X, p. 8.

⁶¹ Ibid., pp. 6-8 and pp. 798-800.

the historian

to struggle against manifestations of survivals of pre-revolutionary liberal-bourgeois historiography which laud the West in every way and minimize Russia and to disclose an adequately critical attitude toward foreign documentation.⁶²

Tarle was attacked particularly for his interpretation of Marshall Kutuzov's strategy and leadership during the "Fatherland War" and the role that the Russian army played in it. His opinions contradicted Stalin's pronouncements concerning the military tactics he used in defeating the Germans. Interesting was the fact that during the early stages of the war, Stalin announced that Soviet setbacks were caused by inadequate war supplies and the lack of a second front. He even admitted that "our government made not a few errors, we experienced at moments a desperate situation in 1941-1942 when our army was retreating, abandoning our native villages and towns . . . because there was no other way out."⁶³ In 1947, however Stalin claimed that he had successfully employed a complex master plan during the course of World War II which was similar to the strategy used by Kutuzov in routing Napoleon's armies.

The ancient Parthians know about such a counter offensive

⁶²"Za Patrioticheskuyu Sovetskuyu Nauku," Vestnik Akademii Nauk, No. 4 (April, 1949), pp. 7-8; also quoted in Erickson, "E.V. Tarle: The Career of a Historian under the Soviet Regime," p. 210.

⁶³I. Stalin, O Velikoy Otechestvennoy Voiny Sovetskogo Soyuza (Moskva, 1952), pp. 196-197; Also quoted in Erickson, "E.V. Tarle: The Career of a Historian under the Soviet Regime," p. 210.

when they drew the Roman General Crassus and his army into the depths of their country and then striking in a counter offensive, destroyed them. Our gifted General Kutozov, who destroyed Napoleon and his army with the help of a well organized counter offensive, knew this well.⁶⁴

On the basis of this pronouncement, it was now clear that Stalin's new evaluation of Kutuzov contradicted Tarle's previous assessment of the General's strategy in the "Fatherland War." Most significant though, in light of the Party's attack on Tarle, was that after war, Stalin began to picture himself as a military genius, the savior of Russia and mankind, and the prototype of the great Marshall Kutuzov, who, "as in 1812, ordered his armies to fall back under the pressure of a stronger and better organized foe."⁶⁵ The tactics of Kutuzov were again repeated by Stalin during the Great Fatherland War and

with the help of the vastness of Russian territory, the over extension and severance of the enemy's supply lines, the severity of the climate, and the political shortsightedness, the lack of resourcefulness, and mistakes of the enemy,

the German armies were crushed.⁶⁶

Western historians have concurred that Tarle was the

⁶⁴I. Stalin, "Otvét tov. Stalina," Bol'shevik, No. 3 (February, 1947), p. 8; Also quoted in the following works: Erickson, "E.V. Tarle: The Career of a Historian under the Soviet Regime," p. 211; Mathew P. Gallagher, The Soviet History of World War II (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963), p. 52; Hollingsworth, "The Napoleonic Invasion of Russia and Recent Soviet Historical Writing," p. 39.

⁶⁵Yaresh, "The Campaign of 1812," Rewriting Russian History, p. 287.

⁶⁶Ibid., pp. 287-288.

most prominent victim of Stalin's reappraisal of Kutuzov's strategy in the "Fatherland War" and the doctrine of the counter offensive.⁶⁷ In an article written by S. Kozhukov in the Party journal Bol'shevik in 1951, Tarle was rebuked for his views of Kutuzov in his book, Napoleon's Invasion of Russia.⁶⁸ Kozhukov accused him of falsifying the history of the "Fatherland War." Tarle's uncritical use of foreign sources, particularly the works of aristocratic bourgeois historians in his book Napoleon's Invasion of Russia, and his neglect of Russian sources, according to Kozhukov,

reproduces on the fundamental questions of 1812, the erroneous and tendentious views of German, British, and French historians and memoir writers--Clausewitz, Bernhardt, Wilson, de Segur, Thiers, and others--who distorted the history of the "Fatherland War" and belittled the roles of Kutuzov, the Russian army, and the Russian people in the defeat of Napoleon's army.⁶⁹

Furthermore, and as a result, Kozhukov argued,

Deviation from the principle of a comprehensive, objective examination of materials and reliance mainly on foreign sources has led Academician Tarle into gross errors in his elucidation of the Russian peoples' patriotic war of national

⁶⁷For example see the following: Erickson, "E.V. Tarle: The Career of a Historian under the Soviet Regime," pp. 211-216; Gallagher, The Soviet History of World War II, p. 54; Hollingsworth, "The Napoleonic Invasion of Russia and Recent Soviet Historical Writing," pp. 38-40; "A New Purge of Russian History," The Economist, Vol. 161 (October 6, 1951), pp. 808-811; Mazour, Modern Russian Historiography, pp. 223-234.

⁶⁸S. Kozhukov, "K Voprose ob Otsenke Rolii M.I. Kutuzova v Otechestvennoy Voiny 1812 Goda," pp. 21-35; translated in Sidney Harcave (ed.), Readings in Russian History, Vol. I (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1962), pp. 303-312.

⁶⁹Ibid., p. 304.

liberation against Napoleon's army, an army which had been carrying out the predatory, aggressive aims of the counter revolutionary bourgeoisie of France.⁷⁰

The attack on Tarle was also marked by several references to Stalin's views about the doctrine of the counter offensive. Thus, Kozhukov criticized him for deviating from the historical truth in describing Kutuzov's deeds, especially his strategy which was formulated in preparation for the counter offensive and for the eventual knockout blow to the forces of Napoleon.⁷¹

An objective study of the data on 1812, both published and archival, exposes the anti-scientific notions of Tarle's conceptions and shows that it was Kutuzov who destroyed Napoleon's army by a well prepared counter offensive and by bold pursuit of the enemy along a line parallel to his line of retreat.⁷²

Kozhukov also contended that Kutuzov was a far superior tactician than Napoleon.

Kutuzov was the most outstanding military leader of his time who proved beyond a doubt that Russian military science was, and still is, superior to Western European military science.⁷³

Tarle failed to show that Kutuzov was a better strategist than Napoleon, and thus he "minimized the role of the heroic Russian people and their army in the defeat of Napoleon and the liberation of the enslaved peoples of Europe from the Napoleonic yoke."⁷⁴

⁷⁰Ibid., p. 305.

⁷¹Ibid., p. 306.

⁷²Ibid., p. 311.

⁷³Ibid., p. 306.

⁷⁴Ibid., p. 311; The relevance of this statement is important in light of the Soviet victory over Nazi Germany.

Kozhukov also admonished Tarle for overemphasizing such factors as the vast spaces of Russia, cold, hunger, illness, and desertion, which were important but "by no means the decisive significance that Tarle tries to give to them."⁷⁵ These factors, as well as Kutuzov's role as a military leader, were played down by Tarle in his 1938 work on Napoleon in which he stressed the resistance of the Russian masses, especially the heroism of the peasant.⁷⁶

In relieving Napoleon of the responsibility for the destruction and the burning of Moscow, Kozhukov argued that Tarle's book "repeats inventions of Western European historians representing Napoleon as a generous military leader."⁷⁷ In repeating these legends about the supposed humanity of Napoleon, "Tarle in every way whitewashes him, trying to convince the reader that Napoleon's army started burning towns only during the retreat from Moscow."⁷⁸ Although many Russians destroyed possessions which would have been useful to the French, they did not follow a scorched earth policy as maintained by Tarle.

Numerous documents indicate that Napoleon's army destroyed, plundered, and burned the towns and villages of Russia not only after his retreat from Moscow, but also during his advance on Moscow.⁷⁹

⁷⁵Ibid., p. 309.

⁷⁶See Chapter V, pp. 135-143.

⁷⁷Harcave, Readings in Russian History, p. 309.

⁷⁸Ibid., p. 307.

⁷⁹Ibid., p. 309.

In a letter addressed to the editors of Bol'shevik in October of the same year, Tarle replied to Kozhukov's criticism of his book, Napoleon's Invasion of Russia.⁸⁰ He was aware of the fact that after the conclusion of World War II a number of previously unknown documents about Kutuzov had been discovered.⁸¹ Tarle also acknowledged that "in 1947 Josef Vissarionovich Stalin gave a formula which shed a new and clear light on the most important questions of the history of 1812."⁸² He referred to his projected three volume study based on the theme, "The Russian People in the Struggle Against Aggressors from the Eighteenth to the Twentieth Century" and declared that he was in the process of writing the second book, to be entitled "The Invasion of 1812 and the Rout of Napoleon in Russia."

It is not a revised edition, but a new study which will probably be more than twice the length of my old book, and even longer than the book I am now publishing on the Swedish invasion.⁸³

As for the contents of the new work, Tarle stated that the plan for the counter offensive "will occupy its due place for the first time."⁸⁴ He also remarked that he was dedicating

⁸⁰ Tarle, "Pis'mo v Redaktsiyu Zhurnala Bol'shevik," pp. 71-77.

⁸¹ Ibid., p. 71.

⁸² Ibid., p. 72.

⁸³ Ibid., p. 71.

⁸⁴ Ibid.

a special chapter to Kutuzov, "a chapter which I am beginning not from 1812, but from much earlier. Kutuzov was a great man, not only as a strategist and tactician, but also as a diplomat."⁸⁵

Tarle recognized that some of his former conclusions needed revision, but he also asserted that "Comrade Kozhukov intentionally and completely distorts my general view of the war of 1812."⁸⁶ To support his contentions, Tarle gave several examples from his work on Napoleon. He furthermore commented about his use of sources.

Russian sources, both from archives and libraries are the basis of my new book, just as they were the foundation of my old book. But to exclude foreign sources altogether, merely because they are foreign, is, in my opinion, incorrect. Sometimes the involuntary enemy admission of Russian successes can be particularly valuable.⁸⁷

Tarle concluded his letter to the editors of Bol'shevik, stating that,

Comrade Kozhukov systematically ignores what I say and frequently repeat in my book, but he attributes to me things I never even thought of saying, and then triumphantly refutes them. Those who have read my book (and there are many, especially in the Army during the war) will know my attitude to the resistance of the Russian people, to Kutuzov, and to the invading enemy. But those who have not read my book or who have forgotten my true words have the right to expect that I should recall what my opinion really was without any distortions. For this reason alone I have quoted here my own thoughts and not those attributed to me by Kozhukov.⁸⁸

⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁸⁶ Ibid., p. 72.

⁸⁷ Ibid., p. 73.

⁸⁸ Ibid., p. 76.

The editors of Bol'shevik replied quickly to Tarle's letter. They were pleased that he admitted the necessity for revising his opinions about the war of 1812, particularly Kutuzov's role in it, and that he had started to write a new work on this subject.⁸⁹ However, they agreed with Kozhukov, repeated his accusations, and declared that Tarle's objections were groundless.

It is quite impossible to agree with Academician Tarle when he attempts to explain the serious errors in his book by the haste allegedly imposed on him by the publishers and also by lack of knowledge of many sources on the history of 1812. The fundamental reason for the errors made in Napoleon's Invasion of Russia is in our view, not haste or insufficient knowledge and use of sources, but an uncritical handling of sources, and incorrect interpretation of sources.⁹⁰

Tarle never completed his proposed new book on Napoleon. He wrote, however, a long article in Voprosy Istorii, entitled "Michael Kutuzov--General and Diplomat," which expressed the views of Kozhukov and the editors of Bol'shevik.⁹¹ "Thus Tarle had not only recanted in the Party press to satisfy his critics, but their remarks influenced his scholarly writings."⁹² In the essay, Tarle portrayed Kutuzov as a great Russian patriot, an

⁸⁹"Ot Redaktsii Zhurnala Bol'shevik," pp. 77-78.

⁹⁰Ibid., pp. 79-80.

⁹¹E.V. Tarle, "Mikhael Illarionovich Kutuzov--Polkovodets i Diplomat," Voprosy Istorii, No. 3 (March, 1952), pp. 34-82.

⁹²Erickson, "E.V. Tarle: The Career of a Historian under the Soviet Regime," p. 213.

outstanding military leader and a skilled diplomat "whose talents had been concealed by writers in foreign countries and masked even more dishonestly than those of Suvorov or Peter the Great."⁹³ Tarle stressed that Kutuzov's military strategy was distinctly Russian and for this reason "he defeated the best army and the best military leader in the world at the time." In 1936 Tarle depicted Napoleon "as the greatest military genius in world history."⁹⁴

Tarle praised Kutuzov's diplomacy, which was contrary to what he wrote in 1938. In 1952, he stated,

In the range of all the history of Russia, undoubtedly there was not a diplomat more talented than Kutuzov. His aim first was to destroy Napoleon's armies in Russia, and then to liberate Europe from his predatory Empire.⁹⁵

In 1938 he wrote,

Kutuzov had no intention of liberating Europe, this he regarded as the business of Europe itself. . . . Kutuzov did not even desire a close contact with the rear guard of the retreating French Emperor. His reluctance did not arise from cowardice. From his point of view, which he had adopted after deep meditation, new engagements with the enemy were unnecessary.⁹⁶

⁹³Tarle, "Mikhael Illarionovich Kutuzov--Polkovodets i Diplomat," pp. 81-82; Also quoted in Erickson, "E.V. Tarle: The Career of a Historian under the Soviet Regime," p. 214.

⁹⁴Tarle, Bonaparte, p. 10; Also quoted in Erickson, "E.V. Tarle: The Career of a Historian Under the Soviet Regime," p. 214.

⁹⁵Tarle, "Mikhael Illarionovich Kutuzov--Polkovodets i Diplomat," p. 68; Also quoted in Erickson, "E.V. Tarle: The Career of a Historian under the Soviet Regime," p. 214.

⁹⁶Tarle, Nashestvie Napoleona na Rossiyu, pp. 288-289.

Tarle changed his interpretations of the "Fatherland War" and of Kutuzov in the article to prevent any further attacks on him by the Party. His new views of Kutuzov's role in the War of 1812 conformed to the political trends in Soviet historiography at the time. Perhaps Tarle well remembered his experiences between 1928 and 1931 and feared the possibility of being arrested, tried, and exiled once more. As for his conclusions, they

were primarily value judgments about events or individuals connected with Napoleon's invasion of Russia; and even though Tarle mentioned the use of a variety of original sources, he never supported his findings with this new evidence.⁹⁷

Despite the Party's attack, Tarle continued to remain at his teaching post. Until his retirement in 1953, because of illness, he taught courses in modern European history, gave special lectures, conducted seminars, and advised graduate students at Leningrad State University, Moscow State University, and the Moscow Institute of International Relations.⁹⁸ He was instrumental in training many of the present day Soviet historians.⁹⁹ For his work, Tarle was decorated three times with the Stalin prize, awarded the Order of Lenin on his seventy-fifth birthday, and was given honorary degrees from the Sorbonne,

⁹⁷Erickson, "E.V. Tarle: The Career of a Historian under the Soviet Regime," p. 215.

⁹⁸Sochineniya, Vol. I, p. XXXII; Manfred, "Evgenii Viktorovich Tarle," p. 17.

⁹⁹The book edited by Manfred is a Festschrift in Tarle's honor by his former students.

the Universities of Brno, Oslo, Algiers, and Prague.¹⁰⁰

Just before his death, Tarle wrote a short article while he was in the hospital in which he analyzed Soviet diplomacy since the Bolshevik Revolution.¹⁰¹ In Tarle's view, from the Lenin Peace Decrees adopted on January 8, 1917,

Soviet diplomacy has operated on the basis of true democratic principles which has been the great wish of millions of people from all ends of our planet. /This idea/ has been fostered and encouraged by Soviet diplomacy which has constantly aimed in the direction of the creation of collective security in order to strengthen cooperation among all states.¹⁰²

On January 6, 1955, E.V. Tarle died. Two days later, a laudatory obituary appeared in a short column in Izvestiia which conveniently failed to mention any of the difficulties he encountered during his long productive career.¹⁰³

Academician Eugene Viktorovich Tarle, outstanding Soviet scholar and historian, remarkable teacher and publicist and member of the Soviet Peace Committee, has passed away in his 80th year, after a severe illness.

During his long years of creative life, Academician Tarle wrote many valuable scholarly works on the history of our homeland and the countries of Western Europe during the Middle Ages, recent, and modern times. The most important of these works are his basic researches into the

¹⁰⁰ Sochineniya, Vol. I, p. XXXV; Manfred, "Evgenii Viktorovich Tarle," p. 17.

¹⁰¹ "Nasha Diplomatiya," Sochineniya, Vol. XII, pp. 395-400.

¹⁰² Ibid., p. 400.

¹⁰³ CDSP, Vol. XII, No. 1 (February 16, 1955), p. 39. "Obituary--E.V. Tarle," Izvestiia, January 8, 1955, p. 4.

history of the Fatherland War of 1812, and of the Crimean War 1853-1856. Many books by Academician Tarle have become widely known abroad, as well as in the Soviet Union. As a Professor at Leningrad and Moscow Universities, E.V. Tarle accomplished a great deal of work in training cadres of Soviet historians.

Academician Tarle had a remarkable combination of brilliant talent as an historian and outstanding ability as a journalist, acutely and passionately responsive to major events in international political life. During the Great Fatherland War, he wrote several brilliant patriotic articles. After the war, Academician Tarle constantly exposed the plots of the imperialist instigators of a new world war.

The scholarly services of E.V. Tarle, who made a great contribution to the study of world history, were recognized by scholars throughout the world. He was elected a Member of the Academy of Sciences in Oslo, Corresponding Member of the British Academy for Encouraging Historical, Philosophical and Philological Sciences, and was given honorary doctorates from several Universities. The Soviet government highly valued the work of Academician E.V. Tarle and awarded him three Orders of Lenin, two Orders of the Red Banner of Labor, and other medals.

Outstanding historian and remarkable publicist, scholar-patriot, active fighter for the cause of peace, tireless worker, man of great charm--thus Academician Tarle will forever remain in our memory.¹⁰⁴

Perhaps E.V. Tarle's relationship with the regime is the best example of the problems which have confronted the historian in the Soviet Union. Since the Bolshevik Revolution, and particularly after 1928, the historian has been used to promote the domestic and foreign line of the Party. Thus, until the present day, the rôle of the historian has been circumscribed, as he must write history within a framework of political relevance in order to explain the past. And although the rehabilitation of

¹⁰⁴Ibid.

Pokrovsky has not occurred as yet, his statement that "history is politics projected into the past" expresses the way in which the Party has and still views the meaning of history and thus the precise duties of the historian in explaining events is to justify the policies of the regime.

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AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL STATEMENT

I was born in Boston, Massachusetts on April 30, 1931. I attended the Boston Public Schools and was graduated from English High in 1948. After working for three years, I joined the United States Air Force in 1952 and served for four years. In 1956, I enrolled at Northeastern University where I was graduated with honor in 1961. I received a fellowship for my Masters at Northeastern University and had the degree conferred in 1963. From 1963 to 1965 I was a teaching fellow at Wayne State University and during the 1965 - 1966 academic year I was appointed as an instructor in history.

Currently I am assistant professor of History at Southampton College of Long Island University. I belong to Phi Alpha Theta, the National Honor History Society and Pi Sigma Alpha, the National Honor Political Science Society. I am a member of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, the Northeastern Conference of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, the American Historical Association, and the American Association of University Professors.

I have written two book reviews which appeared in the March and May, 1968 issues of Social Education. In June of this year, I received a faculty research grant. I expect to

publish a book which will be a collection of previously unpublished Russian documents dealing with the foreign policy of Catherine the Great.

I am married and have two children.

